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NATURAL HISTORY AND THE STATE OF NATURE 
In the second section of chapter III above, we re-
ferred to Locke's apparent relegation of morality to the 
periphery of his concern in writing the Essay. Locke seems 
in effect to promise that however novel in other respects 
may be his empiricist account of natural science, that 
account leaves relatively inviolate the province of moral-
ity; he declares in closing that the study of nature is 
"wholly separate and distinct" (4.21.5) from the science of 
ethics or morality. We have noted too that Locke's asser-
tions of the possibility of a demonstrative, mixed-mode 
science of morality appear to entail an insistence on 
precisely such a strict separation of the respective 
sciences of morality and nature.1 In fact, however, there 
are significant ambiguities in Locke's presentation of this 
proposal. To say the least, it is by no means clear that 
he does insist upon the total or even decisive abstraction 
of morality from nature; indeed we may wonder whether his 
occasional qualifications of this proposal, taken together, 
serve ultimately to undermine in principle any attempt at 
such an abstraction. In the midst of his chapter "Of the 
lsee chapter III above, especially pp. 99-106. 
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Improvement of Our Knowledge, " for instance, Locke pro-
fesses to "doubt not, but if a right method were taken," 
that not all, but only "a great part of Morality" might be 
demonstrated "to a considering Man" with a clarity equal to 
that of a mathematical demonstration (4.12.8). Similarly, 
in his discussion "Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge, " he 
claims that the central ideas of the proposition that human 
beings as "understanding, rational Beings" are God's Work-
manship would, "if duly considered, and pursued, afford 
such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might 
place" morality among the demonstrative sciences, "to any 
one that will apply himself with the same Indifferency and 
Attention" to morality that he devotes to mathematics 
( 4. 3. 18) . Shortly thereafter, in explaining why attempts 
at demonstrations in ethics have hitherto caused greater 
difficulties than those in m~thematics, he makes the same 
point still more cautiously, maintaining that a search with 
"indifferency" would bring us only "nearer perfect Demon-
stration, than is commonly imagined" (4.3.20).2 
Leaving aside for the moment the implications of the 
questionable likelihood of widespread "indifferency" on the 
part of individuals in their moral inquiries, we first 
2Gibson is rare among Locke's commentators in noting 
the caution apparent in Locke's formulations concerning the 
possibility of a demonstrative science of morality, but he 
seems nonetheless to hold that Locke is at best dimly aware 
of the difficulties that such a pure science would entail 
(1896, 50,58). 
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wonder in the wake of these qualifications precisely how 
according to Locke an indifferent inquiry would fall short 
of strict demonstration, or what part of morality necessar-
ily resists attempts at demonstration. We recall that 
though he acknowledges that moral discourses inevitably 
contain substance ideas as well as ideas of mixed modes and 
relations, he maintains that the presence of substance 
ideas need not disturb such discourses, because the 
adequacy of their definitions need not--indeed cannot--be 
self-evident or demonstrated, and so instead can and must 
be merely supposed ( 3. 11. 16) . As Grant explains, "With 
respect to subjection to the law, the question to be asked 
is not, Is this a Man? but Is this a corporeal rational 
Being?" (1987, 30). Locke suggests here that our inability 
to achieve any precise, finally adequate definition of a 
human being is inconsequential for morality, insofar as we 
can nonetheless frame an abstract idea comprising the 
qualities essential to moral beings. 3 The undemonstrative 
portion of ethical science would then appear to be the 
supposed or posited character of the subject of morality, 
of the "moral man" or person. 
3This reasoning appears to underlie Locke's occasional 
references to the subject of law or morality as a "rational 
Creature" or a "free and intelligent Agent" (TT II .12, 57; 
also STCE 31). We hope to show in what follows, however, 
that for Locke such references to agency or personhood may 
provide greater analytical precision, but they do not imply 
the invalidity of ordinary references to human beings as 
the subjects of morality. 
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It is important to recognize, however, that this 
supposition lying at the basis of Lockean moral science 
does not represent a pure act of mental construction or 
creativity. Locke does not suggest that we ponder, in a 
spirit of indifference to whether such beings actually 
exist, what faculties one would have to possess in order to 
qualify as a moral being. Morality is our great concern, 
"the proper Science and Business of Mankind in general" 
(4.12.11); insofar as we do so with even minimal rational-
ity, therefore, we frame moral ideas, be they substances or 
mixed modes, with a view to their usefulness (2.22.6,10; 
2.28.2; 3.5.7). In the context of his own account of the 
origin of our moral ideas, Locke's framing of the concept 
of a moral man or person makes sense only on the premise 
that such beings actually exist in the world. He proceeds 
not by simply positing an idea, but instead by collecting 
the morally basic or necessary qualities of the class of 
moral beings actually existing, of which we have actual 
experience. Once again, Locke appeals to what "Every one, 
I think, finds in himself" (2.21.7) in order to corroborate 
his account of our moral faculties.4 The complex idea of a 
corporeal rational creature is not then a pure creature of 
the mind, but is instead formed in an act of abstraction 
proper. It is abstracted from real experience. 
The premise of the present chapter is that throughout 
4see chapter IV above, pp. 191-193. 
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the Essay Locke tends to exaggerate the methodological 
separation of moral from natural science, just as elsewhere 
he exaggerates the distinction between the abstract, norma-
tive-theoretical principles of political science and the 
empirically, historically grounded prudential art of 
governing.5 In maintaining that "at best an Argument from 
what has been, to what should of right be, has no great 
force" (TT II.103), Locke implies no more than that what is 
moral or just cannot be simply reduced to actual historical 
practice; he does not deny that historical inquiry is use-
ful and indeed necessary for the development of a proper 
understanding of the nature and limits of our capacities as 
5see again "Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and study 
for a Gentleman," in Axtell 1968, 400. I do not mean to 
argue that the distinctions in question are without any 
validity for Locke. I am suggesting only that the rules of 
morality, and by implication the principles of political 
justice, rest ultimately upon an empirically grounded 
conception of the nature of those to whom such rules and 
principles properly apply. Locke's exaggerations of these 
distinctions tend to obscure the extent to which his 
account of a constructivist moral science rests upon a 
natural ground. Focusing on other textual ambiguities, 
Strauss persuasively explains much of the reason for 
Locke's exaggeration by reference to the different form of 
caution proper to practical as opposed to theoretical 
writers (1953, 206-209; cf. Cox 1960, 11). I believe that 
in the Essay Locke indeed intends to attack scholastic 
morality, but to do so for the most part indirectly, 
through his critique of scholastic natural science; he 
seeks to clear a space of relative freedom to deliver his 
critique of scholastic natural science, by suggesting 
misleadingly that that critique will not implicate 
scholastic morality as well. 
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moral beings. 6 In keeping with the "Historical, plain 
Method" of the Essay as a whole (1.1.2), Locke employs the 
idea of "moral man" as an empirically grounded, testable 
hypothesis, even as a kind of thought-experiment. Let us 
suppose, Locke reasons in effect, that the beings in the 
world who possess the capacity or equipment for morality 
constitute a natural species; the following empirical 
questions then arise, as most immediately relevant to our 
purposes. In what relation does the class of moral beings 
stand to the class or classes of beings ordinarily denom-
inated "human"? What if anything can we infer from the 
nature of this moral equipment concerning the specific 
content of the political morality most appropriate to the 
class of tho.se so equipped? What further common qualities 
can we discover that may be relevant to our construction of 
moral ideas? What natural needs, desires, interests, and 
passions do the members of this class share, in addition to 
the qualities constitutive of moral personhood, which may 
6cf. ECHU 4. 4 .1 with 1.1. 5: Perhaps with a view to 
the fact that a purely constructive or definitional moral 
science could produce only "Castles in the Air," Locke 
remarks somewhat offhandedly but suggestively that "Proba-
bility," the proper yield of empirical inquiry, "is suffi-
cient to govern all our Concernments." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) It appears that this fact compels Grant as well, 
notwithstanding her opinion that the distinction between 
normative and empirical political science derives from a 
distinction fundamental to the Essay, ultimately to attrib-
ute to Locke the opinion that "Nature is the appropriate 
standard" for the formation of our moral ideas (1987, 37; 
cf. 21-22,37-41,48). Cf. Ashcraft 1969, 209; Shapiro 1986, 
81,105,109,123-124. 
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engender a natural affinity for or resistance to a given 
moral-political doctrine--in particular the doctrine of the 
natural rights of humankind? 
In this chapter and the one following it, we will 
describe more specifically Locke's view of the nature of 
our moral equipment, and then examine the reasoning whereby 
Locke defends the doctrine of equal unalienable rights as 
the teaching of justice most appropriate to our nature. We 
will argue that there is no ultimate conflict between the 
Essay's proposed demonstrative moral science and the Two 
Treatises' doctrine of natural rights, provided that the 
former be understood as resting upon empirically well-
founded but nonetheless necessarily experimental proposi-
tions. More importantly, we will argue that in the end 
Locke's account of the nature of our moral equipment does 
contain the materials required to erect a reasonable 
defense of the principles of natural rights, though the 
peculiar rhetorical imperatives by which Locke finds his 
presentation constrained tend to obscure these materials. 
Let us begin by elaborating Locke's account of agency as a 
requisite for subjection to moral rules or laws. 
THE MORAL AGENT 
Fundamental to Locke's elaboration of the idea of 
"moral man" as a "corporeal rational Creature" is the 
concept of a person or self. All rational creatures, 
according to Locke, have an experience of inwardness or of 
reflectiveness, in which they recognize a distinction 
between self and world, between the subject and objects of 
their thinking. To have this experience is to be a "Per-
son ..• a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same 
thinking thing in different times and places" (2. 27. 9). 
Moreover, to be a person is to be conscious of oneself as 
the author or proprietor not merely of thoughts, but also, 
and more generally, of actions. By ordinary reflection, 
according to Locke, we find in ourselves "a Power to begin 
or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, 
and motions of our Bodies, barely by a thought or prefer-
ence of the mind ordering, or as it were commanding the 
doing or not doing ... a particular action" ( 2. 21. 5, 7, and 
passim). In exercising this power of willing we experience 
ourselves as agents, as free, self-disposing, responsible 
beings. For it is our sense of the mind's "Dominion ... over 
any part of the Man" (2.21.15), of our self-ordering or 
commanding power, that allows us to appropriate our inter-
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nal and external motions, which would otherwise be mere 
unconscious or unfree behavior, as our own productions and 
thus our own actions. Without this power we could not be 
moral beings, the bearers of rights and obligations. 
"Person" for Locke is "a forensick Term appropriating 
Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent 
Agents capable of a Law ••• " In "personal Identity is 
founded all the Right and Justice of Reward and Punishment" 
(2.27.26,18; cf. 1.3.14). 
Essential to our moral equipment is then, as Shapiro 
describes it, our capacity for "autonomous intentional 
action" (1986, 96,105,124,144).7 Whether this capacity in 
itself represents a proper or sufficient basis for Locke's 
doctrine of rights, however, remains to be seen. "Freedom, 
or not Freedom," Locke maintains, "can belong to nothing, 
but what has, or has not a power to act" (2.21.19). Let us 
consider more carefully what it means, according to Locke, 
for us to be free, to be agents. We need first to bear in 
mind that freedom and volition are nonidentical, though 
closely related; volition in itself is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of the freedom of agents. We are free 
as agents, in Locke's more provisional definition, insofar 
as the alternatives of performance and forbearance of a 
7More or less elaborate descriptions and analyses of 
Locke's account of agency appear in Lamprecht 1918, 96-102, 
110-115; Parry 1978, esp. 23-37; Tully 1980, 105-111; Wood 
1983, 143-161; Colman 1983, 188ff, 206-234; Yol ton 1970, 
138-159, and 1985, 17-33; Rapaczynski 1987, 116-176. 
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given action lie equally in our power, so that our volition 
to perform or forbear occurs in the context of a genuine 
choice (2.21.8,27). In Locke's examples, a man falling 
through the air who wills not to fall is obviously not 
free, in that his volition is irrelevant to his performing 
or forbearing, that is, his continuing or ceasing to fall; 
whereas, less obviously though on the same principle, a man 
who wills to remain with desirable company in a locked room 
is also unfree, in that his remaining does not depend 
decisively upon his own will, but is necessitated by an 
external impediment to his leaving (2.21.9,10). 8 
The freedom of agency thus requires a certain 
contingency or indeterminacy in the actual possibility of 
either doing or forbearing, in order to ensure the primacy 
of volition. Still, as Locke somewhat testily imagines 
"the inquisitive Mind of Man" might object, how does this 
notion of freedom apply to the action of volition itself? 
Can we say properly that someone is free "if he be not as 
free to will, as he is to act, what he wills" (2. 21. 22)? 
Bet. Hobbes, Leviathan XXI: "A FREE-MAN, is he, that 
in those things, which .Qy his strength and wit he is able 
to do, is not hindered to doe what he has g_ will to" (ed. 
MacPherson 1968, 262). Thus Hobbes would hold that only 
the man in the first of Locke's examples is unfree. In its 
greater emphasis on the availability of a genuine choice, 
Locke's stricter definition of freedom seems to reflect his 
desire to promote among his readers a sharper consciousness 
of the conditions of human freedom and unfreedom. It thus 
corresponds with his insistence on freedom, contrary to the 
doctrine of Hobbes, as an unalienable right and a condition 
of governmental legitimacy. 
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In what sense can we be agents, possessing active power, if 
the will itself is a passive power?9 We recall Locke's 
acknowledgement that "Morality and Mechanism .•. are not very 
easy to be reconciled, or made consistent" ( 1. 3. 14) . On 
the other hand, it is equally questionable whether we can 
be truly agents if the will is a strictly active power. 
For if we conceive of the freedom of the will or more gen-
erally of the mind as radical autonomy, as pure contingency 
or indeterminacy, then we would reduce human action to 
sheer arbitrariness--"as great an imperfection," according 
to Locke, "as the want of Indifferency to act, or not to 
act, till determined by the Will, would be an imperfection 
on the other side" (2. 21. 48). The difficulty concerning 
the status of the will is thus twofold, with extreme impli-
cations of arbitrariness and fatalism seeming to correspond 
respectively to the alternative conceptions of the will as 
an active or a passive power.10 The task Locke faces in 
explicating our experience of agency is to find a moderate 
solution whereby willing can be in some sense both active 
and passive, both free and nonarbitrary. 
9 11 Power thus considered is twofold, viz. as able to 
make, or able to receive any change: The one may be called 
Active, and the other Passive Power" (2.21.2). 
lOcf. Rapaczynski's formulation: "If the agent's 
choice of reasons is ultimately determined, then he cannot 
be responsible for his actions. If, on the other hand, his 
choice is not determined, then it is unmotivated and arbi-
trary. If this is the case, however, responsibility will 
not make much sense either, for the agent is not 'ration-
a 1 Ill ( 19 8 7 I 12 6 ) • 
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After disposing of both the semantic confusions and 
the more trivial questions that arise from an excessively 
literal construction of the term "free will" (2.21.6,14-
25), Locke turns finally to the serious question of the 
determination of the will. He holds that " ... that which 
immediately determines the Will ..• is the uneasiness of 
desire, fixed on some absent good ... " (2.21.33). Several 
ideas here require explication. Most basic is the idea of 
good, which Locke tends to define in purely hedonistic 
terms: 11 ••• what has an aptness to produce Pleasure in us, 
is that we call Good, and what is apt to produce Pain in 
us, we call Evil, for no other reason, but for its aptness 
to produce Pleasure and Pain in us" (2.21.42; also 
2.20.2).11 Uneasiness for Locke refers simply to pain; it 
subsumes "All pain of the body of what sort soever, and 
disquiet of the mind. 11 12 Moreover, it is inseparable from 
desire, in that desire is "nothing but an uneasiness in the 
llcf. again Hobbes, Leviathan ch. VI: "Pleasure 
therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of 
Good; and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or 
sense of Evill" (ed. MacPherson 1968, 122). 
12colman complains with some justification that in its 
abstraction or generality Locke's concept of uneasiness is 
"to say the least of it, shadowy ... a blanket term covering 
a variety of mental states of the agent ... too broad and 
vague to be of much service in a causal explanation of hu-
man action" (1983, 216-217,223). But this for Locke seems 
to be precisely the point; his vague, general account of 
the concept of uneasiness constitutes merely a statement or 
restatement of the massive fact of relativism or dissensus 
with respect to the objects of our actions or our concep-
tions of happiness. 
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want of an absent good." No one feels pain without feeling 
in that very pain a desire for relief equal in magnitude to 
the pain itself (2.21.31). Uneasiness for Locke seems to 
represent the force capable of moving the will, while 
desire represents the determination of the direction of 
that movement. 13 Further, Locke distinguishes between an 
essentially negative or indefinite desire for ease from 
pain and an essentially positive desire for a particular 
absent good (ibid.). It is the latter form, the desire for 
an absent positive good, in which our cognizance of the 
absent good precedes the sense of uneasiness, that leads to 
the heart of his account of voluntary action. 
According to his own testimony, Locke changed his 
mind concerning the determination of the will between the 
publication of the first and second editions of the Essay. 
In the first edition, he confesses, he "took .•. for granted" 
the soundness of the opinion that "seems so establish'd and 
settled a maxim by the general consent of all Mankind, That 
good, the greater good, determines the will" (2.21.35) .14 
In its most basic significance, Locke's insistence in the 
second and subsequent editions on the primacy of uneasiness 
13cf. Rapaczynski 1987, 145-148. 
14Thus 2.21.29 of the first edition: "For the cause 
of every less degree of Pain, as well as every greater 
degree of Pleasure, has the nature of Good, and vice versa, 
and is that which determines our Choice, and challenges our 
Preference. Good then, the greater Good is that alone 
which determines the Will" (ed. Nidditch 1975, 250-251). 
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represents an application of the principle that "'tis 
against the nature of things, that what is absent should 
operate, where it is not" (2.21.37). This is in a trivial 
sense a matter of semantics: an absent good can be present 
to the mind only as desire, as privation or uneasiness, and 
therefore can move the will only in this mode. As for its 
more substantive significance, it is fundamentally true, as 
Yolton argues, that Locke's reconsideration involves a 
rejection of the first edition's "intellectualist position 
on motives" (1970, 144). But this does not mean that in 
the second and subsequent editions Locke totally or dras-
tically depreciates the role of the understanding in voli-
tion; Colman observes aptly that Locke's revision consti-
tutes rather a clarification than a rejection of the view 
"that properly free actions are those which are grounded in 
rational decisions" (1983, 215).15 
The depreciation of reason in the revised account 
consists in Locke's denial of the causal or motivational 
efficacy of "bare contemplation" or "unactive speculation" 
(2.21.34,37); he no longer holds that the mere apprehension 
or acknowledgment of an absent good as such, that is, of 
its pleasurable potential, is in itself sufficient to raise 
15contrast the account of Lamprecht, who finds in the 
first edition a statement of "the extreme hedonistic posi-
tion, which discomfited Locke by its implication "that men 
were mere creatures swayed by the strongest pleasure .•. thus 
leaving no room for the guiding activity of reason." 
Locke's revision thus represents for Lamprecht a retreat 
from mechanism, not from intellectualism (1918, 112-115). 
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in us a desire proportionate to its goodness. What is 
instead sufficient to raise our desires is "happiness and 
that alone" (2.21.41). In accordance with his definition 
of the good, Locke tends also to define happiness hedonis-
tically; in its full extent it is "the utmost Pleasure we 
are capable of," while in its lowest degree it is "so much 
ease from all Pain, and so much present Pleasure, as 
without which one cannot be content" (42). Thus conceived, 
the idea of happiness operates as a kind of regulatory 
principle, determining which prospective goods will and 
which will not raise desires in us. Not all absent acknow-
ledged good stirs us, "but only that part, or so much of 
it, as is consider'd, and taken to make a necessary part of 
(our) happiness" (2.21.43; also 59). 
Locke's diminished estimate of the power of a ration-
al apprehension of the greater good to determine the will 
arises in part from the necessity of explaining the common 
fact of volitional error. On the principle that the 
greater apparent good determines the will, we are unable to 
explain the fact that we often stray voluntarily from our 
own understanding of what is good for us--that we commonly 
acknowledge the real possibility of a joyful afterlife or a 
prosperous earthly future, for instance, and yet choose not 
to order our lives in the pursuit of such goods. 
... let a Drunkard see, 
Estate wastes; Discredit 
all things, even of his 
the course he follows: 
that his Heal th decays, his 
and Diseases, and the want of 
beloved Drink, attends him in 
yet the returns of uneasiness 
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to miss his Companions; the habitual thirst after his 
cups, at the usual time, drives him to the Tavern, 
though he has in his view the loss of health and plen-
ty, and perhaps of the joys of another life: the least 
of which is no inconsiderable good, but such as he con-
fesses, is far greater, than the tickling of his palate 
with a glass of Wine, or the idle chat of a soaking 
Club. (2.21.35; also 38,45) 
If not all, nor even the greatest apparent goods, but 
only those that gain inclusion into our conceptions of 
happiness can raise in us a sense of uneasiness and thereby 
determine our wills, then the essential question concerns 
the framing of our conceptions of happiness: How do we 
come to regard some goods as necessary to our happiness, to 
the exclusion of others of equal or even greater magnitude? 
It is clear that in correcting the first edition's implicit 
assimilation of human willing to that of "those superiour 
Beings above us," Locke calls specific attention to the 
commonly subrational construction of our ideas of happi-
ness16; some combination of more-or-less unreflectively 
acquired habits, as in the case of the drunkard, and 
natural passions or aversions, such as bodily pain, lust, 
16wood suggests that in emphasizing the various envi-
ronmental influences on or obstructions of reasoning, Locke 
advances the development of Bacon's "embryonic 'sociology 
of knowledge' and conception of 'ideology'" (1983, 94-107). 
Cf. Tully's discussion of the "normative and constitutive" 
functions of mixed-mode ideas in Locke's epistemology, ap-
parently attributing an ideological closure to particular 
"language communities": like that of Vico, Locke's polit-
ical thought begins (and therefore ends) with "the consti-
tutive and regulative ideas of a given culture" {1980, 13-
34). A similar account of the origin of moral reasoning, 
though with a greater emphasis on the possibility of tran-
scending one's cultural inheritance, appears in Rapaczynski 
1987, 161-176. 
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or revenge (2.21.38), tends at any given moment to produce 
the uneasinesses whose alleviation our happiness requires. 
What is crucial, however, is that Locke does not intend by 
his revision to assert the necessarily or essentially sub-
rational character of human willing. The doctrine of the 
insufficiency of the mere intellectual recognition of pro-
spective goods to determine volition may involve in one 
sense a diminished estimate of the subjection of volition 
to reason; yet what Locke's revision ultimately denies is 
less that subjection as such than the constancy of our 
understandings in devoting adequate consideration to the 
framing of our ideas of happiness. Our propensity to for-
bear the pursuit of acknowledged greater goods represents 
no insuperable limitation of our nature, but instead pro-
ceeds simply from our negligence in constructing concep-
tions of happiness. 
Locke's understanding of happiness as a mental 
construct or a complex idea points to the sense in which 
his revised account of volition preserves an emphasis on 
the decisive role of reason. Because the substantiation of 
our ideas of happiness is in Locke's view identical with 
the specification of that complex of goods whose absence 
raises in us a sense of uneasiness, in order for our ideas 
of happiness to be rationally constructed we must be some-
how capable of raising within ourselves feelings of uneasi-
ness at the absence of goods that our reason approves. In 
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fact, according to Locke, the inefficacy of bare intellec-
tual apprehension in determining volition does not signify 
the inefficacy of the understanding in general; we are able 
by "a due considering and examining any good proposed ... to 
raise our desires, in a due proportion to the value of that 
good, whereby in its turn, and place, it may come to work 
upon the will, and be pursued" (2.21.46; also 56,69) .17 
Inasmuch as this account of our ideas of happiness as prop-
erly the products of reflective, considered judgment or 
intention holds the key to Locke's conception of moral 
agency, it is necessary for us to explore further the basis 
of this "due considering." 
Two seemingly closely related mental powers are at 
work here. Our ability to devote due consideration to any 
proposed good depends at least in part upon a power that, 
like the primacy of uneasiness in general, Locke introduces 
in the revised second edition of the Essay. In the power 
17 In this explanation of our intellectual power to 
raise in ourselves sensations of desire for absent goods, 
Rapaczynski sees the grounds for a resolution of the com-
monly observed tension between rationalistic and hedonistic 
elements in Lockean ethics (1987, 150-156). Viewing "the 
relation between universal moral norms and sensual inclina-
tions [as] more 'dialectical' in Locke than in Kant," he 
goes so far as to issue a rather striking denial that Lock-
ean morality is hedonistic in the ordinary sense of the 
term (167; 155-161). See the further discussion of this 
point in chapter VI below, pp. 352-364. Cf. Colman's view 
that while Locke's theory "is quite distinct from egoistic 
hedonism as a psychological theory," still his "account of 
rational action may be termed a hedonistic theory of 
reasons for actions" (1983, 223). Contrast Lamprecht 1918, 
65-118; Aaron 1955, 256-269; Von Leyden 1958, 71-75. 
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of the mind "to suspend the execution and satisfaction of 
any of its desires, " Locke observes "the hinge on which 
turns the liberty of intellectual Beings" (2.21.47,52).18 
18This conception of liberty as dependent upon a 
mental capacity to suspend the execution of our desires 
appears to supersede Locke's earlier, more Hobbesian, more 
behavioral or mechanical definition of liberty as the power 
only to do or forbear, with out reference to the question 
whether we are free also to determine our own preferences, 
desires, or volitional commands. Critics have sometimes 
questioned, however, whether Locke's revised conception 
represents a truly significant departure from the original. 
Locke's contemporary John Jackman observes, for instance, 
"that either this suspension must be no voluntary action, 
or, though it be a voluntary action, the Will must not be 
determin'd to it by any Uneasiness, or, it must be deter-
min'd to it by a less Uneasiness than that, the relief 
whereof is suspended. Of the parts of which Disjunction, 
the first and last, are too unreasonable to need any confu-
tation to you, and the second is directly contradictory to 
your opinion" (CJL #2105, 6/20/1696). More recently, Ellen 
Meiksins Wood opines similarly that the act of suspension 
must represent an act of volition determined by uneasiness, 
and therefore that Locke's account of voluntary action re-
mains close to that of Hobbes (1972, 36-40). See also Von 
Leyden 1981, 56. Colman concludes somewhat more sympathet-
ically that "Although Locke continues to talk of uneasiness 
as determining the will even on those occasions when we 
stand back and deliberate on whether the proposed actions 
accord with our true happiness, the tenor of his later 
doctrine is that properly free actions spring, not from 
some occurrent feeling of the agent, but from reason" 
(1983, 221-222). It is undeniable that Locke's revision 
creates a textual ambiguity on this point (cf. especially 
2.21.40,47,53); but this ambiguity is not fatal to Locke's 
account of moral freedom. Even if the act of suspending 
one's desires were itself a voluntary act determined by the 
most pressing uneasiness, this need imply no more than that 
moral reason does not develop autonomously or spontaneous-
ly, but instead requires the cultivation of a desire in 
support of it. There would be no contradiction in holding 
that once properly cultivated, such a desire could assume a 
position of priority relative to all other desires, so that 
in effect reason, once made the primary element of one's 
"relish," would nonetheless constitute a power capable of 
overriding all or nearly all more particular desires. On 
the cultivation of rationality, see STCE 36,40,41,77,81,83, 
95. 
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For the "first ••. and great use of Liberty, is to hinder 
blind Precipitancy" (2.21.67); insofar as it enables us to 
perform our duty to examine with "caution, deliberation, 
and wariness" the alternative courses of action available 
to us and therefore provides the foundation for our power 
of raising our own desires, the exercise of this suspensory 
power establishes us as the justly accountable authors and 
owners of our actions (2.21.52,56,67). But because the 
idea of happiness represents more for Locke than an indef-
inite train of successes in attaining the objects of our 
desires,19 more than a mere aggregation of goods or of 
reports on successive present mental states--because it 
represents instead an ordering, an assignment of priorities 
that extends properly over the courses of our entire lives-
-the exercise of the suspensory power as a requisite of 
rational liberty depends in turn upon the exercise of a 
still more basic mental power, namely the power of abstrac-
tion. 
Only in a narrow, casual sense does Locke hold that 
"who is content is happy" (2.21.59); he clearly believes 
that there is such a thing as an irrational contentment, an 
"imaginary" as well as a "real happiness" (51). For "the 
present moment not being our eternity," and "since our vol-
19cf. Hobbes, Leviathan VI: "Continual! successe in 
obtaining those things which a man from time to time desir-
eth, that is to say, continual! prospering, is that men 
call FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life" (ed. Mac-
Pherson 1968, 129). 
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untary Actions carry not all the Happiness and Misery, that 
depend on them, along with them in their present perfor-
mance; but are the precedent causes of Good and Evil" (39, 
59), it follows that a fully rational conception and pur-
suit of happiness must involve a consideration of prospec-
tive as well as present pleasures and pains (61,62). This 
consideration obviously involves an empirical, probabilis-
tic assessment of the consequences of alternative courses 
of action, but it involves more fundamentally the exercise 
of the crucial power of abstraction in facilitating full 
human self-consciousness. For it is by virtue of the power 
of abstraction that we are able to conceive of the core of 
our being as the self, as the source of action and concern-
ment, with an identity continuing over time (2.27.17ff).20 
20In explaining personal identity as consisting in 
identity of consciousness, Locke may seem, as some critics 
have charged, to mistake the mere datum of personal identi-
ty, i.e. memory, for its cons ti tu ti ve element. Thus he 
declares, for instance, that "If there be any part of its 
Existence, which I cannot upon recollection join with that 
present consciousness, whereby I am now my self, it is in 
that part of its Existence no more my self, than any other 
immaterial Being" (2.27.24). For a thorough discussion of 
this objection, see Flew 1968, especially 158-166. In mak-
ing this argument Locke may intend in part to call atten-
tion to the genuine difficulty in searching for grounds for 
claiming an unrecollected action as one's own. More impor-
tantly, however, Locke's description of the fragility of 
our identities as persons serves to underline the human 
need to struggle to overcome the attractions of present, 
momentary indulgences and thus to unify one's experiences 
into a single, coherent, well governed and directed life. 
"This appropriating consciousness is not just memory," ob-
serves Yelton, but involves in addition a capacity of "be-
ing concerned for the deeds I have done, concerned for 
their happiness-producing, for their moral worth, for their 
importance in my intentional actions" (1985, 32). In main-
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we are thus able to abstract from a succession of instant, 
momentary experiences a conception of our own life as an 
integrated whole capable of being more or less well lived. 
By projecting our selves into the future and comparing the 
likely consequences of pursuing various possible or imagin-
able courses of action, we can frame general conceptions of 
happiness or of well-lived lives whereby we can evaluate 
our present alternatives. 
Our construction of ideas of happiness represents for 
Locke the most comprehensive indication of our natural 
capacity for rational liberty and therefore for law. The 
capacity to transcend the present, or alternatively, to 
bring ideas of future, absent goods into the present and 
deliberate on their relative merits is inseparable from the 
capacity to master our inclinations or to forego more im-
mediately available gratifications. Moreover, the capacity 
for transcendence inherent in our power of abstraction 
permits us not merely to transfer, as it were, our self-
consciousness to various past and future moments in our own 
lives. Locke's opinion concerning the ultimate sweep of 
this transcendent capacity may remain unclear, but in 
taining that "a concern for Happiness [is] the unavoidable 
concomitant of consciousness" (2.27.26), Locke comes close 
to arguing that individuals possess unitary selves to the 
degree that they are concerned to possess unitary selves. 
To the extent to which reason succeeds in governing our 
passionate pursuits, comments Pangle, "the self would seem 
to unify itself, to gather itself, to become more fully a 
self" (1988, 268). Cf. Wood on Locke's apparent conflation 
of cognitive and conative selves (1983, 157-161). 
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stressing the dangers inherent in uncritical assent to the 
received opinions of our various circles of association 
(1.4.22, 4.12.4, 4.15.6, 4.20.17: also cu 3,41), he seems 
to imply a far-reaching power at least in some to reflect 
critically upon their formative influences, to look "abroad 
beyond the Smoak of their own Chimneys" (1.3.2). It seems 
to be within our power, according to Locke, to transcend 
not merely our own historical present, but also our cul-
tural inheritance.21 Our capacity to appropriate to our 
imagination the experiences of others in other times and 
places, to consider them as potentially our own, thus seems 
to be an essential guarantor of our capacity to appropriate 
actions by ensuring that the latter proceed from an authen-
tic choice. 
This appears to be the reasoning behind Locke's claim 
that it is the mental power of abstraction, "the having of 
general Ideas," in which "the Species of Brutes are dis-
criminated from Man: and 'tis that proper difference where-
in they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to 
so vast a difference" (2.11.10,11) .22 Notwithstanding, 
21Thus Wood recognizes that, notwithstanding his con-
tribution to the development of the 'sociology of know-
ledge,' Locke's conception of consciousness is essentially 
transhistorical. But as Wood presents it, this recognition 
constitutes less an appreciation than an accusation (1983, 
94-100,157-163). Cf. note 16 above. 
22under fire from Stillingfleet, Locke subsequently 
disclaims any intention to argue that 'herein chiefly lies 
the excellency of mankind above brutes that these cannot 
abstract and enlarge their ideas, as men do.' He replies 
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therefore, his definition of happiness in wholly hedonistic 
terms, Locke is able to claim that on the basis of this 
power of abstraction or generalization, human beings are 
uniquely persons, capable of both law and happiness in ways 
that the lower animals, which are capable of little more 
than the mere perception of pleasure and pain, are not 
) 23 (2.27.26 . Therefore, insofar as "the highest perfection 
somewhat condescendingly that "The ability of mankind does 
not lie in the impotency or disabilities of brutes," and 
claims that he had suggested in the Essay that the power of 
abstraction constitutes only "one excellency of mankind 
above brutes" (Works 1823, IV, 15). As is often the case 
in his exchanges with Stillingfleet, Locke's response may 
seems evasive at best. Though he does at one point in the 
Essay refer to the power of abstraction as merely "an Ex-
cellency" that the brutes do not possess, his accompanying 
references to the "proper difference" and the "perfect dis-
tinction betwixt Man and Brutes" lend support to Stilling-
fleet' s reading. on the other hand, it may be that still-
ingfleet here pays insufficient attention to Locke's impli-
cit suggestion that the power of abstraction represents the 
original or fundamental difference between humans and the 
lower animals, a difference which "at last," fully devel-
oped, widens to a vast difference. It is not at all clear 
that Locke's remark implies a reduction of the difference 
in question to a matter or degree, or of power. See 
chapter VI below, pp. 
23Thus notwithstanding his conjectures and anecdotes 
concerning the possibility or even actual existence of non-
human rational persons (2.27.8; 3.6.22,29; 3.11.16,20), 
Locke's account of personhood generally corroborates the 
reading presented in chapter III above of the ultimately 
moderate character of his critique of the doctrine of nat-
ural species. Whatever the status of the border cases, for 
the purposes of his moral and political thought Locke ac-
cepts on grounds of sound, empirical, probabilistic judg-
ment the proposition that the qualities requisite of moral 
agency or personality tend to inhere in beings possessing 
the shape and other qualities we ordinarily identify as 
"human," or in other words that we can reliably judge moral 
beings and human beings not only as natural, nonconvention-
al kinds, but as practically identical natural kinds. Once 
again, "Morality is the proper science, and Business" not 
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of intellectual nature, lies in a careful and constant pur-
suit of true and solid happiness" (2.21.51), Locke sees no 
denigration of human freedom or dignity in his doctrine of 
the determination of the will. To the contrary, he argues 
that 
A Perfect Indifferency in the Mind, not determinable by 
its last judgment of the Good or Evil, that is thought 
to attend its Choice, would be so far from being an 
advantage and excellency of any intellectual Nature, 
that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want 
of Indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined 
by the Will, would be an imperfection on the other 
side. (2.21.48). 
The freedom proper to volition consists not in pure contin-
gency, but instead in the determination of the will by 
rational judgment of the good ( 2. 21. 71) . As yet unex-
plained, however, are precisely wherein this good consists, 
and what substantive principles of morality follow from our 
capacity for moral agency. 
merely of moral beings, according to Locke, but of "Mankind 
in general" ( 4 .12 .11) ; whoever violates the law of nature 
violates not merely "the right Rule of Reason," but also 
"the Principles of Human Nature" (TT II. 10; also II. 63) . 
Cf. note 3 above. 
AGENCY AS THE PARTIAL BASIS OF LAW 
"Law," in Locke's understanding, "is not so much the 
Limitation as the direction of g free and intelligent.Agent 
to his proper interest ... Could [he] be happier without it, 
the Law, as an useless thing, would of it self vanish ... " 
(TT I I. 5 7 ) • 2 4 The end of law for Locke is to promote or 
facilitate our pursuit of happiness. The question arises, 
therefore, as to the manner in which the form of happiness 
toward which we are by nature directed determines the form 
of law most appropriate to us. Locke implicitly sharpens 
this question, in apparently maintaining an extreme rela-
tivism as a corollary of his hedonistic conception of 
happiness: 
... I think, that the Philosophers of old did in vain 
enquire, whether Summum Bonum consisted in Riches, or 
bodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation: And they 
might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best 
Relish were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts; and 
have divided themselves into Sects upon it. For as 
pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves, 
but their agreeableness to this or that particular 
Palate, wherein there is great variety: So the great-
est Happiness consists, in the having those things, 
which produce the greatest Pleasure; and in the absence 
of those, which cause any disturbance, any pain. Now 
these, to different Men, are very different things. 
(2.21.55) 
24cf. the propositions with which Locke introduces his 
undated, unpublished fragment "Morality": "Morality is the 
rule of mans actions for the atteining happynesse. For the 
end and aime of all men being happynesse alone noething 
could be a rule or a law to them whose observation did not 
lead to happynesse and whose breach did [not] draw misery 




ooes Locke hold that we can know ourselves as human beings, 
only as a natural species of agents or choice-makers? If 
so, can he avoid the implication that principles of human 
justice and happiness are alike relative to the societies 
and even ultimately to the individuals who embrace them? 
If human beings according to Locke have no fixed natural 
end, if there is no common determinate content of our hap-
piness, then to what form of common, natural law can we be 
properly subject? 
One traditional and still influential scholarly re-
sponse to this question of moral relativism appeals to the 
theological horizon within which Locke frequently claims to 
view the human condition. 25 Immediately after presenting 
his emphatically relativistic description of happiness, 
Locke proceeds to issue an important qualification: "Men 
may chuse different things, and yet all chuse right, sup-
posing them only like a Company of poor Insects," suppos-
ing, that is, that "there be no Prospect beyond the Grave" 
(2.21.55; emphasis supplied). Perhaps then his statement 
of relativism describes no more than the actual condition 
of diversity in human judgments of the good.26 Accordingly, 
25Recent variants of this view appear in Tully 1980, 
41ff,105ff; Colman 1983, 6,32ff,69ff,189; Shapiro 1986, 
lOlff; Grant 1987, 41-48. 
26see Locke's own response to a contemporary objection 
of this kind, in a note appended by his editor Coste to 
ECHU 2.28.11. Von Leyden opines that a pure description of 
actual modes of evaluation, abstracted from any attempt at 
prescription, characterizes Locke's intention throughout 
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he subsequently proposes a distinction between the actual 
and the appropriate in judgments of this kind, in distin-
guishing natural from moral good and evil. While natural 
"Good and Evil," as Locke reiterates, "are nothing but 
Pleasure or Pain ... Morally Good and Evil then, is (sic] 
only the Conformity or Disagreement of our voluntary 
Actions to some Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us, 
from the Will and Power of the Law-maker" (2.28.5).27 More 
specifically, he continues, "the only true touchstone of 
moral Rectitude" is the "Divine Law, whereby I mean, that 
Law which God has set to the actions of Men" ( 2 . 2 8. 8) . 
Locke overcomes or at least seeks to overcome the problem 
of relativism, in this view, by conceiving of human beings 
as God's workmanship and therefore as God's property. 28 
Virtuous or vicious actions may well be productive of 
pleasures or pains, but they are not defined as such by 
that production. Rather they are defined by their conform-
ity or nonconformity with the will of the creator God, and 
pleasures or pains can be no more than their incidental 
consequences.29 
the entire Essay (1954, 74-76). 
27see also Locke's unpublished fragment "Of Ethicks in 
General," in King 1830, 311. 
28see especially TT I.53,86; II.6,56. 
29Locke's most emphatic statements of this point 
appear in his unpublished Questions Concerning The Law of 
Nature. In concluding the work he insists, for instance, 
that "interest is not a foundation of law or a basis of 
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As commentators have frequently observed, however, 
including some who accept this view as the most compelling 
statement of Locke's intention, Locke fails to provide a 
fully developed argument in support of the distinction 
between natural and moral good and evil.30 His most elab-
orate attempt at demonstrating the existence of God, for 
instance--or more precisely, of "a GOD"--appears in Book 4, 
chapter 10 of the Essay. If we accept for the sake of 
argument the soundness of this demonstration as far as it 
goes, the fact remains that Locke makes no attempt at 
demonstrating that the God intelligible to us promulgates 
legislation, complete with otherworldly sanctions, for the 
proper guidance of human action.31 It is true, as we have 
noticed, that at times Locke does suggest the possibility 
of deducing from the bare fact of creation by an intelli-
gent God at least the main principle of God's legislative 
obligation, but the consequence of obedience. It is one 
thing if an action entails some benefit by itself, another 
if it should be advantageous by reason of the fact that it 
is in conformity to the law ..• " (LN 11.251; also 8 passim. 
Cf. Yolton 1958, 490; Singh 1961, 114; Tully 1980, 41-43.) 
But cf. LN 10.231, where Locke affirms the viability of 
"other," apparently Hobbesian arguments for defending the 
obligatory force of the natural law. 
30cf. the various accusations or admissions along this 
line in Strauss 1953, 202-226, and 1958, 210; Ashcraft 
1969; Dunn 1969, 21,187, and 1984, 30,66ff.,84; Gough 1973, 
6-11; Yolton 1985, 87,90; Pangle 1988, 198-202. 
31Indeed Locke straightforwardly denies that we can 
have knowledge of an afterlife: " ... that the dead shall 
rise, and live again" is "beyond the Discovery of Reason" 
(4.18.7). See also Works 1823, 4.303ff., 480,489,491. 
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intention for human beings (ECHU 4.3.18; 4.13.3). Because 
an intelligent God could only create intelligently or pur-
posively, according to this deduction, the human creatures 
of that God bear an obligation to preserve themselves and 
their species; or to state it more precisely, they have no 
right of arbitrary self-disposal, no right willfully to 
destroy themselves or others (TT II.6). As we have argued 
above, however, Locke's suggested deduction is at best 
incomplete, insofar as he fails to explain what would 
constitute an arbitrary or willful, as distinct from a 
noble sacrifice of human life.32 It would seem, therefore, 
that the obligation to preserve human beings cannot derive 
simply from the fact of creation, but must instead proceed 
from a compelling account of the unity and dignity of the 
species--an account that Locke's "workmanship" principle, 
at least as he ordinarily presents it, does not in itself 
provide. 
If Locke's theological arguments thus imply that we 
can gain access to God's intentions for human beings only 
through our knowledge of the nature that God has given us, 
then the distinction between natural and moral good and 
evil must collapse. The relevant distinction must take the 
form of a distinction between true and false or apparent 
happiness, or between forms of pursuing happiness that are 
32For a fuller statement both of Locke's suggested 
deduction and of the difficulties that it entails, see 
chapter II above, pp. 73-75. 
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more and less in conformity with the requirements of our 
nature and natural condition. The incompleteness of 
Locke's theological arguments therefore returns us to the 
question whether Locke's secular, empirical-historical 
account of human nature and the human condition can provide 
an adequate basis for a genuine doctrine of political 
morality. 
Recently some scholars have argued that the true or 
enduring significance of Lockean political morality, once 
abstracted from its ostensibly theological context, derives 
exclusively from its basis in the fact of personal agency 
or autonomy.33 The capacity of human beings to be agents, 
to be the authors and owners of our actions, is in this 
view not only a necessary, but in fact the sufficient, 
definitive condition of our moral status. As the owners of 
our actions, according to Locke, we are the owners of our 
selves, of our powers of agency--free, self-disposing 
beings, "equal to the greatest, and subject to no Body" (TT 
II.123; also 27,44).34 The priority of rights to law in 
33Parry argues that though it is Locke's intention to 
present his theory of agency in a theological context, the 
intelligibility of that theory does not require that con-
text (1978, 13-17, 27,156). See also Wallin 1984, 150-157; 
Rapaczynski 1987, 116-176. 
34Laslett comments that this assertion of human self-
ownership "almost contradicts [Locke's] first principle 
that men belong to God" ( 1960, 114) . Others believe that 
Locke does indeed thus retract the workmanship principle. 
See Strauss 1953, especially 227,247; Wallin 1984, 155ff. 
Tully suggests that the two principles are reconciliable; 
Locke intends to say that an individual's "body and his 
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Locke's political morality is merely a corollary of the 
primacy of this principle of agency or self-ownership. 35 
Human beings as natural agents or choice-makers have a 
fundamental natural right simply to act in the pursuit of 
happiness--and therefore to act upon, to appropriate or 
otherwise transform the "materials" (TT II. 41) of the ex-
ternal natural world in order to create or recreate a home 
for ourselves. 36 
If our rights as human beings derive solely from our 
character as self-owning, choosing actors, then it would 
follow that our rights can be limited or circumscribed not 
"vertically," by our dependence upon a higher authority, 
limbs are God's property: the actions he uses them to make 
are his own" ( 1980, 109; also 114) • Cf. Colman 1983, 188-
190; Yolton 1985, 69. It is difficult to see how this sug-
gestion in itself can resolve the difficulty, insofar as 
God's ownership of our bodies and limbs necessarily imposes 
restrictions on our employment of our action-producing ca-
pacity, or in other words on our proprietorship, our right 
of free disposal, over our selves. However that may be, it 
is perhaps safest to adopt the conclusion of Mansfield, to 
the effect that even according to Locke's workmanship prin-
ciple, individuals best follow the will of their maker and 
proprietor by regarding themselves as their own property 
(1979, 30ff.) 
35cf. Strauss: "Through the shift of emphasis from 
natural duties or obligations to natural rights, the indi-
vidual, the ego, had become the center and origin of the 
moral world, since man--as distinguished from man's end--
had become that center or origin" (1953, 248). 
3 6Thus according to Rapaczynski' s reading, "a man's 
action on the world around him is capable of imposing on it 
a human order and transforming it in accordance with the 
dictates of the agent's will ... In this way, all human 
rights--'property' in its broader sense--are tied to man's 
ability to transform nature into an objective correlaie of 
his own freedom" (1987, 172,180). 
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but only "horizontally," 37 by the presence of other agents 
with rights equal to our own. The fact of human equality, 
that as human beings we are "Creatures of the same species 
and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of 
nature, and the use of the same faculties ... sharing all in 
one Community of Nature" (TT II.4,6), would then constitute 
according to Locke the specifically moral element of the 
doctrine of rights.38 Yet this justification of rights by 
the principle of equality in moral autonomy has also drawn 
scholarly objections, of which perhaps the most widely 
noticed is the argument of C.B. MacPherson. On the basis 
of Locke's apparently anomalous references to rationality 
as a distinguishing characteristic not merely of, but also 
and more importantly among human beings, MacPherson con-
tends that Locke's general invocation of the principle of 
equality represents at bottom no more than an obfuscation 
of the morally and politically decisive inequality between 
the class of "industrious and rational" property owners and 
37cf. Strauss' judgment on the thought of Rousseau, 
who in contrast to unspecified "earlier men" attempts "to 
get rid of that which essentially transcends every possible 
human reality," and thus decisively undermines the distinc-
tion between liberty and license. "These men acknowledged 
a limitation which comes from above, a vertical limitation. 
On the basis of Rousseau, the limitation of license is ef-
fected horizontally by the license of other men ... The hori-
zontal limitation is preferred to the vertical limitation 
because it seems to be more realistic: the horizontal lim-
itation, the limitation of my claim by the claims of others 
is self enforcing" (1959, 51-52). 
38see also II.54,87,96,159,190; TT I.27,67; STCE 117. 
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that of subrational wage laborers (1962, especially 221-
251) . 39 
Against this thesis of "differential rationality" 
generating differential class rights, others have argued, 
persuasively with respect to the immediate issue, that 
Locke employs the term "rationality" to refer to both a 
moral and a more strictly intellectual faculty, and that 
only.his conception of the latter is significantly inegali-
tarian40; moral rationality, which properly qualifies us as 
the bearers of rights, is a species characteristic, shared 
more-or-less equally by all human beings. 41 Yet if we 
39In addition to Locke's apparent references to 
rationality as a distinguishing characteristic of the 
propertied class (II.34,50) and to property as a condition 
of full membership in civil society (II .119-122, 140, 158), 
MacPherson relies heavily upon Locke's observation that 
"The greater part cannot know, and therefore they must 
believe" (RC 243). 
40ounn 1969, 250-255. See also Seliger 1968, 49-53, 
163-165; Ryan 1968, 239-242; Ashcraft 1986, chapters 7 and 
9; Shapiro 1986, 86,136-139. Wood agrees that Locke impli-
citly distinguishes between moral and "naturalistic" forms 
of rationality, but argues nonetheless that for Locke human 
equality in moral rationality is not decisive for the dis-
tribution of moral and political rights; Locke "never 
dreamed of a social condition of widespread equality of 
opportunity" (1983, 115-118,121-123), and indeed regarded 
the propertied and the mere laborers as distinct moral spe-
cies (1984, 43ff.). 
41In addition to his references to rationality as a 
species-characteristic, Locke's explanation in the Second 
Treatise of his inclusive usages of the term 'property' 
(123), his clear affirmation of the reasonableness of ali-
enating not only one's radical natural freedom in forming 
civil society (128-131) but also one's labor power to an 
employer or 'master' within the bounds of civil society 
(41,85,131,135), and his explicit disqualification only of 
slaves or aggressors and "Lunaticks and Ideots" for member-
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abstract from its particulars, MacPherson's argument raises 
a deeper issue that remains unresolved by his critics. 
Notwithstanding his common affirmations of the principle of 
equality, Locke at times quite forthrightly acknowledges a 
natural inequality among human beings, with respect to both 
the possession and exercise of rationality. In what is 
only the most striking of such acknowledgments, he declares 
it 
evident, that there is a difference of degrees in Men's 
Understandings, Apprehensions, and Reasonings, to so 
great a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to 
Mankind, affirm, that there is a greater distance 
between some Men, and others, in this respect, than 
between some Men and some Beasts. (4.20.5) 
Admitting the possibility that Locke refers here to the 
relatively small number of border cases, to "Lunaticks and 
Ideots" (II.60) or to "Naturals" (2.11.13; 3.6.22; also CU 
6) disabled from birth, we must yet come to terms with his 
judgment, clearly not restricted to cases of disability, 
that those "who have fairly and truly examined, and are 
thereby got past doubt in all the Doctrines they profess, 
and govern themselves by ... are so few" as to number perhaps 
no more than one in one hundred (4.16.4; also 1.3.24,25; cu 
6,24,34).42 
ship ( 16-24, 60) would all appear to cast doubt upon the 
thesis of a moral, jural distinction between laborers and 
owners in a Lockean political society. 
42Thus Mansfield refers to Locke's assertion of the 
proposition of equal rationality as a "pretense" ( 1979, 
32) . 
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The implication is that in order to maintain the 
proposition of equal moral rationality--the proposition 
that whatever the differences in rationality among individ-
ual human beings, the morally relevant form of rationality 
is a more-or-less equally shared species characteristic--
Locke must significantly dilute his conception of moral 
rationality. Thus, as Tarcov observes, not only is Locke 
ambiguous as to whether rationality as a condition of 
agency or personhood develops automatically with age in 
"the ordinary course of Nature" (II.60) or instead only as 
the product of a proper education (II.58,61,64,69); he also 
tends, more importantly, to assimilate children's irration-
al submission or forebearance of their desires to a ration-
al submission (STCE 38), thereby raising the question 
"whether he is being similarly if not equally free in 
calling the adult rationally autonomous" (1984, 72-73,91-
92). The Second Treatise' doctrine of natural human jural 
equality seems to rest upon a principle of presumptive 
rationality, according to which all those capable, if not 
of discovering, at least of understanding and conforming 
with the dictates of the law of nature are to be treated as 
rational beings and bearers of rights.43 At bottom, the 
43compare in this regard ECHU 4. 20. 2, 3, where Locke 
first deplores the "natural and unalterable ... Ignorance" of 
"the greatest part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour," 
and proceeds in the immediate sequel to insist that "No Man 
is so wholly taken up with the Attendance on the Means of 
Living, as to have no spare Time at all to think of his 
Soul." 
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mere potential for understanding the law of nature, in 
conjunction with actual innocence of irrational action, or 
action against that law, seems to be according to Locke the 
practically determinative requisite of moral rationality 
(II.16,59). Possession of the morally qualifying faculty 
of reason, in other words, seems for Locke's purposes to be 
demonstrated sufficiently by our observance of rational 
principles, or by our respect for reason understood as the 
social bond or "Rule betwixt Man and Man" (II .172; also 
11, 181). 44 
What remains to be explained, however, is why we 
should regard as morally decisive a conception of reason 
that unites us rather than one that distinguishes or 
divides us. In the face of what he himself acknowledges to 
be the manifest superiority in "Parts and Merit" of some 
human beings to others, on what grounds does Locke deny, 
consistently and emphatically, the existence of a natural 
right of the truly rational or wise to rule, and affirm to 
the contrary the "eaual Right that every Man hath, to his 
Natural Freedom" (TT II. 54)? On what grounds does Locke 
insist that in the morally or jurally decisive respect, 
44Thus Pangle observes that "Locke promotes a rational 
society, i.e. a socialized rationality" (1988, 272). For a 
discussion of the deeper significance of this observation, 
see chapters VI and VII below, pp. 365-390, 424-450. 
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human beings constitute a single species?45 
45Locke's observation of inequality among human beings 
in the possession and exercise of reason brings into view a 
particularly challenging instance of the moral-political 
difficulty inherent in his critique of the doctrine of nat-
ural sorts or species. If in Locke's view "each abstract 
Idea, with a name to it, makes a distinct Species," then 
though we are not free to construct (as representations of 
real things) substance ideas by combining simple ideas that 
do not coexist in nature (3.6.28), we are free to choose, 
among a virtually limitless number, which clusters of par-
ticular beings bearing certain common qualities we will 
designate as species. Locke professes to hold no doubt 
that this implication of his account of substance ideas and 
names "will seem very strange" (3.6.38). Applied to our 
own species, Locke's argument would compel us to admit the 
existence of innumerable distinct sorts of human beings, 
each with as much right as any other, or for that matter as 
the class of human beings itself, to denomination as a nat-
ural species. Nature, in its presentation of ideas to our 
perceptions, entitles us to form species ideas of human 
beings, but entitles us equally to form such ideas of, say, 
redheads, left-handers, English-speakers, and of innumera-
ble other subgroups sharing some distinguishing quality. 
Perhaps the mo~t malignant implication that scholars have 
drawn from this argument is a justification of racial dis-
crimination, based on a justification of narrow or exclu-
sionary definitions of humankind. (See Miller 1979, 178n; 
McGuinness 1989, 141. See also the overviews in Farr 1986, 
and Glausser 1990, 211-213.) To this particular objection 
Locke can reasonably respond that although his account 
would indeed permit, say, ancient Greeks to define non-
Greeks, or North American or European whites to define 
Africans as by nature distinct species and vice-versa, it 
by no means permits them to define such groups as morally 
inferior, as barbarians or natural slaves. Not every 
species difference carries moral significance; since Locke 
regards morality as "the rule of mans actions for the 
atteining happynesse" ("Morality," in Sargentich 1974, 26; 
see note 23 above, and accompanying text), one must on 
Lockean grounds regard Greeks and non-Greeks or Europeans 
and Africans as moral equals, whatever their differences in 
other respects, insofar as they share the morally decisive 
capacity for the rational pursuit of happiness. (Cf. the 
arguments of Squadrito 1975 and Grant 1987, 28-31.) How 
Locke can respond to the proposition that the differential 
possession of rationality justifies the division of human 
beings into morally unequal subspecies, however, remains to 
be shown. 
THE STATE OF NATURE 
The difficulty that lingers in the wake of Locke's 
establishment of the capacity for agency as a requisite of 
the possession of rights can be restated as follows. Taken 
in itself, the human capacity for the self-conscious, cal-
culatingly rational pursuit of happiness implies no more 
than the existence of a natural desire among individual 
human beings for the protection of the conditions of happi-
ness, or at best a natural fitness for asserting one's 
rights as powers against others; it does not in itself 
imply the existence of any natural inclination to respect 
others' rights as rights, as equivalent to one's own and 
conferring reciprocal obligations. Why, in particular, 
should those of superior rationality, or those who believe 
themselves to be of superior rationality, respect the claim 
to equal rights by those they consider their inferiors? 
How is it consistent with their natural happiness for them 
to grant such respect? 
Returning briefly to the question concerning the sig-
nificance of Locke's qualified assertions of the possibil-
ity of a demonstrative science of ethics, we recall that 
his qualification of this point is twofold, implying first 
that not all but only "a great part" of morality is demon-
strable, and second that we must apply ourselves with 
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"Indifferency and Attention" to achieve whatever degree of 
demonstration we may be capable of. In elaborating the 
latter aspect of his qualification, Locke cautions that the 
achievement of "much" of a demonstrative ethic is condi-
tioned upon the triumph of rational "indifferency" over the 
obfuscations of "Vices, Passions, and domineering Inter-
ests" (4.3.18), and is thus "not to be expected, whilst the 
Desire of Esteem, Riches, or Power, makes Men espouse the 
well-endowed Opinions in Fashion, and then seek Arguments, 
either to make good their Beauty, or varnish over, and 
cover their Deformity ... " (4.3.20) .4 6 According to his own 
qualification, the viability of Locke's proposed science of 
ethics rests not only upon an actual equality in natural 
endowment, but also, and perhaps more importantly, in our 
willingness to acknowledge such equality. To the extent, 
therefore, that he is serious about the realism or efficacy 
of his proposed moral science--to the extent that the 
Essay's moral-political project accords with the broader 
Machiavellian project, elaborated in his more explicitly 
practical works, of "endowing virtue" or aligning it with 
interest (RC 245)47--Locke is compelled to attempt to 
measure the power of the passions and interests in ques-
46Hobbes seems somewhat less than optimistic, in con-
cluding Leviathan with the observation that "such Truth, as 
opposeth no mans profit, nor pleasure, is to all men wel-
come" (MacPherson ed. 1968, 729). 
47cf. The Prince ch.15ff; Hobbes, Leviathan 31, end; 
Rousseau, On The Social Contract 1.1. 
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tion. He is compelled, in other words, to extend his 
empirical inquiry into the character of the subjects of his 
proposal, into the area of human psychology or motivation. 
If Locke's thinking about political morality is to accom-
plish more than the construction of mere "Castles in the 
Air" (4.4.1), if the human pursuit of happiness is not to 
resolve into mere solipsism,48 the principles of human 
equality and unalienable rights must be not only internally 
consistent, but also capable of commanding a rational con-
sensus among human beings; in short, once again, they must 
conform with nature.49 
Herein lies the broader significance of Locke's in-
sistence in the Second Treatise that "To understand Polit-
ical Power right, and derive it from its Original, we must 
consider what State all Men are naturally in ... " (4). The 
48Rapaczynski states the question as follows: "But 
even if it is granted that men do form their own standards 
of good and evil .. it could still be argued that these facts 
by themselves do not guarantee any uniformity of moral val-
ues accepted by different subjects ... The norms of behavior 
presented in the mixed-modes theory may then be said to be 
like figments of imagination or conventional theoretical 
constructs: they can be changed for all kinds of reasons 
and are in this respect unlike the principles of morality, 
which must preserve a constant and intersubjective validi-
ty" (1987, 168-169). 
49rt would seem then that not simply the abstract idea 
of "moral man" itself, but more significantly the relation 
between moral beings and human beings constitutes for Locke 
the undemonstrative portion of the science of ethics. If 
so, then his assertions of a radical disjunction between 
natural and moral science, and by implication of the super-
iority of the latter to the former, must appear still more 
highly questionable. See note 6 above, and accompanying 
discussion. 
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condition of "Men living together according to reason, 
without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge 
between them, is properly the State of Nature" (II.19; cf. 
87). On its face, this reference to men "living together 
according to reason" need not mean that Locke conceives of 
the natural condition as essentially lawful and peaceful. 
Rather it is safer to say that the character of the natural 
condition for Locke reflects the extent to which the gover-
nance of each by his or her private reason can consist with 
or produce social peace and lawfulness. contrary to the 
views of some commentators, Locke does not employ the con-
cept of the state of nature as a mere heuristic contri-
vance; he affirms quite emphatically "That all men are 
naturally in that State, and remain so, till by their own 
Consents they make themselves Members of some Politick 
Society" (II.15; also 14,100-103).50 The state of nature 
50ounn asserts most emphatically the arbitrariness of 
Locke's concept of the state of nature, describing it as a 
"classically feeble expository cliche ... neither a piece of 
philosophical anthropology nor a piece of conjectural his-
tory. Indeed it has literally no transitive empirical con-
tent whatsoever ... In itself it is simply an axiom of theo-
logy" (1969, 100,103). See also Von Leyden 1981, 99. 
Against this view, various scholars argue for the historic-
al reality of the Lockean state or states of nature. See 
especially Strauss 1953, 230-231; Laslett 1960, 111-112; 
Seliger 1968, 83-91; Goldwin 1976; Colman 1983, 177; Pangle 
1988, 244-251. Others argue that Locke's ambiguous usage 
of the concept signifies a dual intention on his part, that 
the Lockean state of nature is both a historical and a mor-
al concept. Different versions of this reading appear in 
Ashcraft 1968, especially 898ff.; Aarslef 1969, 101-104; 
Waldron 1989. 
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is natural, for Locke, in large part51 insofar as it is 
revelatory of the natural constitution of the human mind, 
or of the natural power of reason relative to that of the 
(socially divisive) passions. In the context of Locke's 
political thought, it serves as a kind of historical lab-
oratory, or series of laboratories,52 in which reason and 
the passions are allowed, free of legal or conventional 
restraint, to contest for dominion within the human mind. 
In assessing the outcome of this contest, scholars 
have been and remain notoriously divided. To oversimplify 
somewhat, the predominant view throughout at least this 
century has held that in clear contrast to Hobbes and to 
some extent in anticipation of Rousseau, Locke conceives of 
an essentially pacific, even harmonious state of nature.53 
51Moving beyond the definitions in the Second Treat-
ise, one might more expansively define the Lockean state of 
nature as the totality of the provisions of nature (as 
opposed to human art) forming the constant context of the 
human pursuit of happiness. Pangle seems to have in mind 
something like this more expansive definition, in including 
"the drastic economic scarcity of the natural environment 
in which man is situated" as a dimension of the state of 
nature (1988, 244). 
52Thorough discussions of the various historical 
possibilities subsumed under the concept of the state of 
nature appear in Seliger 1968, 83-105; Goldwin 1976; and 
Simmons 1989. 
53several of Locke's commentators have tended in vary-
ing degrees to find in Locke an anticipation of Rousseau. 
An early proponent of this view is C.E. Vaughan; see 1925, 
134-139, 159-161, 202. In his note to TT I. 58, Laslett 
declares that Locke's contrast between the 'Brutality'of 
'busie'-minded men to the behavior of the 'irrational un-
taught Inhabitants' of the 'Woods and Forests,' who 'keep 
right by following Nature,' "reads almost like ... the Rous-
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Locke describes the early period of political society, and 
by implication the prepolitical state of nature, as a "poor 
but vertuous. . . Golden Age" marked by the "Innocence and 
sincerity" or the lack of "irregular," expansive desires on 
the part of its inhabitants (II.110,111: cf. 108,199). 
Because "in the beginning" each individual had not only "a 
Right to all he could employ his Labour on, 11 but also "no 
temptation to labour for more than he could make use of, " 
there could be "no reason of quarrelling" about property. 
Insofar as "Right and conveniency went together, 11 the law 
of nature is at least originally self-enforcing (II.37,51: 
also 31). 54 
Notwithstanding the significant textual evidence 
lending credence to the view of the Lockean natural condi-
tion as "a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, 
and Preservation" (II .19), the preponderance of the evi-
dence sustains the contrary view. According to this view, 
Locke more seriously conceives of the state of nature in a 
seau of the Discours sur l'Inegalite" (1960, 218n.). (For 
an effective response to Laslett's reading, see Tarcov 
1984, 68-70.) More recently, Grant remarks, on the basis 
of some of the evidence presented here, on the association, 
common to Locke and Rousseau, "of simplicity, poverty, vir-
tue, and good government" (1987, 88 n.50). Without specif-
ic reference to the relation between Locke and Rousseau, 
Ashcraft argues for the generally, though not entirely, 
peaceful character of the Lockean state of nature ( 1968, 
904) . 
54on the originally self-enforcing character of the 
natural law, cf. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and 
Foundations of Inequality Among Men, "Preface," 93-96: 
"First Part," 128-134 (ed. Masters 1964). 
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manner very similar to that of Hobbes, as an essentially 
antisocial, warlike condition.SS In Locke's own words, the 
state of nature is a condition wherein "the greater part" 
are "no strict Observers of Equity and Justice," and there-
fore a condition "full of fears and continual dangers"--an 
"ill condition" that is "not to be endured," whose subjects 
"are quickly driven into Society" (II.123,127,13).S6 
In order to provide a foundation for subsequent dis-
cussion, it is worthwhile for us to present at some length 
the evidence in support of this reading of Locke's inten-
tion. The argument that Locke conceives of an essentially 
pacific natural human condition causes us most immediately 
to wonder how and why, according to Locke, political soci-
eties and governments are originally constituted. With 
respect to the ultimate basis of human society, Locke 
speaks in similar, and similarly ambiguous, terms in the 
Essay and the Second Treatise. His summary statement in 
the latter runs as follows: 
God having made Man such a Creature, that, in his own 
Judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him 
under strong Obligations of Necessity, Convenience, and 
Inclination to drive him into Society, as well as fit-
ted him with Understanding and Language to continue and 
SSThe most influential recent proponent of this view 
is Strauss 19S3, especially 221-22S. See also Cox 1960, 
72-lOS; Goldwin 1972, 4S2-4S8; Pangle 1988, 244-2Sl. 
S6cf. ECHU 1.3.9: "Robberies, Murders, Rapes, are the 
Sports of Men set at Liberty from Punishment and Censure." 
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enjoy it. (II.77) 57 
once again, in view of such remarks it may seem clear 
enough that Locke holds human beings to be naturally social 
creatures. Yet here as always it is advisable to inquire 
further after Locke's meaning. 58 What specifically are the 
"Obligations of Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination" 
that "drive" us, as he suggestively puts it, into society? 
"The first Society," Locke continues, "was between 
Man and Wife, which gave beginning to that between Parents 
and Children" (II.77). It would seem reasonable to suppose 
that this society comes about through our pursuance of a 
natural inclination, and so it does, according to Locke, in 
a way; but not quite in the way that we might commonly, or 
perhaps charitably, suppose. In his treatment of this 
question in the Second Treatise, Locke characterizes "Con-
jugal Society" as based upon a "voluntary Compact," and 
rather pointedly denies, at least with respect to the gen-
erality of cases, that love alone suffices to bind men and 
women together. Instead he suggests that "a Communion of 
57The parallel statement in the Essay runs thus: "God 
having designed Man for a sociable Creature, made him not 
only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have 
fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him 
also with Language, which was to be the great Instrument, 
and common Tye of Society" (3.1.1). On Locke's apparently 
deliberate conflation of obligation and motivation in the 
Second Treatise' statement, see below, pp. 311-314. 
58The following brief account of Locke's view of the 
origin and basis of the family or human conjugal society 
draws in particular upon the fuller discussions in Tarcov 
1984, 66-76, and Pangle 1988, 172-177, 230-243. 
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Interest" is "necessary ... to unite their Care, and Affec-
tion" (II.78). Proceeding then to reduce the nature of 
human "conjugal society" to merely a particular form of 
"conjunction between Male and Female" in the animal king-
dom, Locke holds that the true end and bond of such con-
junctions is "not barely Procreation, but the continuation 
of the Species" (II.79). This claim is consistent with his 
proposition in the First Treatise that next to the desire 
for self-preservation, "God planted in Men also a strong 
desire of propagating their Kind, and continuing themselves 
in their Posterity" (I. 88) . Yet again, however, we must 
take care to understand precisely what Locke means by his 
references to the desire for continuing the species. For 
as Tarcov in particular observes, Locke here and elsewhere 
in the First Treatise implies that the desire for propaga-
tion is subordinate to and even derivative of the desire 
for self-preservation (1984, 69-70).59 Indeed his ef f ec-
tive annihilation of the notion that parental affection is 
an ineffaceable human instinct is unmistakable in his 
apparently unquestioning reporting of cannibalism practiced 
among some peoples by parents upon their own children 
59That Locke intends rather literally his reference to 
children as continuations of their parents' selves becomes 
clearer at I.97, where Locke claims that parents are 
"taught by Natural Love and Tenderness to provide for 
[their children], as a part of themselves." For further 
discussion of our capacity for expanding our sphere of 
concernment beyond our individual selves, see chapter VI 
below, pp. 309-349. 
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(I. 56-59). 60 
Shortly prior to delivering those reports, by means 
of a simple rhetorical question Locke discloses what he 
takes to be a more strictly natural inclination that is 
more effective in moving us to form conjugal societies even 
than the parental affection that represents a form of ex-
tended self-love. "What Father of a Thousand," asks Locke, 
when he begets a Child, thinks farther than the satisfying 
his present Appetite?" (I.54).61 But if mere lust is 
according to Locke the primary natural inclination reliably 
supporting the formation of conjugal society, then we must 
view with considerable skepticism even the reasoning that 
60Locke presents this among several examples of like 
barbarism at ECHU 1.3.9,12. See also LN 4.145-147, 7.187-
193, 10.217. 
61see also ECHU 2.21.34, where Locke, apparently reso-
lute in maintaining his bachelorhood, provides a similar, 
somewhat more comedic statement of this exceedingly unsen-
timental view of the basis of marriage: "It is better to 
marry than to burn, says st. Paul [I Cor. 7:9]; where we 
may see, what it is, that chiefly drives Men into the en-
joyments of a conjugal life. A little burning felt pushes 
us more powerfully, than greater pleasures in prospect draw 
or allure." Moreover, his expression shortly thereafter of 
a still greater austerity may recall to mind a similar ex-
pression by an earlier detractor of the institution of mar-
riage. It is noteworthy that in listing the ordinary, con-
stantly recurring uneasinesses of "Hunger, Thirst, Heat, 
Cold, Weariness with labour, and Sleepiness" (2.21.45), 
Locke makes no mention of any form of erotic desire; cf. 
the well known austerity of Socrates' account of the origin 
of cities, at Republic 369-372. (See especially Strauss 
1964, 111-118,138; 1972, 20-26, 38-41). For evidence indi-
cating that such austerity may not represent the whole of 
Locke's view of these relationships, and on the general 
significance of his apparent abstraction from eros, see 
chapter VI below, pp. 350-416. 
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supports his stated estimate of the naturally longer 
(though by no means lifelong) conjunction that distin-
guishes human marriages, inasmuch as that reasoning rests 
upon the presumption that fathers would be naturally 
inclined to perform their "Obligation" to care for their 
offspring (II.80).62 Moreover, if according to Locke our 
natural affections are generally of insufficient power to 
sustain even familial or conjugal obligations, it is diffi-
cult to see how they could be sufficiently powerful in 
themselves to bind individuals together as members of a 
common political society. 
Similar difficulties inhere in the suggestion that 
convenience is the decisive factor in effecting the origin 
of political society. If we understand convenience as dis-
tinct from necessity proper, it would seem to reduce to the 
desire to diminish one's labors by cooperation with one's 
fellows. Supposing, then, even that the early human beings 
possessed the civility and foresight required for them to 
engage in such cooperation--a dubious assumption on the 
basis of Locke's discussion--we would yet be unable by 
reference to this factor alone to explain the origin of 
62cf. Rousseau's objection to what he takes to be 
Locke's account of the naturalness of family life, at Dis-
course on Inequality, note 1, 213-220. I am suggesting 
that when one reads Locke's account in the Second Treatise 
in the light of what he says and implies about the same 
subject in the First Treatise, it appears that the disa-
greement between Locke and Rousseau is much smaller than 
Rousseau recognizes or is willing to admit. 
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.129litical society proper.63 It would seem that in ref er-
ring to "Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination" as appar-
ently coequal forces, Locke nonetheless implies that neces-
sity is the primary factor motivating the creation of soci-
ety. To state it more precisely, Locke seems to imply that 
human beings are moved originally to form stable societies 
less by any positive, outward- or forward-looking inclina-
tion toward one or another form of fellowship than by the 
inclination or "strong desire of Self-preservation" (I.86), 
given direction by the naturally necessitous condition of 
humankind. 
A closer look at the relevant discussions corrobo-
rates this suggestion. Following his discussion of conju-
gal society and familial relations in the Second Treatise, 
Locke addresses the question of the beginning of political 
society proper. His announced purpose in chapter eight is 
to defend the proposition that "that, which begins and 
actually constitutes any Political Society, is nothing but 
the consent of any number of Freemen capable of a majority 
to unite and incorporate into such a Society" (99). Lest 
63one might yet argue that some combination of mater-
ial necessity and convenience constitutes the primary moti-
vation for the creation and maintenance of society within a 
certain stage of the state of nature, and that only later, 
with the development of distinctly human vices, does the 
need for genuine coercive government arise. For a more 
specific assessment of this argument, see the examination 
of the character of the necessity, i.e. material or mar-
tial, to which the original human beings may be subject, in 
the context of the more general problem of teleology in 
Locke's account, pp. 274-300 below. 
268 
we misinterpret his intention, however, in attempting to 
understand this proposition we should first bear in mind 
that political power in Locke's usage is not necessarily 
synonymous with governmental power. In strict Lockean 
usage, political power is by definition legitimate, invol-
ving "g_ Right of making Laws ... " (II.3). Accordingly Locke 
proceeds to offer the following qualification of the doc-
trine of historical consent: 
Reason being plain on our side, that Men are naturally 
free, and the Examples of History shewing, that the 
Governments of the World, that were begun in Peace ... 
were made Qy the Consent of the People ... " (II.104) 
From this remark alone we can inf er only that accor-
ding to Locke some governments originated in peace and 
consent, and some did not. In reaffirming this qualifica-
tion shortly thereafter, however, Locke provides a clarify-
ing hint. He refers in chapter 8 only to the peaceful 
beginnings of government, he now discloses, "because . I 
shall have occasion in another place to speak of Conquest, 
which some esteem a way of beginning of Governments" 
(II.112). Chapter 16 of the Second Treatise, "Of Con-
quest," begins as follows: 
Though Governments can originally have no other Rise 
than that before mentioned, nor Polities be founded on 
any thing but the Consent of the People; yet such has 
been the Disorders Ambition has filled the World with, 
that in the noise of War, which makes so great a part 
of the History of Mankind, this Consent is little taken 
notice of... (175) 
If it is Locke's view that "the noise of war ... makes 
so great a part of the history of mankind, " then it could 
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not be Locke's view that the generality of governments 
throughout history began in peace and popular consent. Nor 
is this Locke's only significant qualification of the 
announced thesis of the chapter. For as Pangle somewhat 
tartly observes, as the chapter unfolds "even the miniscule 
part of history that is the nice, peaceful, consensual part 
turns out to be not so nice" (1988, 249). Ostensibly as 
historical evidence for the thesis of original peace and 
consent, Locke presents the beginnings of Rome and Venice, 
and the founding of Tarentum by Palantus and his Spartan 
followers (II.102,103). Yet as Cox points out, Locke's own 
sources indicate that all these cities in fact began in 
acts of conquest, not consent (1960, 42-44,100-101,210-
211). Moreover, Locke quotes the historian Acosta to the 
effect that the early Peruvians lived for a long time out-
side political society, and freely chose their rulers when 
they saw the need for government (II.102). But upon exam-
ining the text in question, one finds that Acosta's concept 
of choice can scarcely be said to meet the criteria of 
Lockean consent. In the immediate sequel to the remark 
Locke quotes, Acosta elaborates his opinion of the true 
origin of government among the Indians: "But some men 
excelling others in force and wit, began in time to rule 
and domineere as Nembrot did; so increasing by little and 
little, they erected the kingdoms of Peru and Mexico ... " 
(1590, 72). Later in the same work, after discrediting the 
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Indians' own accounts of the origins of their societies, 
Acosta conceives of the original condition of the Indians 
as "altogether barbarous," a condition wherein they existed 
"without law, without King, and without any certaine place 
of abode, but [went] in troupes like savage beasts," and 
out of which "comminalties" develop through the "valure and 
knowledge of some excellent men" (427).64 It seems clear 
that in this context "valure and knowledge" refer not to 
virtue and wisdom, or to the perfections of civilized human 
beings, but instead to "force and wit," to the virtues of 
war. 65 
Upon closer inspection even Locke's apparent descrip-
tions in this chapter of an originally pacific human condi-
tion reveal themselves to be consistent with the more 
Hobbesian or Machiavellian conception suggested here. Once 
again, taken at face value his references to the infancy of 
political society as a "poor but vertuous Age," a "Golden 
Age" (II .110, 111) in which political societies as out-
growths of particular familial societies were internally 
harmonious, bound by affection and troubled by only the 
64see also Acosta's description of "some more barbar-
ous" places, where "all command and govern in common, hav-
ing no other thing, but wil, violance, unreason, and dis-
order, so as he that most may, most commands" (410). For a 
fuller account, see Cox 1960, 94-104. 
65cf. Locke's reference to the tendency of the "People 
of America" to pass over weak heirs in favor of selecting 
"the stoutest and bravest Man for their Ruler" (II. 105; 
also 109). 
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simplest of desires (II.105,107,110; also 74-76), would 
tend to raise the question why political authority, which 
after all involves a right of legislating "with Penalties 
of Death, and consequently all less Penalties" (II.3), is 
needed at all. Locke answers that fathers become kings, or 
familial societies become political in character, with a 
view toward defending themselves against foreign or exter-
nal enemies: "their first care and thought cannot but 
be .•. how to secure themselves against foreign Force" 
(II.107). Government appears originally less as judicial 
authority than as federative, especially military, power: 
" ... the Kings of the Indians in America, which is still a 
Pattern of the first Ages in Asia and Europe ... are little 
more than Generals of their Armies .•. " (II.108; also 
105,109,110). The affection that Locke describes in this 
chapter apparently serves at best as a principle of inter-
nal unity; such "golden age" as ever existed obtained at 
best within, but not among, particular societies.66 Accor-
dingly, he observes that irrespective of whether mere 
"Chance, Neighborhood, or Business" initially brought them 
into proximity, the uniting of particular societies under 
common governments must have occurred, as a rule, as "the 
stronger, or more fortunate swallowed the weaker" (II.110, 
66Beneath Locke's question whether human affection 
were originally powerful enough to prevent wars lies there-
fore the implicit question whether it were originally pow-
erful enough to provoke them. See the discussion in chap-
ter VI below, pp. 393-398. 
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115). 
The evidence presented thus far is sufficient to 
establish the view that an essentially Hobbesian conception 
of the state of nature reflects Locke's most serious inten-
tion. Whether Locke is by his own principles or by the 
relevant evidence entitled to conceive of the state of 
nature in this manner, however, is another question. Locke 
himself points us toward the fundamental issue. "'Tis 
often asked as a mighty Objection," he acknowledges, "Where 
are, or ever were, there any Men in such g_ State of 
Nature?" (II.14; also 100). For if the evils of the state 
of nature are such as to drive its subjects quickly out of 
it, then would not that state be virtually inaccessible by 
the sort of historical evidence that Locke employs to sup-
port his description of it? Locke himself seems to concede 
that "History gives us but a very little account of Men, 
that lived together in the State of Nature." But if "Gov-
ernment is everywhere antecedent to Records," and the ad-
vent of "Letters" occurs only after "a long continuation of 
Civil Society has, by other more necessary Arts provided 
for [a People's) Safety, Ease, and Plenty" (II.101), how 
then can Locke counter the "mighty Objection" that the 
state of nature as such necessarily eludes precisely the 
sort of historical inquiry that would be required for us to 
gain knowledge of it? How can he avoid the conclusion that 
whatever his intentions, his account of the state of nature 
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is unhistorical, is at bottom nothing more than an arbi-
trary or ideological contrivance? 
THE PROBLEM OF TELEOLOGY 
It is useful at this point to raise this objection 
not because it is in itself unanswerable in Lockean terms, 
but rather because the response suggested by Locke's dis-
cussion points to a still deeper objection and thus facil-
itates a deeper understanding of Locke's conception of the 
nature and natural condition of humankind. To the immedi-
ate objection Locke responds in effect that we do have 
access to ample historical evidence of the character of the 
state of nature, even if our accounts of the original con-
dition of humankind are necessarily somewhat conjectural. 
Locke's concept of the state of nature is ahistorical in 
the sense that it refers to no particular historical or 
prehistorical period, but instead to a set of possible 
relationships among jurally free human beings. 67 This 
implies that the actions toward others of any human beings 
unrestrained by law, irrespective either of historical 
period or of the presence of government, are admissible for 
Locke as evidence of the character of the state of nature. 
Relations between independent rulers or sovereigns, or 
between uncivil, nonconsensual or despotic rulers and their 
subjects for this reason represent instances of the state 
of nature, just as would relations among truly independent 
67see note 52 above. 
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individuals or families in a prepolitical condition.68 
Locke's response to the immediate objection thus pro-
ceeds from his refusal to recognize any strict disjunction 
between natural history and human history; in drawing con-
clusions in the Second Treatise concerning the state of 
nature on the basis of historical evidence, he simply ap-
plies and extends the appeal to natural history that marks 
his empiricism in the Essay. On the proposition that human 
nature can be known through the study of history69 rests to 
68Locke implies a distinction between "ordinary" and 
extraordinary states of nature, according to which in the 
ordinary state each individual possesses a liberty roughly 
equal to that of all others "to judge of his Right, and ac-
cording to the best of his Power, to maintain it," whereas 
in (what Locke implies would be) the extraordinary state, 
the enforcement of individuals' rights depends decisively 
upon the whims of "one, who being in the unrestrained state 
of Nature, is yet corrupted with Flattery, and armed with 
Power" (II.91). Insofar as these ordinary and extraordina-
ry states can be identified with pre- and post-political 
states of nature, Locke's argument is that the character of 
the ordinary state can be inferred from that of the extra-
ordinary state. See, for example, II.108, where Locke 
refers to "America" as "still a Pattern of the first Ages 
in Asia and Europe." (See also II.46,49,102). Cf. the 
brief discussion of Pangle (1988, 247-248), who appears to 
identify this distinction with Locke's parallel (and also 
largely implicit) distinction between "perfect" and imper-
fect states of nature (II.14,87, 94). As Pangle observes, 
Locke seems to intend both to indicate quietly the diff i-
cul ty in conceiving of a strict separation between the 
natural and political conditions. But the difference lies 
in the fact that the latter turns on the degree to which 
each has a perfect right to judge and execute the law of 
nature, while the former turns on the degree to which each 
has the power to do so. Cf. Goldwin 1976, 135. 
69rn his brief essay "Some Thoughts Concerning Reading 
and Study for a Gentleman," Locke opines that one can learn 
of human nature "chiefly from experience, and next to that 
from a judicious reading of history," as well as from cer-
tain classic texts such as Aristotle's Rhetoric (quoted in 
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a considerable extent his agreement with Hobbes on the 
antisocial, warlike character of the natural condition. As 
he explains in a discussion of the dangers of absolute mon-
archy, to study "the History of this, or any other Age" is 
to confirm the opinion of "the baseness of Humane Nature" 
(II.92). Precisely because human history in great part 
resounds with "the noise of War" (II.175), Locke recommends 
that it be taught to young pupils with a special care not 
to bestow honor upon conquerors, lest such pupils be misled 
"to think Slaughter the laudable Business of Mankind, and 
the most Heroick of Vertues" (STCE 116). 70 His extensive 
exploration of the travel literature of his day, offering 
for Locke at least a glimpse of "the first Ages" of human 
Axtell 1968, 403). When Laslett remarks that "As a polit-
ical theorist ••. Locke made no appeal to history or tradi-
tion, " he seems to mean only that Locke did not appeal to 
English history or tradition as the source of his concep-
tion of right (1960, 91; cf. his reference to Locke as the 
founder of comparative anthropology, at 112). Glat ob-
serves properly that the Second Treatise displays a concern 
more for the history of humankind than for that of the Eng-
1 ish, and further that the aspiration toward a genuinely 
historical analysis of politics is central not only to 
Locke's thought, but indeed to early modern political 
thought in general (1981, 4,15). 
70rn an unpublished essay "Of Study," Locke recommends 
that history of this kind be taught only "to one who hath 
well settled in his mind the principles of morality," inas-
much as "the greatest part of history being made up of wars 
and conquest," we would be otherwise "in danger to be mis-
led by the general current and business of history; and 
looking on Alexander and Caesar and such like heroes as the 
highest instances of human greatness because they each of 
them caused the death of several 100,000 men ... we are apt 
to make butchery and rapine the chief marks and very 
essence of human greatness" (quoted in Axtell 1968, 422, 
410) . 
277 
history and of a rather broad diversity of societies and 
cultures, yields similar data. Locke seems indeed to find 
a certain relish in refuting the proposition that a natural 
moral consensus binds humankind, by relaying the reports of 
"authors worthy of confidence that entire nations have 
been, on their own admission, pirates and brigands" (LN 
5.185). "Have there not been whole Nations," he asks rhe-
torically, "and those of the most civilized People, amongst 
whom" the practices of exposure, or parricide, or cannibal-
ism are widespread and publicly approved (ECHU 1. 3. 9 et 
seq.; cf. TT I.56-59)? 
Once again, Locke's defense of the accessibility of 
the state of nature depends upon the constancy of that 
condition, or upon the constancy of human nature, through-
out human history. It depends, in other words, upon a 
conception of human history as fundamentally or essentially 
nondevelopmental. Herein lies the serious issue. In fail-
ing or refusing to recognize a strict disjunction between 
natural and human history, Locke may seem to expose himself 
to the deeper objection formulated most powerfully and 
influentially by Rousseau, who summarizes his charge as 
follows: 
The philosophers who have examined the foundations of 
society have all felt the necessity of going back to 
the state of nature, but none of them has reached it. 
Some have not hesitated to attribute to man in that 
state the notion of the just and unjust, without troub-
ling themselves to show that he had to have that notion 
or even that it was useful to him ... All of them, final-
ly, speaking continually of need, avarice, oppression, 
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desires, and pride, have carried over to the state of 
nature ideas they had acquired in society: they spoke 
about savage man and they described civil man. (Dis-
course on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality 
.Among Men, in Masters ed. 1964, 102) 
There can be no doubt that at the head of the list of 
philosophers to whom Rousseau refers are Hobbes and Locke. 
As Bloom comments, Rousseau's charge amounts to a charac-
terization of the two English founders of modern liberalism 
as "cryptoteleologists" (1972, 535). Hobbes and Locke 
accept and indeed significantly advance the modern critique 
of the classical teleological understanding of nature, 
according to Rousseau, but they do not pursue this critique 
to its ultimate conclusion. They seem to conceive of the 
natural condition of humankind as the condition prior to 
all conventional acquisitions, yet in describing this con-
dition they fail to appreciate the profundity of the act of 
abstraction that such a conception properly requires. At-
tributing to the nature of human beings a developed ration-
al faculty and various socially dependent and divisive pas-
sions (such as, most fundamentally, pride or vanity), they 
fail to appreciate nature's beneficence in providing for an 
original human condition of simplicity and peace, and 
therewith the decisively conventional character of human-
kind' s historical ills. Finally, their failure to grasp 
the naturally indeterminate, evolutionary character of the 
human species and the human condition determines their 
blindness to the need to discard entirely the traditional 
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notion of a natural law or right that is applicable to 
civil societies, and to replace it with purely abstract, 
formal principles of legitimacy, capable of accommodating 
as much as possible the radically malleable character of 
human beings and therefore the radically historical, rela-
tivistic character of substantive principles of justice.71 
Adding to the difficulty is the fact that at times 
Locke himself appears to anticipate Rousseau's position and 
thus to contradict (what seems to be) his own. Locke's 
conception of the relation between nature and custom is of 
particular importance in this respect. In his discussions 
of the moral, intellectual, and political dimensions of 
human development, Locke stresses in varying degrees the 
principle that in its influence over human behavior, "Cus-
tom [is] a greater Power than Nature" (ECHU 1. 3. 25). In 
the Essay, this principle appears primarily in the form of 
Locke's observations of the ordinarily enormous power that 
traditional, received opinions exercise over our understan-
dings (1.3.23-27, 2.33.6).72 In Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education, the principle that "Custom ... prevails over 
everything" (STCE 164) appears primarily in the form of a 
repeated insistence on the power of habituation as an edu-
cational device; the possibility of success in the forming 
71see the discussion of Rousseau's critique in Strauss 
1953, esp. 264-294. 
72see also cu 34,41; STCE 146. 
280 
of a child's character seems to rest decisively for Locke 
upon the possibility that "Habits" can be "woven into the 
very Principles of his Nature" (42; also 64,66,67) .73 
Locke's descriptions of the power of custom and habit-
uation raise the question whether this subtle interweaving 
of habit into nature in the end leaves nature influential 
or even recognizable in any significant respect. They 
raise the question whether according to his own principle, 
Locke must ultimately acknowledge that the faculties and 
passions that he ordinarily ascribes, with Hobbes, to human 
nature are in fact in the decisive respect not natural, but 
products of custom or convention. To what extent does 
Locke's estimate of the power of custom apply to the forma-
tion or development of species characteristics as well as 
those of individuals? With respect to the most apparently 
"human" of the faculties, namely reason or the understan-
ding, we should consider in this context the implications 
both of Locke's fundamental insistence that the understan-
ding is originally or naturally unfurnished (ECHU 2. 1. 2) , 
and of his occasional usages of the term "naturals" to 
ref er to human beings lacking any developed rational f ac-
73As an apparent corollary of his estimate of the great 
power of custom, Locke offers a similarly expansive esti-
mate of the power of education: " ... I think I may say, 
that of all the Men we meet with, Nine Parts of Ten are 
what they are, Good or Evil, useful or not, by their Educa-
tion. 'Tis that which makes the great Difference in Man-
kind" (STCE 1). Locke remarks somewhat ambiguously on the 
common propensity to acquire a customary attachment to 
traditional constitutional forms, at TT II.223,225. 
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ulty.74 And with respect to the passions, we should con-
sider as well Locke's important distinction between "ordi-
nary" or natural and "fantastical" uneasinesses, according 
to which nature besets us with certain constantly recur-
ring, apparently physiological "necessities" or uneasi-
nesses, such as "Hunger, Thirst, Heat, Cold, Weariness with 
labour, and Sleepiness," whereas such other primarily men-
tal uneasinesses as "itch after Honour, Power, or Rich-
es ... and a thousand other irregular desires" represent 
"acquir'd habits by Fashion, Example, and Education ... which 
custom has made natural to us" (2. 21. 45). 75 On the basis 
of this distinction taken in itself, one would expect that 
Locke, like Rousseau, would consider the advent of civili-
zation on balance a misfortune that reflects and perhaps 
also hastens the historical degeneration or corruption of 
humankind.7 6 To what extent then does Locke agree with the 
position of Rousseau on the relation of nature to custom, 
and to what extent does he therefore undermine his appar-
74see pp. 251-253 above. 
75cf. the very similar distinction between "Natural 
Wants" and "Wants of Fancy" at STCE 106ff. Cf. also Rous-
seau's famous description of the passions of the natural 
man, Discourse on Inequality, QR. cit., 116: "His desires 
do not exceed his physical needs, the only goods he knows 
in the universe are nourishment, a female, and repose; the 
only evils he fears are pain and hunger ... " 
76vaughan (1925, 138,160) and Seliger (1968, 71) 
attribute to Locke the thesis of historical degeneration. 
Albritton's inference of an original human like-mindedness 
at the level of simple ideas appears to point to a similar 
conclusion (1976, 263). 
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ently Hobbesian conception of the antipolitical, antisocial 
character of the state of nature? 
Here is the basic issue. If Locke does, like Rous-
seau, intend a completely nonteleological conception of the 
natural condition, constituted only by what is originally 
given to humankind and excluding what is acquired or pro-
duced by human labor of any kind, then we would be com-
pelled to acknowledge as an implication of Locke's princi-
ple that neither rationality nor any socially divisive 
desire could be in the strictest sense natural. On the 
other hand, if we ascribe to Locke an insistence on the 
naturalness of the latter as human qualities, then it would 
seem that Rousseau's observation is sound, at least to the 
extent that Locke's failure or refusal to identify the nat-
ural and the original marks him in some sense a teleolo-
gist. We will argue, first, that Rousseau's observation is 
indeed sound in the respect that Locke's conception of the 
state of nature does mark him, in his way, as a teleolo-
gist; but second, that Locke employs the teleological prin-
ciple self-consciously and in a manner that distinguishes 
him not only from radically anti-teleological modern phil-
osophers, but also from the classical teleologists. 
Within the context of their political theories, Locke 
and Rousseau appear to disagree most fundamentally with 
respect to the extent to which our natural concern for our 
own well-being necessitates the advent of society, and 
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necessitates thenceforth the development of the faculties 
and passions that we commonly take to be definitive of or 
distinctive in human nature. We have established above the 
fact of Locke's appeal in the Second Treatise to natural 
necessity, to the natural endangerment of individuals' 
preservation or well being, as the efficient cause of the 
origin of political society. We must now inquire further 
into the grounds of that appeal, or more specifically into 
the character of that motivating necessity. 
In chapter 5 of the Second Treatise in particular, 
Locke gives the impression, by means of his widely noticed 
references therein to the original condition as one of pen-
ury, want, need and wretchedness and to nature's spontan-
eous provision as mere waste (II.32,35,37,42,43,45) that 
the natural necessity of which he conceives is a fundamen-
tally material condition. 77 Yet even if we dismiss as 
anti-Hobbesian rhetorical evasions his descriptions in the 
same chapter of an original condition of material plenty 
featuring harmonious property relations, the fact remains 
that Locke provides therein no real argument in support of 
the proposition that pure material necessity or scarcity is 
the decisive force that drives the early human beings into 
77 Cf. ECHU 2 .16. 6, where Locke refers to the "Ameri-
cans, " whom he regards in the Second Treatise as paradig-
matic of the first ages in Asia and Europe (108), as "ac-
commodated only to the few necessaries of a needy simple 
Life." Recall also Locke's assimilation of the naturally 
unprovided material and intellectual conditions (ECHU 
2.2.2, 2.12.1). 
. t 78 socie Y· 
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He never retracts or contradicts his conjecture 
that the originally small number of "spenders," in conjunc-
tion with the severely limited productivity of their labor, 
would leave "no reason of quarrelling about Title" in the 
first ages (II.31,44,51). Of course, that there may have 
been no reason for such quarrels would not imply that they 
could not have occurred; but it does imply that if they did 
occur, they must have proceeded either from the obstinate 
incapacity to resolve an honest dispute or from covetous-
ness of one form or another. It implies, in other words, 
that any "necessity" of sufficient power to drive the 
original human beings "quickly ... into Society" (II .127) 79 
must have been at least as much psychological as material 
in character; the advent of stable, enduring human socie-
ties would then represent an effort to achieve security not 
so much against the prospect of starvation as against the 
prospective consequences of conflict with other human 
beings. 
In fact, when Locke mentions the forces that drive us 
out of the state of nature into society, he makes no men-
78cf. again Rousseau's apparently contrary estimate of 
the fertility of the natural material condition, Discourse 
on Inequality, First Part, 105, and noted, 186-187. 
79or perhaps in some cases to drive them apart from 
one another, into a condition of dispersion. See II.101: 
"The inconveniences of that condition, and the love, and 
want of Society no sooner brought any number of them to-
gether, but they presently united and incorporated, if they 
designed to continue together" (emphasis supplied). 
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tion of primarily material necessity. Instead he refers to 
the baseness and viciousness of human nature (II .13, 125, 
128); he maintains that the state of nature is "full of 
fears and continual dangers," an "ill condition" that is 
"not to be endured," precisely because "the greater part" 
of its subjects are "no strict Observers of Equity and Jus-
tice" (II.123,127). In chapter 8, as we have seen, in 
identifying the original necessity that binds families and 
political societies, Locke refers not to any material pri-
vation, but rather to a desire on the part of the stronger 
or more fortunate to conquer the weaker (115). His expla-
nation is somewhat more elaborate in chapter 5, wherein he 
implies that at work very early in the development of the 
human mind if not from the very beginning is an expansive 
desire, a "desire of having more than Men needed," an "amor 
scleratus habendi" (II. 37, 111), even a desire to conquer 
and subdue, a desire for power for its own sake. 
Locke introduces this desire abruptly in this con-
text, apparently to mark a transition from one stage of the 
prepolitical state of nature to another. He suggests that 
"in the beginning, before" this expansive desire "had al-
tered the intrinsick value of things," the right to approp-
riate was limited to what one could directly use or consume 
(II.37, emphasis supplied). But the significance of this 
transition is questionable. Strictly speaking, Locke re-
fers to a condition before desire beyond necessity had a 
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specific effect, namely the alteration of intrinsic or use 
values; he makes or implies no comment here concerning 
whether such desire were present in the beginning and sim-
ply otherwise focused. 80 While it is true that Locke pre-
sents in chapter 5 an account of early property relations 
as generally peaceful, he by no means discounts entirely 
the passion of covetousness, or the desire for "the benefit 
of another's Pains" or labor, as a possible cause of con-
tention. 81 Early in his discussion, he qualifies his 
statement of the originally pacific character of property 
relations, claiming only that "there could be then little 
room for Quarrels or Contentions about Property so estab-
lish'd," that is, little room for quarrels so long as prop-
erty is taken directly from nature and limited to one's 
immediate use (II.31; emphasis supplied). Shortly there-
after he raises directly the possibility that theft might 
80cf. the similar procedure at II.111: Locke's refer-
ence to a golden age "before vain Ambition, and amor scler-
atus habendi, evil Concupiscence, had corrupted Mens minds 
into a Mistake of true Power and Honour" does not imply the 
existence of an age from which such passions were simply 
absent; it seems to mean that in an age of tribal, patri-
archal monarchy, such passions were typically directed out-
ward against other peoples rather than inward against one's 
own. 
81rt is interesting in this respect, as Pangle ob-
serves ( 1988, 161) , that in his chapter "Of Property," 
Locke makes no mention of the state of nature. Taken in 
conjunction with the evidence indicating that he intention-
ally exaggerates the peaceful character of property rela-
tions in that chapter, this seems to imply that the state 
of nature as such, whatever its particular manifestation, 
cannot be characterized as a condition of peace. See Mans-
field 1979, 36; Pangle 1988, 170. 
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be the first of the labor-saving arts discovered by human 
beings, that covetousness might be a natural outgrowth of 
the ignorant early wanderers' subjection to uncertain, 
penurious material circumstances (34). Most significantly, 
he suggests a few paragraphs later that "Men, at first, for 
the most part, contented themselves with what un-assisted 
Nature Offered to their Necessities" (II.45; emphasis sup-
plied); he suggests that at least in some or a few human 
beings, from the earliest period onward, operates some deep 
and potentially dangerous desire to transcend or conquer 
necessity, to magnify oneself by expanding the realm of 
one's own freedom and power.82 
It seems clear then that whatever the form in which 
it manifests itself historically, the Lockean state of 
82without denying the developmental aspect of Locke's 
account of the prepolitical state of nature, one must con-
clude that that development cannot be described as a lapse 
from a peaceful, nomadic, pre-money stage to a contentious, 
sedentary, post-money stage. MacPherson is much closer to 
the mark in arguing that Locke does divide the prepolitical 
state of nature into pre- and post-money stages, and yet 
denying that this division corresponds to Locke's descrip-
tions of peaceful and warlike states of nature; the divi-
sion is important for Locke, in this view, because it 
brings to light the conditions under which truly rational 
appropriation can flourish (1962, 197-221,232-236, 241-
242). In ascribing to Locke a conception of "a monetary 
and commercial state of nature, which is nonsense historic-
ally" (235-6; also 209), however, MacPherson seems errone-
ously to assume that the Lockean state of nature must be 
without government altogether, not merely without civil 
government. As is evident in his repeated references to 
early wandering peoples as living under rudimentary govern-
ments (II.41,102,107-110), Locke does not suppose that the 
advent of money historically precedes that of government. 
Nor, therefore, does he suppose that the conflicts facili-
tated by money are the originating cause of government. 
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nature, understood as a condition necessitating the consti-
tution of political societies, refers ultimately at least 
as much to a natural mental condition as to a material 
condition. What seems to impress Locke most about the 
natural human condition is the power of the human will to 
overwhelm or obfuscate the understanding's attempts at 
charting the course of true happiness, or of "true Power 
and Honour" (II.111). The state of nature as a state of 
"perfect Freedom" (II. 4) harbors the constant danger of 
degenerating into a state of complete mental license, in 
which the mind's power to create whole worlds of fancy 
operates virtually without rational guidance or regula-
tion. 83 Absent such rational restraint, the fact that 
human beings, unlike other animals, possess by nature no 
moderating instincts84 explains why "Robberies, Murders, 
Rapes, are the Sports of Men set at Liberty from Punishment 
and Censure" (ECHU 1.3.9).85 Locke's comment in the First 
83see Pangle 1988, especially 179-180. 
84In response to humans' capacity for neglect of and 
even cruelty toward their own offspring, Locke asks: "And 
is it the Priviledge of Man alone to act more contrary to 
Nature than the Wild and most Untamed part of the Crea-
tion?" (I.56). In this denial of the power of instinct 
seems to lie Locke's real similarity to Rousseau. See 
Discourse on Inequality, First Part, 113-115; also Tarcov 
1984, 68-70. 
85cf. 1.3.13: "Principles of Actions indeed there are 
lodged in Men's Appetites [i.e. the pursuit of pleasure and 
the avoidance of pain], but these are so far from being 
innate Moral Principles, that if they were left to their 
full swing, they would carry Men to the over-turning of all 
Morality." 
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D'."eatise on Vega's account of Peruvian cannibalism is worth 
quoting at length: 
Thus far can the busie mind of Man carry him to a Bru-
tality below the level of Beasts, when he quits his 
reason, which places him almost equal to Angels. Nor 
can it be otherwise in a Creature, whose thoughts are 
more than the Sands, and wider than the Ocean, where 
fancy and passion must needs run him into strange 
courses, if reason, which is his only Star and compass, 
be not that he steers by. The imagination is always 
restless and suggests variety of thoughts, and the 
will, reason being laid aside, is ready for every 
extravagant project; and in this State, he that goes 
farthest out of the way, is thought fittest to lead, 
and is sure of most followers ... (I.58) 
An acute sensitivity to this human propensity for 
willfulness, fancy or "busy-mindedness"--ultimately for 
madness--not only underlies his urgent insistence in the 
Two Treatises on the proper limits of governmental, polit-
ical power,86 but also runs as a recurrent, unifying theme 
throughout Locke's work.87 As we have seen, he undertakes 
in both published and unpublished works a wide-ranging his-
torical refutation of the proposition that a natural moral 
consensus binds humankind, employing evidence gleaned both 
from his extensive exploration of the travel literature of 
his day and from his knowledge of more conventional histor-
ical sources to illustrate the prevalence of war and via-
86Thus Locke warns of the power and danger of human 
ambition, and particularly of the dangerous effects of 
flattering the powerful, at II.91,135n.,143,226, and I.10. 
8 7 On the power of fancy, see Locke to an otherwise 
unidentified "Tom," 20 October 1659, CJL #81. More gener-
ally on the human propensity for fancy, "busy-mindedness" 
and ultimately madness, see ECHU 1.1.4; 2.1.2,16; 2.33.4,9. 
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1ence throughout human history. 88 The overridingly impor-
tant, transhistorical constant among human beings, accor-
ding to Locke, is the extreme fragility of human reason, 
and thus our easy susceptibility to the most extravagant, 
grotesque mental or psychological disorders. This, as the 
natural mental condition of humankind, constitutes most 
essentially the necessitous condition of which we must be 
ever cognizant in our attempts at constructing and main-
taining political societies. 
This is the character of the Lockean teleology, as 
manifest in Locke's account of the state of nature. The 
preceding discussion has made it clear that Locke regards 
the acquisition of expansive, fanciful desires (both social 
and antisocial) as well as of some rudimentary, instrumen-
tal rationality as occurring very early in human develop-
ment. Yet at the same time, it seems tolerably clear as 
well, on the basis of his psychological hedonism, his 
distinction between natural and fanciful desires, and his 
critique of innatism, that he does regard these as acquisi-
tions, not as innate or instinctual qualities. To return 
then to Rousseau's objection: How can Locke, in a manner 
consistent with his rejection of the classical principle of 
teleology, conceive of certain human properties as both 
natural and historically acquired? 
As we have observed at some length above, throughout 
88see the evidence presented above, pp. 275-277. 
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the Essay Locke conceives of the natural in the strictest 
sense as the causally necessary, the constant, the invar-
iant. 89 Upon occasion he further refines this conception 
in a manner that seems to anticipate Rousseau, associating 
the natural with the original or native. 90 Now, if we are 
to infer that according to Locke a property natural to 
human beings must be innate in individuals and present at 
the origin of the species, then we must conclude that he 
cannot consistently maintain his account of the state of 
nature or the natural condition in the form that we have 
described. But in conceiving of these developmental, 
acquired properties as natural, what Locke seems to have in 
mind is the proposition that while such properties are not 
in themselves strictly original to individuals or to the 
species, they are natural in the sense that they develop 
according to the promptings of an original, constant human 
condition of necessity. And although Locke's textual dis-
cussions remain somewhat ambiguous with respect to the 
character of this necessity or to the mode in which it 
89once again, Locke implies such a conception espe-
cially at ECHU 2.21.73, 2.23.32, 3.5.8ff., 3.9.7, 3.10.20, 
4.16.6. 
90rn his discussion of various relations in the Essay, 
for instance, he observes that among the occasions of 
comparing things, and by implication the properties of 
things, "is (sic] the Circumstances of their origin or 
beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make 
the Relations, depending thereon, as lasting as the Sub-
jects to which they belong ... and these I call natural Rela-
tions" (2.28.2; also 2.33.7). 
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effects the expansion of human desires, the following seems 
the most powerful among the available alternative interpre-
tations. 
Although according to the Essay's natural-historical 
sketch of the development of the human understanding, the 
first, most basic mental faculty of sensory perception is 
virtually innate (2.1.23; 2.9.1), only "in time" does the 
mind come "to reflect on its own Operations" (2 .1. 24). In 
fact, according to Locke, "'tis pretty late, before most 
Children get Ideas of the Operations of their own Minds; 
and some have not any very clear, or perfect Ideas of them 
all their Lives" (2.1.8) Herein lies then a further state-
ment of Locke's observation that many people remain unre-
flective or less than fully self-conscious throughout their 
lives; but what is important in the present context is to 
understand the limits of this observation. Locke's denial 
that most children early or ever make extensive use of 
their powers of reflection is by no means equivalent to a 
denial that any form of reflection is in the strict sense 
natural to human beings. He argues to the contrary that 
the most basic form of reflection, the capacity for self-
consciousness, is "inseparable from thinking," or from 
perception: "It being impossible for any one to perceive, 
without perceiving, that he does perceive" (2.27.9). 
Thus at least as something akin to a felt intuition, 
if not necessarily as a fully articulated concept, the idea 
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of one's self is according to Locke natural to human beings 
or coeval with human thought. However dimly or crudely, we 
are in the most basic respect naturally reflective, inward 
creatures. When Locke denies that reflection is among our 
natural or native capacities, he is referring to the fail-
ure of most children and some adults to reflect on their 
own mental operations, their powers of perception, think-
ing, reasoning, and so forth; this failure signifies not 
the absence in them of any idea or consciousness of self as 
such, but rather a more specific failure to conceive of 
that self as a seat or repository of clearly defined 
powers. Locke's explanation of the source of this failure 
is helpful in clarifying more positively what in his view 
our natural idea of self represents. The difficulty as he 
presents it derives from the fact that reflection thus 
understood involves attentive action, a redirecting of 
one's attention from (mainly) outward objects to inward, 
subjective operations (2 .1. 7, 8); Locke contrasts the more 
generally active operation of reflection to the generally 
passive operation of sensory perception ( 2. 1. 2 5; 2. 9. 1; 
2.21.72). We have described above in some detail his 
hedonistic account of human motivation.91 In its relevance 
to the present discussion, that account implies that we 
91rn the absence of experiences of pleasure and pain, 
according to Locke, "we should have no Reason to pref err 
one Thought or Action, to another" ( 2. 7. 3) . On Locke's 
tendency to conflate reasons and motivations for action, 
see Colman 1983, 223-224. 
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most basically, naturally, vividly experience the self less 
as the seat of perception in general than as the seat of 
our more specific "concernment," the subject of our pleas-
ures and pains. A "concern for Happiness," observes Locke, 
is "the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness, that 
which is conscious of Pleasure and Pain, desiring, that 
that self, that is conscious, should be happy" (2.27.26; 
also 2.1.11; 2.27.17).92 
To this point the divergence between Locke's concep-
tion of natural self-consciousness and Rousseau's depiction 
of the original, natural human beings appears relatively 
insignificant. It seems clear that, like Rousseau, Locke 
conjectures that the original human beings must have pos-
sessed at best a minimal rationality, sufficient for them 
to make crude instrumental calculations in meeting the 
necessities of daily survival, but devoid of any signif-
92Taken as a description of the experience of the 
basic Lockean self, the following statement by Wallin is 
essentially accurate: " [Locke's] denial of innateness is 
radical because it is equivalent to a denial of any corre-
spondence between man and the world he lives in except on 
the purely sensual level ... That which is other does not 
exist, or cannot be known, or is limited to that which can 
produce pleasure or pain" ( 1984, 155) . In the following 
chapter, however, I will try to show that according to 
Locke this conception of the basic materials of self-
consciousness does not circumscribe human experience as 
severely as Wallin claims; especially the development of 
various mental pleasures and pains out of the sensual means 
that the potential sphere of human concernment, of what is 
capable of producing in us pleasure or pain, and therefore 
worthy of inquiry, is virtually infinite. See ECHU 2.7.2, 
10; 2.20.15. 
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icant foresight, let alone any scientific curiosity.93 
There may be some ground for disagreement in Locke's ac-
count of the basic operation of willing, though as is usual 
in this matter he leaves it to the reader to construct the 
relevant argument. Inasmuch as according to Locke we can 
scarcely perceive anything without thereby acquiring, how-
ever dimly, some idea of the self, and we can have no 
experience of self-consciousness that does not include a 
concern for the well-being of that self, it follows that 
action in pursuance of our own well-being is for Locke a 
concomitant of perception. Thus the "two great and prin-
cipal Actions of the Mind ... are these two: Perception, or 
Thinking, and Volition, or Willing" (2.6.2). Now if we 
consider the naturalness of willing in the light of Locke's 
account of the "Association of Ideas," of the human propen-
sity to form mental associations between ideas more or less 
"ally'd by Nature" (2.33.6, and passim), we might well 
inf er the virtual naturalness of an association between the 
ideas of pleasure and power, at least insofar as many of 
the pleasures in human experience require some sort of 
93Locke tends to scatter throughout various works the 
argumentation and evidence in support of this conjecture. 
In the Essay, for instance, he observes, apparently with 
reference to no specific historical period, that "Men are 
apt enough," in accordance with "our feeble passionate 
Nature, " to ignore future pleasures in favor of attending 
present uneasinesses (2.21.65,67). See also STCE 45,48,50. 
At TT II.44,45,94,107,111, Locke depicts the inhabitants of 
the first ages as wanderers, living hand to mouth, and also 
as tacitly consenting to the unlimited prerogative power of 
monarchs--both marks of innocence or lack of foresight. 
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volitional act for their production. In this way Locke 
seems to contend that human beings come naturally to take a 
kind of pleasure simply in the act of willing, of exercis-
ing power, irrespective of its object. 94 The presence of 
expansive desires according to Locke would then be coinci-
dent not merely with human social life, but with human 
consciousness itself. Such desires would be not strictly 
innate, but nonetheless operative virtually from birth. It 
is perhaps in-this fairly precise sense that Locke declares 
in his work on education that "we are all, even from our 
cradles, vain and proud Creatures" (STCE 119; also 38, 
148) . 
It is true that Locke's presentation is not free from 
ambiguity with respect to the scope and intensity with 
which this expansive desire prevails over human behavior. 
Nothing in the preceding account, of course, would compel 
Locke to deny that the power of these expansive desires and 
the specific mode of their development or awakening may 
vary with the particular experiences and the natural con-
stitutions of individuals. 95 In fact the willful desire 
94The "peculiar" character of Locke's hedonism rests 
according to Strauss in the fact that for Locke the great-
est happiness consists less in enjoying the greatest pleas-
ures than in having things that produce the greatest pleas-
ures. "Locke says in effect that the greatest happiness 
consists in the greatest power" (1953, 249; see ECHU 
2.21.55). Cf. Pangle 1988, 167. 
95on natural constitutions, see STCE 66, 101, 102; cf. 
Tarcov 1984, 109. For Locke's statements ascribing the 
expansive desires to "the greater part" (II.123) or to the 
297 
for power as Locke describes it does appear in many people 
to lie dormant or to assume passive or attenuated forms, 
perhaps in some subdued by an absorption in immediate 
gratifications, in others overpowered by the more urgent 
desire for security or regulated by the desire for the 
esteem of one's fellows. Yet it is clearly Locke's view 
that in the generality of human beings inheres at least an 
"apt(ness] to grasp at Power" (TT II.143), and further that 
notwithstanding his references to self-preservation as the 
object of "the first and strongest desire" (I.88)96 and to 
the great power of the desire for esteem, 97 the species 
generality of human beings, see II.13,92,125; I.10,106; 
STCE 103, 119. Cf. however his reference at II. 45 to the 
contentment of the early human beings "for the most part" 
with the necessitous existence provided spontaneously by 
nature, and his later somewhat ambiguous reference to "Am-
bition, Revenge, (and] Covetousness" as "irregular" pas-
sions (II.199; also ECHU 2.20.14). I take "irregular" as 
Locke uses it here to signify nonregularly occurrent, and 
thus to refer to passions whose objects are not strictly 
necessary for biological survival. 
96In view of Locke's estimate of the power of the ex-
pansive, fanciful desires, it appears that Cox goes too far 
in ascribing to Locke the opinion that there exists "a dis-
cernible natural hierarchy among the desires; the desire 
for self-preservation ... is primordial, universally opera-
tive, and the most powerful of all desires" (1960, 88). 
Goldwin exaggerates similarly: "The desire for preserva-
tion can be diverted, directed, or cajoled, but there is no 
way to diminish or eradicate its overwhelming power" (1972, 
484). Were this simply true, the law of nature would be 
far less "hidden" than it is for Locke (see LN 1.111, 
2.135, 10.217), and the need for him to write books like 
the Two Treatises much less urgent. 
97on the power of the desire for esteem, see ECHU 
2.28.10,12; STCE 56,58,61. See the further discussion in 
chapter VI below, pp. 339-344. 
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manifests no shortage of overtly ambitious, aggressive 
individuals in whom the desire for more than is necessary, 
for self-magnification, for power or dominion suppresses or 
overwhelms the other desires. 
The essential point is simply that in Locke's view 
the operation of such expansive desires is "ordinary and 
natural" (STCE 103). The wants of fancy are in their way 
also wants of nature. 98 As thus far presented, Locke's 
argument implies a rejection of the classical notion that 
human nature points toward definite natural ends or states 
of perfection, 99 but it involves a rejection also of the 
inference that he is thereby compelled to understand human 
nature exclusively or strictly in terms of the species' 
beginning. Apparently recoiling from the more radically 
modern view on the grounds that a total rejection of the 
teleological principle is neither desirable nor ultimately 
possible, 100 Locke presents what he seems to consider a 
98Tarcov draws this conclusion also from Locke's com-
parison of mental to bodily pain, at STCE 112-114 ( 1984, 
152) . 
99Locke's most explicit rejection of the classical 
teleology appears at ECHU 2.21.55. Elsewhere, however, he 
seems to appeal to a different, somewhat democratized or 
relativized form of teleology, according to which our nat-
ural "perfections" fit us not necessarily for high virtue, 
but rather for our personal preservation and happiness. 
See ECHU 2.7.4-6; 2.9.14; 2.21.50,51; 4.11.8. Cf. Colman 
1983, 40,240-242; Tarcov 1984, 134,173. 
lOOcf. the discussion of ECHU 4. 6. 11, in chapter IV 
above, pp. 167-186. It is worth noting, though it is dif-
ficult to know what to make of the fact, that in an unpub-
lished 1696 fragment entitled "Deus," Locke expresses sus-
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partially or moderately teleological conception of human 
nature. His appeal in the Essay to "natural history," 
applied to the human condition, represents a continuation 
of the Machiavellian project of early modernity to under-
stand human nature as it manifests itself in the generality 
of human beings, to view human beings as they are histor-
ically, 101 not as they ought to be or might be in excep-
tional cases, whether of exceptional virtue or of radical 
(solitary or socially creative) freedom. That appeal 
implies, in other words, that in Locke's view on principle 
there can be no strict separation between nature and his-
tory, that human nature is revealed in and throughout his-
tory. Human nature as Locke conceives it is a product of a 
condition of necessity that is both original and con-
stant, 102 that brings forth faculties and passions in human 
picion of Descartes in response in part to the latter's 
"shutting out the consideration of final causes out [sic] 
of his philosophy" (in King 1830, 314). Why Locke chooses 
not to remedy in his own published philosophy this defect 
of Descartes remains to be explained. 
lOlsee Machiavelli's famous statement of his realistic 
intention, in The Prince 15: "But since my intent is to 
write something useful to whoever understands it, it has 
appeared to me more fitting to go directly to the effectual 
truth of the thing than to the imagination of it. And many 
have imagined republics and principalities that have never 
been seen or known to exist in truth; for it is so far from 
how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of 
what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather 
than his preservation" (ed. Mansfield 1985, 61). 
102Lockean human nature seems in other words to be the 
product of something standing between, or some combination 
of an essential and an accidental necessity. Cf. Strauss 
1953, 272. 
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beings that, however variously manifested or directed, 
cannot be eradicated or fundamentally transformed. The 
teleology that Locke espouses takes its bearings from the 
historically observable "ordinary course of Nature" (TT 
II.60; ECHU 2.26.4; 4.16.6); the considerable degree of 
observable human malleability notwithstanding, according to 
Locke a common subjection to certain constant, basic neces-
sities conditions the psychological formation of both pre-
social and fully civilized peoples in fundamentally similar 
ways. 
On the basis of this account of Locke's attenuated 
teleology, we can see in part how it makes sense, contrary 
to the objection of John Dunn (1969, 102), for Locke to 
present his account of the human condition in the first 
ages as in important respects normative for modern peoples. 
The original condition is normative for us, insofar as it 
is, not because it is original, according to Locke, but 
rather insofar as it reveals with particular clarity the 
fundamental characteristics of the historically constant 
human condition. Yet Dunn's objection does point implic-
itly toward a potentially serious difficulty in Locke, 
insofar as it brings us to wonder how Locke's account of 
the human nature that is formed by this human condition can 
be normative for any people, ancient or modern. Having 
constructed the likely Lockean grounds of resistance to the 
Rousseauian conception of radical human malleability, we 
301 
recall the point of departure for the foregoing discussion 
of the natural human condition. In exploring Locke's view 
of the basic constancies in human nature and in the human 
condition, we have unearthed some undeniably troubling 
evidence relative to the psychological fitness of human 
beings for conforming with the principles of natural 
rights. 
We have argued that Locke presents a hedonistic 
account of human motivation, but in a rather complex form. 
Though he seems to hold that in the strict sense "the only 
thing, we naturally [i.e. natively, originally] are afraid 
of, is Pain, or loss of Pleasure" (STCE 115), he observes 
more particularly that the focus of our egoistic concern 
for our own well being ordinarily falls or oscillates 
between two polar extremes: a "strong desire of Self-
preservation" (I.86), and an expansive, transcendent desire 
for self-magnification. In this way Locke's view recalls 
to some extent Machiavelli's observation of the two diverse 
humors or appetites that divide the human race into two 
fundamental classes.103 But with respect to Locke's thee-
103"For in every city these two diverse humors are 
found, which arises from this: that the people desire 
neither to be commanded nor oppressed by the great, and the 
great desire to command and oppress the people. From these 
two diverse appetites one of three effects occurs in cit-
ies: principality or liberty or license" (The Prince 9, in 
Mansfield ed. 1985, 39). Locke appears to differ from 
Machiavelli in replacing the desire not to be oppressed 
with the desire for self-preservation, which would seem 
much more consistent with submission to despotism. (See 
e.g. II.223,230). 
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ry of justice, what are the implications of this implicit 
questioning of . the unity of the human species? What if 
nature endowed a relative few with an overpowering ambi-
tion, a proud desire of dominion insatiable except by the 
exercise of despotic power over others, and endowed the 
greater number with, if not a positive desire for subjec-
tion to such power, at least a preference for suffering 
rather than resisting it? Would we be compelled to con-
elude that nature has constituted humankind, in the morally 
decisive respect, not one but two or at least two species--
that nature does not mandate moral equality or government 
by consent, but instead sanctions the rule of the stronger, 
for the interest of the stronger? 
By means of his natural-historical account of the 
fragility of human reason, of our frequent proneness to a 
destructive, fanciful will to power and even to madness, 
Locke appears to imply that moral dissensus is natural to 
human beings not only or primarily on epistemological, but 
also on psychological grounds.104 He therefore raises the 
question whether his account of the state of nature 
describes so powerfully the naturalness of wrongs that it 
overwhelms any attempt at def ending the naturalness of 
rights. In rejecting as he does the Rousseauian, radically 
104Thus observes Miller: "Locke's emphasis on the 
variability of moral and political ideas makes us wonder 
how the agreement necessary to political life can ever be 
secured" (1979, 184). 
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evolutionary argument for the conventionality of justice, 
does Locke necessarily commit his assent to a version of 
the Machiavellian or Hobbesian argument for the convention-
ality of justice? In the following chapter, we will final-
ly explore in detail the arguments whereby Locke seeks to 
show how the materials that nature provides can both guide 
our construction of and sustain our commitment to certain 
fundamental, transhistorical principles of justice. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE NATURALNESS OF RIGHTS 
In calling attention in the Essay to the character of 
our moral rules and concepts as mixed-mode constructions, 
Locke implies that not merely their practical efficacy, but 
indeed the very existence of our conceptions of morality 
and justice is to a considerable degree dependent upon 
societal consensus.1 Moreover, as the preceding chapter's 
account of the Lockean state of nature makes clear, Locke's 
emphasis on the dependent status of morality serves also to 
underline the difficulty of achieving a rational consensus. 
When his only published suggestions of the possible content 
of his proposed demonstrative science of ethics point in 
the end from natural theology back to human nature, one 
might understandably conclude, therefore, that that 
proposal fails utterly.2 
lsee chapter III above, pp. 99-115. 
2This is the conclusion most notably of Dunn, who 
explains the "persistently abortive" character of Locke's 
sketches of his proposal of a demonstrative ethics by 
reference in the end to Locke's recognition of the fact 
that "such a demonstration is not in principle possible" 
(1969, 80,187; also 1984, 66ff.,84). Cf. Von Leyden 1954, 
74. For Locke's own explanations of his apparent failure 
to accomplish or even to attempt seriously such a demon-
stration, see especially Works 1823 4.187,407ff., and CJL 
#1538, 9/20/92 and #2059, 4/5/96, both to Molyneux. 
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Yet, perhaps in more ways than the most obvious is 
Locke's insistence on the naturalness of moral dissensus 
similar and indeed closely related to his statement of the 
natural uncertainty of our definitions of the names of sub-
stances and species. It is striking, of course, that he 
seems so urgently concerned3 to discredit both the tradi-
tional scholastic doctrine of natural species and the 
quasi-innatist doctrine of a moral consensus gentium. In 
both cases, however, alongside his emphatic denials of the 
adequacy of the definitions that nature provides us, 
whether of species or of moral laws, he more quietly admits 
that though it surely does leave the business of precise 
definition to human convention, nature contributes signifi-
cantly in furnishing the basic "materials" of consensus. 
Locke indicates the character of those "materials" relevant 
to the issue of moral consensus, in thus qualifying one of 
his more extreme statements of the prevalence of moral 
dissensus: "there is scarce that Principle of Morality to 
be named ... which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and 
condemned by the general Fashion of whole Societies of 
Men," he observes, "those only excepted, that are 
absolutely necessary to hold Society together ... " (ECHU 
1.3.10).4 
3cf. Miller 1979, 178. 
4Locke goes on to say of these rules of social neces-
sity that they "commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct 
Societies"; but this is to say only that they are not self-
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The rootedness of morality in societal necessity is 
present as a recurrent, if understated theme throughout 
Locke's published and unpublished works. 5 If we may 
therefore take it as a premise, the above qualification 
would suggest something like the following as a sketch of 
the foundations of the Lockean principles of justice. In 
the modernized, empirically circumscribed form of teleology 
common to Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke, politically 
relevant nature comprises those forms of necessity that 
originally and constantly move human beings to form and 
maintain political societies. The construction of moral 
concepts and rules as the regulative conditions of the 
human pursuit of happiness is nonrelativistic, according to 
Locke's suggestion, insofar as it is guided by a conscious-
ness of the sway of necessity in human affairs. The recog-
nition of the fundamentally necessitous character of the 
human condition, in its psychological as well as its mater-
ial dimension, represents according to Locke the beginning 
of human wisdom about politics; this would explain espe-
cially the great emphasis he places on the fact of moral 
enforcing, or that the law of nature is not generally ob-
served in the state of nature. The present argument does 
not maintain that such rules require no conventional sup-
ports, but only that they provide a natural basis for the 
promulgation of positive laws. For similar qualifications 
of Locke's rejection of the notion of a consensus gentium, 
see ECHU 1.3.6, 2.28.11. 
5see ETG 125, 172; LN 1. 115-117, 5. 169; "Of Ethics in 
General," in King 1830, 309-310; RC 243. 
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dissensus, rooted in the virtually boundless potential for 
disorder in the human mind. Political society then repre-
sents the fundamental convention whereby rational human 
beings confront and manage their naturally necessitous 
condition. It is reasonable, according to this argument, 
to expect that human beings reasoning in common about their 
fundamental interests can achieve a consensus at most on 
the minimal conditions necessary for the maintenance of 
society and thus for the management of natural necessity. 
The principles of justice or natural rights represent the 
minimal personal guarantees that rational, naturally free 
individuals require in submitting themselves to a common 
authority; their preservation constitutes, in other words, 
the minimal condition in which subjection to a governmental 
authority is rationally preferable to a more direct con-
frontation with the forces of nature and human nature. 
Inasmuch as "no rational Creature can be supposed to change 
his condition with an intention to be worse," individuals 
surrender the "Equality, Liberty, and Executive Power they 
had in the State of Nature ... only with an intention in 
every one the better to preserve himself his Liberty and 
Property" (TT II.131).6 
6Moreover, by pursuing this line of reasoning we may 
gain at least some further insight into Locke's puzzling 
proposal of a demonstrative science of ethics. The connec-
tion between that proposal and Locke's necessitarian doc-
trine of justice--and by implication, between the Essay's 
and the Two Treatises' accounts of political morality--
becomes explicit in his unpublished fragment "Morality." 
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It is clear, in view of the fact of moral diversity 
or dissensus across societies, that the "necessity" to 
which Locke appeals signifies only the causal (material and 
psychological) forces that move human beings to form and 
maintain societies. The consensus that such necessity 
Here, in contrast to his suggested adumbrations of moral 
demonstration in the Essay, Locke limits himself to a prin-
ciple of secular hedonism as the source of his fundamental 
"definition" and axioms," acknowledging "a state after this 
life" only as a bare possibility (in Sargentich 1974, 26, 
27; cf. ECHU 2.21.70) and proceeding to develop "a rule of 
action" for beings "who have noe prospect beyond this 
life." More precisely, just as in the more modern or 
Hobbesian strands of argument in the Two Treatises, Locke 
adopts as his premise the naturally necessitous condition 
of humankind, wherein the arbitrary dispensations of "want 
rapin and force" (ibid.) inevitably violate the equal 
birthright of individuals to enjoy nature's provisions, or 
to create for themselves the "plenty and security" that are 
the necessary conditions of happiness. Having therefore 
established justice as the determination of "peoples 
rights" by societal compact, Locke declares that "the rest 
[of the virtues) will not be hard"; he breaks off the manu-
script after the briefest mention of "Civility Charity Lib-
erality," which "relate to society and soe border on Jus-
tice" (27, 28). In this presentation, the demonstrative 
morality thus reduces to a demonstration, on the basis of 
an empirically well-grounded but non-self-evident proposi-
tion, of the minimal, core principles of justice that form 
the bond of society. Finally, one might object that if 
Locke were truly interested in promoting a sober, tolerant, 
empiricist probabilism, he would not advertise the possi-
bility of (and therefore raise his readers' demand for) 
certitude in moral reasoning. Thus Wallin 1984, 149-150, 
argues that the intensification of political conflicts 
occurs as a direct consequence of Locke's mixed-mode 
science of ethics, rooted in a vision of moral autonomy. 
To this I can respond only that in asserting the possibili-
ty of achieving such certitude, Locke seems only to be 
following an intellectual fashion, while his real interest 
seems to lie in indicating the extreme difficulty involved 
in achieving consensus, let alone certitude in matters of 
morality, and therewith the minimalist character of the 
principles of justice (or theology) with which we should be 
satisfied. 
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produces consists at best in a more-or-less tacit agreement 
on the necessity of society itself, not on the specific 
content of the rules whose observance is necessary to 
maintain society. Locke does not make the unsustainable 
claim that natural necessity produces an actual, historical 
consensus across human societies on the truth of the 
natural rights principles of justice. Rather, his appeal 
to necessity represents an appeal to what we might consider 
rationalized necessity, or to the potential grounds of 
consensus inherent in a rational, well considered, fore-
sighted response to the actual conditions of necessity that 
prompt the development of human societies. A rational 
response must of course derive from a sound understanding 
of actual necessity, but not all responses to necessity are 
equally rational.7 To put it another way, Locke does not 
propose a complete reduction of the rational to the actual 
in morality;B the actual for Locke by no means in itself 
circumscribes, though it may imply the limits of the possi-
ble or the rational in morality. 
Yet it remains unclear precisely how even this appeal 
to a minimalist, necessitarian conception of justice can 
resolve the problem that Locke raises concerning the 
naturalness of moral dissensus. In the fact that "even 
7Again contrast Wallin 1984, 157. 
Bon the rationalization of the actual or the conquest 
of chance as the animating purpose of modern political 
philosophy in general, see Strauss 1959, 41-55. 
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outlaws and Robbers, who break with all the World besides, 
must keep Faith and Rules of Equity amongst themselves" 
(ECHU 1. 3. 2) , Locke may find some cause for hopefulness 
with respect to the potential of a consciousness of social 
necessity to provide reliable natural grounds for jural 
consensus. Whether such hopefulness is reasonable depends 
upon the willingness or motivation of individuals to 
respect the sway of a particular form of necessity, namely 
that imposed by the presence in the world of others whose 
power and cunning at least equal one's own.9 But it seems 
questionable precisely on the grounds of Locke's own ac-
count of human psychology whether such a general attitude 
9This is the substance also of Locke's immediate 
response to the pregnant objection that he raises in the 
fragment "Morality." To the argument that "it may be 
sometimes a mans advantage to break his word and then I may 
doe it as contributing to my happynesse," Locke responds 
that such a rule generalized would render it "impossible 
for any man to be happy unlesse he were both stronger and 
wiser than the rest of man kinde, " and thus capable of 
prevailing in "a state of rapin and force" (in Sargentich 
1974, 28; cf. LN 10.231). Cf. Hobbes' defense of the 
principle of equality: "Nature hath made men so equall, in 
the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee 
found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of 
quicker mind then [sic] another; yet when all is reckoned 
together, the difference between man, and man, is not so 
considerable, as that one man can claim to himselfe any 
benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as 
he ... If Nature therefore have made men equall, that equal-
i tie is to be acknowledged: or if Nature have made men 
unequall; yet because men that think themselves equall, 
will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon equall 
terms, such equalitie must be admitted" (Leviathan 13,15, 
in 1968, 183, 211). Among the fundamental grounds of the 
Lockean virtues, as Tarcov comments, is the insight "that 
there are more and stronger men in the world than oneself" 
( 1984, 183) . 
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of deference represents a realistic expectation. We have 
seen that Locke traces in large part the disorders prevail-
ing in the natural human condition to the natural aptness 
of the human mind to fall subject to expansive, fanciful 
desires; indeed Locke views much if not all of human 
criminality as the product of the desire for more than one 
needs. 10 On what grounds does Locke see in humankind in 
general a potential to def er to the sway of natural neces-
sity, when perhaps the most immediately threatening compo-
nent of that necessity is a natural human desire to tran-
scend necessity, to acquire more than one's share, more 
than one needs? 
A two-dimensional question is implicit here. Arising 
more immediately is the familiar question of obligation, or 
of the reasons for submitting oneself to the dictates of 
Lockean justice. Yet inasmuch as Locke tends to view this 
question as reducing to the question of motivation, or of 
the presence of a effective enforcement system of rewards 
and punishments,11 the question of obligation in his 
thought is inseparable from the deeper question of the 
lOncovetousness, and the desire of having in our Pos-
session, and under our Dominion, more than we have need of, 
being the Root of all Evil, should be early and carefully 
weeded out ... " (STCE 110). Cf. STCE 105; TT II.37. 
ll 11 Reward and Punishment," consisting in pleasure and 
pain of one form or another, Locke maintains, are "the only 
Motives to a rational Creature" (STCE 54; also ECRU 2.7.3). 
Therefore they constitute the only possible grounds for any 
rational creature voluntarily to assume any obligation. 
See especially ECRU 2.21.51-52; TT II.77. 
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consonance of Lockean justice with human happiness, and 
therefore with human nature. Could rational human beings, 
rational pursuers of happiness, render their truly free, 
voluntary consent to the Lockean regime, or would instead 
their consent to that regime rest ultimately on an act of 
repression, of internal if not external coercion? 
Herein lies the ultimate significance of objections 
such as that of Strauss, to the effect that the Lockean 
ethic consists in a "peculiar hedonism," that is, a pecu-
liarly repressive, ascetic hedonism. Locke's relativistic 
conception of happiness implies that in his account of 
human nature he abstracts from eros as the ancients 
understood it.12 It means, as Strauss argues, that in 
attempting to elaborate the proper course of action for 
human beings as political creatures, Locke must focus not 
on the attainment of happiness itself, but instead on the 
process of creating the conditions for the attainment of 
happiness. Politically relevant nature consists in a set 
of "necessities" or "mere inescapabilities" that it is the 
proper business of rational action to confront and to 
manage, if never finally to overcome. Rational action for 
Locke consists in subjecting oneself to labor as "the pain 
which relieves pain," or more generally in acquiring power 
sufficient to remedy or to manage the natural condition of 
powerlessness. Human life is reduced to an exercise in 
12cf. Pangle 1988, 213. 
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aimless self-denial, or in Strauss' memorable description, 
a "joyless quest for joy" (1953, 249-251).13 
The implication of this and like charges is that 
Lockean justice is decisively if not wholly conventional in 
character, an alien imposition requiring the suppression of 
natural human desires. In view of its apparent design to 
subject the transcendent desires of the powerful to the 
levelling principle of moral and jural equality, one is 
tempted to regard Lockean justice as in its essence nothing 
more than a restatement of the ancient conventionalist con-
ception of justice as the ideology of the weak or timid.14 
Yet in the scope of its conventionalist implications, 
Locke's doctrine may ultimately surpass even those of the 
ancients. For if our natural inclination toward our own 
well being is bipolar in the manner that Locke describes--
if nature inclines at least some of us to employ our 
13rn the context of a very different interpretation, 
John Dunn reaches a similar conclusion on this point, main-
taining that the Lockean-Calvinist imperative of laboring 
in one's "calling" constitutes a neurotic and nearly Sisy-
phean ethic of "boundless repression," a seemingly "odd 
norm to extract from a utilitarian calculus" ( 1969, 259-
260, 265, 263; see, however, ECHU 2.21.68-69). Also Wood 
1984, 102. Cf. Oakeshott's similar judgment on Hobbes 
(1962, 257-259), and Tocqueville's description of the rest-
lessness and anxiety prevalent among the Americans, whom he 
seems to regard as the world's pre-eminent rational pursu-
ers of happiness, and thus as the world's pre-eminently 
Lockean people (Democracy in America 2.2.13). 
14see especially the statements of this view by Calli-
cles, in Plato's Gorgias 482-492; by Glaucon, at Republic 
358b-362c; and by Philus, summarizing the teaching of Car-
neades, in Cicero, Republic 3.5-21. 
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liberty so as to indulge our fantasies of conquest and 
dominion, and inclines others to look after their own well 
being in a timorous, slothful submission to such conquer-
ors15--then it would seem that not merely the powerful, but 
rather in various ways virtually all human beings must 
experience the socialization required for membership in a 
Lockean commonwealth as unnatural or repressive. The 
advent of the consensually minded homo civilis would seem 
to involve not merely the costuming in respectable attire, 
but instead the thorough suppression or conquest of homo 
naturalis. 16 Though perhaps in a significantly different 
manner, civilization would then represent a condition of 
alienation no less for Locke than for Rousseau; the aliena-
tion, as a condition of membership, of one's natural free-
dom would constitute an alienation of one's happiness, 
ultimately of one's self. 
The aim of the present chapter is to show how it is 
possible to construct, out of the resources that Locke 
provides, an appropriate Lockean response to this fundamen-
15rn the Second Treatise, such sloth and timorousness 
manifest themselves in many peoples' historical contentment 
in material poverty (II.31,41-45,49,51), and in the rela-
tively common fact of popular acquiescence in, or nonresis-
tance to, umlimited, despotic government (cf. 75,94,107-110 
with 92, 223, 230) . Cf. Gorgias 493-499, where Socrates 
brings Callicles to concede that his identification of the 
good with the pleasurable implies that a life of cowardice 
is at least as choiceworthy or admirable as one of bravery. 
16cf. Caton' s judgment on the disproportion between 
these two human types in Hobbes (1983, 8). 
tal challenge. 
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We will argue that notwithstanding either 
the various levels of sacrifice that consent entails or the 
various forms of happiness pursued or asserted by various 
types of human beings, the Lockean regime and the Lockean 
psychology of human motivation are fundamentally compati-
ble; Locke does provide, albeit in a rather muted or even 
concealed manner, the theoretical grounds of a defense 
against tyranny, of an argument for its ultimate unnatural-
ness as distinct from its mere imprudence. Yet the fact 
that Locke does not always directly confront the relevant 
difficulties, and therefore that he requires his readers or 
commentators to construct his response to such challenges, 
in itself requires explanation. By exploring in the final 
section of the chapter the question of Locke's relative 
silence with respect to questions that his thought does, as 
we will attempt to show, contain the means for answering, 
we will come, finally, to the heart of Locke's political-
philosophical enterprise, and to an understanding both of 
the essential problem posed by political life and its pro-
per solution as he views it. More specifically, we will 
argue that the thesis of Lockean esotericism need not yield 
a radically modern, nihilistic Locke, but may instead yield 
a relatively moderate Locke, one whose modernity is more 
genuinely ambiguous than the Straussian reading seems to 
imply, and yet whose traditionalism is more genuinely 
philosophical than the most vocal detractors of Strauss on 
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this point have recognized. 
THE PRINCIPLE OF BALANCE 
A fair portion of textual evidence does appear to 
support the conclusion that reason functions as an essen-
tially repressive power in Locke's moral-political thought. 
This appears as a particularly prominent theme in his 
educational writing, wherein he frequently suggests that 
the great Principle and Foundation of all Vertue and 
Worth, is placed in this, That a Man is able to deny 
himself his own Desires, cross his own Inclinations, 
and purely follow what Reason directs as best, tho' the 
Appetite lean the other way. (STCE 33; also 17,38,45, 
52,107,108,200) 
Yet such suggestions cannot in themselves justify the 
characterization of Lockean morality as proceeding from a 
simple neo-Stoicl 7 or Puritan18 opposition of reason to 
desire. As Tarcov explains (1984, 87-91,96-100), the 
relevant antagonism exists less between reason and passion 
as such than between those passions authorized and those 
unauthorized by reason or rational foresight.19 More 
particularly, Locke tends to conceive of rational self-
mastery as the ability to "resist the Importunity" not of 
all desire, but in particular of "present Pleasure or Pain" 
17cf. Axtell 1968, 138n., 218n., 219n. 
18cf. Dunn 1969, especially 214-261. 
19on the relation of the power of foresight to the 




(STCE 45). In Some Thoughts Concerning Education, he 
elaborates with great subtlety the means whereby a skillful 
educator can cultivate and direct the passions of children 
in such manner as to promote most effectively their long-
term virtue and happiness. At the same time, he indicates 
that his observations regarding both the predominant pas-
sions and even the means whereby they are to be cultivated 
and directed often apply similarly or analogously to adults 
as well as to children.20 
The potential implication for Locke's understanding 
of politics is significant. The question arises whether 
Locke's educational project extends beyond the Thoughts' 
discussion of childrearing and continues in the Two Treat-
ises. More specifically, the suspicion arises that not-
withstanding his apparent entrustment of the task of 
education to the privacy of the family21 and his restric-
tion of the act of political consent to adults (II. 59), 
Locke acknowledges the limits of the presumptive rational-
ity of adults and therefore does not fully accept the 
modern liberal separation between politics and education or 
character-formation. Perhaps instead he views the Two 
Treatises' discussion of the principles of legitimacy and 
constitutionalism as completing, in the relatively unobtru-
20we have noted above (chapter v, pp. 253-254) Locke's 
assimilation of children's and adults' respective acts of 
consent. See also STCE 73. 
2lsee especially STCE 70; also Tarcov 1984, 4-8. 
319 
sive manner appropriate to the characters of adults, the 
project whose beginning he sets forth in the Thoughts, of 
cultivating the virtues necessary to membership in politic-
al society. What we seek, therefore, is to discover wheth-
er or how Locke can address the objection to his political 
thought as alienating or repressive, by showing how the 
principles of political legitimacy and constitutionalism in 
the Second Treatise can perform the related functions of 
moderating and channelling the polar passions of narrow 
self-preservation and covetousness or dominion, such that 
the adults animated by those passions can reach a rational 
accommodation enabling them to live together in civility if 
not indeed in harmony, as members of a common society, 
subjects of a common regime. 
It is helpful to employ Aristotelian categories in 
conceiving of the essential problem and the Lockean 
response.22 Aristotle observes in all actual political 
communities a tendency toward class division, and therefore 
views the achievement of the best practicable regime as 
dependent upon the identification of a principle of bal-
ance, whereby opposing class interests and conceptions of 
justice can be moderated and rendered mutually compatible 
(Politics 3.6-13, 4.1-12). Without precisely identifying 
the Lockean polarities with the Aristotelian principles of 
22For this conception of the Lockean commonwealth as a 
mixed regime, I am indebted to the discussion in Mansfield 
1978, 1-15. 
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democracy and oligarchy, we can state the Lockean problem 
in similar terms. What principle of balance can serve in a 
nonrepressive, nondespotic manner to moderate the interests 
of the classes of people whose predominant passions or in-
terests consist respectively in individual self-preserva-
tion and dominion over others, such that they can come to 
coexist as elements of a common political society, under 
the governance of common rules of reason and law? What is 
the specific formula of a Lockean mixed regime? 
In order to avoid lending unintended support to the 
dismal proposition that Jefferson would later reject with 
virtually the final stroke of his pen, namely that "the 
mass of mankind has ... been born with saddles on their 
backs, [and] a favored few booted and spurred, ready to 
ride them legitimately ... , 1123 Locke must show, first, how 
the natural desire for well being can be raised or expanded 
from its common expression in a narrow, unforeseeing, even 
slavish concern for self-preservation into a more energetic 
disposition to assert and defend one's rights. Second, he 
must show how the same basic desire for well being, once 
hardened into its more expansive expression as a desire to 
aggrandize oneself, can be so tamed or moderated as to 
consist with a forbearance of aggression, a respect for 
others' rights. The middling solution that Locke's psy-
23Thomas Jefferson to Roger c. Weightman, 6/24/1826, 
in Koch and Peden eds. 1944, 729. 
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chology poses consists in an elaboration of the psycholog-
ical grounds of a somewhat attenuated or modernized princi-
ple of republican liberty. Those inclined toward content-
ment with bare self-preservation at the cost of liberty 
must come to embrace the principle that consent is the 
indispensable guarantor of preservation, that "Freedom from 
Absolute, Arbitrary Power, is so necessary to, and closely 
joyned with a Man's Preservation, that he cannot part with 
it, but by what forfeits his Preservation and Life togeth-
er" (TT II.23). On the other hand, those inclined to value 
liberty only insofar as it facilitates their domination of 
others must come, according to this solution, to regard 
self-dominion as the fullest and only truly desirable form 
of dominion; they must come to experience the defensive 
capacity to resist the tyrannical assertions of other 
individuals, and ultimately of their own fanciful desires, 
as the only source of true freedom and power. 
Let us consider first the project of expanding the 
desire of self-preservation to a posture of defensiveness, 
such that it encompasses a desire for liberty. Locke's 
attempt at cultivating such an expansion operates on both 
rational and sentimental levels. On the former level, 
Locke argues that one cannot reasonably claim a right of 
life or of self-preservation without also claiming a right 
of liberty or of self-disposal. We have referred above to 
his observation that self-preservation is "the first and 
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strongest desire God Planted in Men" (I. 88). Locke con-
ceives of this "strong desire" as the foundation of our 
right to our own preservation (I.86), and moreover seems to 
regard the natural primacy of our sense of concernment for 
ourselves (see ECHU 2.27.17,18,26) as the foundation of the 
unalienable character of that right; each individual must 
retain the ultimate right of judging and enforcing the con-
ditions of self-preservation, because the wills of others 
are ultimately opaque to us, and (to say the least) cannot 
be presumed to harbor a reliable concern for our own 
preservation (II.13,22,123,127-131). The individual's 
subjective concern for preservation or, more broadly, for 
well-being requires that the individual retain the ultimate 
power of agency or of self-disposal, the power of judging 
and enforcing the conditions of preservation and well-
being. In this way the right of preservation becomes 
inseparable in Locke's argument from the right of liberty, 
as the principle of self-preservation entails logically the 
principle of self-disposal or self-ownership (II.6,23,27, 
44,55,59-60,123) .24 
As it is necessary, in Locke's view, for individuals 
not merely to know, to assent cognitively to the interde-
pendence of preservation and liberty, but also for them to 
24on self-disposal or self-ownership, see chapter v 
above, pp. 248-250, and below, pp. 365-385. 
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feel it,25 the project of practically binding the two prin-
~
ciples must include an attempt at forming the passions or 
sentiments as well. This attempt assumes a variety of 
forms throughout Locke's work. The cultivation of a 
healthy desire for liberty is clearly the aim, for 
instance, of Locke's advice in Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education that children be treated as rational creatures 
long before they approach full, adult rationality, or that 
they be indulged in the illusion that their activities are 
for the most part self-directed. 26 A similar design is 
manifest in his attempts via the rhetoric of the Two 
Treatises at raising in his audience a proud contempt for 
the condition of slavery27 and a righteous indignation or 
25Thus in addressing the objection that his doctrine 
of resistance must issue in anarchy, Locke argues that the 
people are "not apt to stir" until "the ill designs of the 
Rulers become visible, or their attempts sensible to the 
greater part ... Are the People to be blamed, if they have 
the sence of rational Creatures, and can think of things no 
otherwise than as they find and feel them?" (TT II. 230; 
also 168,225). In their larger significance, Locke's edu-
cational, rhetorical, and political-constitutional schemes 
represent elements of a larger enterprise of cultivating 
"the sence of rational Creatures" in both constitutive 
majorities and also, to a somewhat lesser extent, in gov-
erning elites. 
26upon observing that children "love to be treated as 
Rational Creatures sooner than is imagined," Locke suggests 
that "'Tis a Pride should be cherished in them, and as much 
as can be, made the greatest instrument to turn them by" 
(STCE 81). In a similar way, the child's natural, proud 
love of freedom can assist in the cultivation of industry 
as well as of rationality. See STCE 41,72-77,95,123,148. 
27Thus Locke introduces the work: "Slavery is so vile 
and miserable an Estate of Man, and so directly opposite to 
the generous Temper and Courage of our Nation, that 'tis 
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even hatred for the wielders and seekers of absolute, 
arbitrary power. 28 
Of potentially far greater effect, however, than the 
Two Treatises' rhetoric alone as means of infusing a 
healthy spiritedness into the desire of self-preservation 
are the Lockean principles of legitimacy themselves and the 
constitutional provisions that flow from them. The 
ambiguity of Locke's account renders it difficult to 
estimate precisely the intended or likely effect, in this 
respect, of his insistence on meaningful, rational consent 
as a condition of governmental legitimacy. Yet if Locke's 
practical sympathies are as democratic, in the whole or in 
part, as some have argued,29 it seems reasonable to suggest 
hardly to be conceived, 
Gentleman, should plead 
239). 
that an Englishman, much less a 
for't" (TT I.1; also II.23,163, 
28Laslett remarks upon the ferocity of the sentiment 
expressed in the epigraph from Livy that Locke placed 
immediately after the title page of the 4th edition of the 
work (1960, 170). See also his references to the beastly 
character and jural status of tyrants and other criminals, 
at II.10,11,16,93,172,181,228. In view of such references, 
it seems clear that Locke is hardly squeamish with respect 
to the right of a liberal society to punish criminal of-
fenders; his restriction of the grounds of legitimate pun-
ishment to "Reparation and Restraint," including deterrence 
of others (II.8), is less severely restrictive than this 
discussion taken in isolation may suggest. Contrast Bru-
baker 1989. 
29Kendall is the earliest and the most radical recent 
proponent of the reading of Locke as a majority-rule demo-
crat; see 1941, passim. Ashcraft argues that the Second 
Treatise is best viewed in its context as a radical Whig 
manifesto, though with significant points of contact with 
the doctrines of the Levellers, especially concerning the 
right of a majority to constitute a perfectly democratic 
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that a significant part of the value or potential value 
that Locke assigns to the principle of popular representa-
tion lies in the quiet pride that accompanies ordinary 
people's understanding that their explicit approval is a 
necessary condition of governmental legitimacy.30 
In any event, a clearer illustration of this aspect 
of Locke's intention appears in the "most characteristic 
part" of his teaching, that in which he most clearly takes 
issue with Hobbes, 31 namely his discussion of property. 
government if it so chose ( 1986, 530-589; see II. 95-98) . 
Strauss' Locke is somewhat more ambiguous, adumbrating a 
regime that appears to strike a balance between democratic 
and oligarchic principles (1953, 231-234). Thus although 
Locke "cannot be said to have had an implicit faith in the 
majority" as a guarantor of individual rights, he nonethe-
less places his greatest emphasis on the right of the com-
munity, not the individual, to resist an illegitimate gov-
ernment (especially II.168,208-209). Similarly, though he 
stipulates somewhat ambiguously that legislative represen-
tation be apportioned according to "the assistance, which 
[a given portion of the population] affords to the pub-
lick," Locke seems to intend that numbers as well as riches 
be taken into account (II.157-158). Moreover, if we con-
sider his expectation that the protection and encouragement 
of industry will enhance social mobility and broaden the 
distribution of property, it follows that the Lockean 
regime is potentially more democratic than circumstances in 
Locke's own England would permit, and likely to become more 
democratic as it matures. See Pangle 1988, 168-170. 
30on representation as the preferred modality of leg-
islative authority, see II.143,153-154,157-158. On Locke's 
concomitant emphasis of the illegitimacy of usurpation or 
benign conquest, see II.141,197-198,212,215-217. On the 
capacity of the principle of political representation to 
raise the proper sense of civic pride, contrast Rousseau, 
Social Contract I. For Locke's own implicit qualification 
of the attempt at raising directly political forms of 
pride, see the discussion below, pp. 393-396. 
31strauss 1953, 234. 
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Locke begins this discussion by grounding the right of 
property or appropriation in the right of "Preservation" 
broadly conceived as the right to provide for the "Support 
and Comfort" of our being (II.25,26). Just how broadly 
Locke conceives of this right becomes clearer, however, 
when he almost immediately thereafter introduces an alter-
native principle as the basis of legitimate appropriation. 
Because "every Man has a Property in his own Person," Locke 
continues, the 
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands ... are 
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the 
State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he 
hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something 
that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. 
(II.27) 
If laboring is in itself sufficient to create an original 
property right, then the right of appropriation obtains 
irrespective of any purely material considerations, irre-
spective of the claimant's level of material need or com-
fort. To repeat, the labor theory of appropriation consti-
tutes in the end only a particularly crucial corollary of 
the fundamental principle of human agency. Locke's doctrine 
of self-ownership means most generally that one has a 
natural right simply to act, to employ one's agency or 
action-producing faculty so as best to secure one's own 
well-being, up to the point at which one's actions threaten 
the domination, the unjust appropriation of the labor or 
the agency, of another. 
Locke finds the psychological significance of proper-
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ty most clearly evident in the behavior of young children: 
"Another thing wherein they shew their love of Dominion, is 
their desire to have things to be theirs; they would have 
£_,ropriety and Possession, pleasing themselves with the 
power which that seems to give ... " {STCE 105). It would 
appear then that Locke's insistence on constitutional pro-
tection for an expansive, even virtually unlimited right of 
appropriation represents much more than an attempt at 
ameliorating the natural condition of material unprovided-
ness or at creating the conditions for general private 
happiness in material plenty. At least as important as its 
effect on material conditions is its psychological effect; 
the protection of the right of appropriation and the 
concomitant raising and channelling of the acquisitive 
desire serve with peculiar efficacy, according to Locke's 
argument, to cultivate in ordinary subjects an expanded, 
more assertive, dignified, vigilant sense of self. As 
Locke explains in the Essay, actions, the experiential data 
of human agency or freedom, have in themselves no enduring 
existence save, perhaps, in the human mind; our ideas of 
actions as mixed modes represent only "fleeting, and 
transient Combinations of simple Ideas" ( 2. 22. 8) . But 
whereas the merely transient, momentary existence of most 
actions limits their psychological or pedagogical power, 
the particular action of appropriating represents the 
employment and manifestation of one's freedom to create or 
328 
enlarge a visible, tangible, more-or-less enduring 
domain,32 and for this reason carries a peculiar power to 
expand the individual's sense or consciousness of self. 
Locke intends the protection and encouragement of the right 
of productive appropriation to cement in the minds of 
ordinary individuals the association between the virtue of 
industriousness and a dignifying sense of personal potency 
or efficacy; by virtue of the Lockean stress on property 
and its inculcation of an enlarged sense of one's own, of 
one's personal domain of freedom and power, the imperative 
of preservation transcends the Hobbesian concern for mere 
biological existence and becomes a more vigilant, assertive 
concern for preservation in freedom.33 "The great and 
chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwewalths, 
and putting themselves under Government, is the Preserva-
tion" not narrowly of themselves, but "of their Property" 
(II.124) . By expanding, as it were, the boundaries of the 
32Polin (1969, 6) calls attention to the relation of 
Locke's conception of property to that of Hegel, observing 
that property for Locke "is the external manifestation of 
freedom, its expression and its very concrete existence for 
others," and not only for others. "Every man, being equal 
to every other, manifests his liberty by the domination, 
the ownership of his property" (1969, 6). Rapaczynski's 
reading is similar: Lockean "appropriation is the funda-
mental activity which permits man to overcome his estrange-
ment from the natural environment and to achieve his auton-
omy" (1987, 180). The difficulty to which this conception 
of appropriation leads is implicit in Strauss' observation 
that labor, for Locke as for Hegel, "is a negative attitude 
toward nature" (1953, 250). See the discussion below, pp. 
346-349. 
33see chapter II above, pp. 39-45. 
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self and its sphere of privacy, Locke hopes to contract the 
proper sphere of governmental authority. In a sort of 
"forward defense" strategy, he hopes to raise the proper 
spirit of defensiveness against tyranny or illegitimacy by 
expanding and thus making more visible and more complete 
that which is to be defended. Thus understood, Locke's 
defense of the natural, unalienable right of private prop-
erty or appropriation signifies a defense not of a sordid, 
mean-spirited materialism,34 but rather of an indispensable 
bulwark of civil or political liberty. 
A complementary design is evident in Locke's attempt 
at moderating or taming the desire for dominion. There is 
in fact a certain symmetry in the relation between these 
two attempts. Just as the achievement of a rational, civil 
consensus requires the leavening of the desire for self-
preservation by its blending with a moderate love of domin-
ion, so also it requires the moderation of the extreme love 
of dominion to bring that desire into conformity with the 
imperative of preservation. This two-dimensional character 
of Locke's attempt at identifying and reinforcing the 
foundation for a liberal consensus appears most clearly in 
34The most apparently materialistic of Locke's recent 
commentators agree on this point. MacPherson's employment 
of the term "possessive" to describe Lockean individualism 
may appear to carry this connotation, though MacPherson ex-
plains that he refers fundamentally to a doctrine of pos-
session of self, or of the individualist assertion of inde-
pendence of others, with the implication that the material-
ist form of this assertion is only incidentally related to 
it (1962, 3). Cf. Wood 1983, 34-35; Wood 1984, 31-33,102. 
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the fact that alongside his declaration that "the end of 
_gaw is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and 
enlarge Freedom" (TT II.57), Locke proclaims with signifi-
cant emphasis that political power properly conceived "hath 
no other end but preservation" (II.135; also 124). In 
order properly to moderate the desire for dominion, in 
order to defend the principle of liberty as distinct from 
that of sheer license or arbitrariness, Locke maintains the 
grounding of that principle in a respect for the enduring 
sway of natural necessity. Therefore he avoids a simple 
reversal of the Hobbesian priority of preservation to 
liberty. 35 But the key to the taming of the desire for 
dominion so that it may coexist with the desire for 
preservation lies once again in Locke's defense of the 
right of appropriation. 
The association of the activity of appropriation with 
35The failure to devote sufficient attention to this 
fact, or in other words the failure to take seriously the 
naturalness of the ills of the state of nature, accounts 
for the partiality or one-dimensionality in the reading of 
Locke as a teacher of individual moral autonomy. In his 
attempt at revealing a genuinely moral dimension of Locke's 
thought, Rapaczynski tends, for instance, to underemphasize 
(though he does not simply ignore) Locke's concern with our 
natural alienation from other human beings, not merely from 
nonhuman nature, and thus to underemphasize the essentially 
defensive character of Locke's political thought (1987, 9, 
113-217). The real difficulty in this partial reading lies 
in the fact that an unmixed emphasis on the aim of pure 
moral, that is, individual autonomy would ultimately under-
mine any limitations on the assertions of individual wills, 
and therewith exacerbate precisely those natural ills that 
the Lockean regime is intended to overcome. 
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the desire for dominion implies the usefulness of that 
activity not only for expanding the ordinary concern for 
self-preservation, but also for channelling the desire for 
dominion in a socially beneficial direction. As we have 
seen, Locke in Some Thoughts Concerning Education conceives 
of the desire to appropriate or to possess as an expression 
of the desire for dominion. He clearly associates the 
possessive desire with the vice of covetousness, declaring 
it one of the "two Roots of almost all the Injustice and 
contention, that so disturb Humane Life," and as such to be 
"early ... weeded out" of children's prevailing motivations 
(105; also 110). Yet contrary to the judgment of Axtell, 
this does not imply that Locke in the Education takes a 
"low ... view of acquisitiveness" (1968, 207), in opposition 
to the view he presents in the Two Treatises.36 Even in 
the discussion in question, Locke distinguishes the unjust 
desire for possession from more direct expressions of the 
desire for dominion; the possessive desire to have "things" 
36seliger goes further than does Axtell, asserting 
that even in the Two Treatises Locke's evaluation of the 
moral and social role of money "remains negative" precisely 
because "a money-economy makes it possible for different 
degrees of industry to cause a gross inequality of posses-
sions" ( 1968, 157-158) . Dunn holds similarly that Locke 
"felt deeply ambivalent" about the advent of money because 
money introduced reasons for quarreling over title and 
largeness of possession, sundering the connection between 
right and conveniency (1984, 40). For Tully, the acquisi-
tive desire for more than one needs "is not the motor of 
technological advance and a more refined form of life," but 
rather the morally condemnable motive of mere miserly 
hoarding (1980, 148). 
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or objects at one's disposal appears less directly produc-
tive of injustice than the desire to be "submitted to by 
others," or to have actual persons at one's disposal (STCE 
105,104). 
More importantly, Locke's solution of the problem of 
covetousness or unjust possessiveness in the Education does 
not require the radical suppression or extirpation of the 
desire to acquire. It would appear, after all, a highly 
curious manner of radically "weeding out" children's 
acquisitiveness to teach them, as Locke shortly thereafter 
recommends, that "the most Liberal has always most plenty," 
that the child "loses nothing by his Liberality" (110). 
Locke recommends a method of moderating children's desire 
to acquire or possess that would surely serve to strengthen 
their sense of the legitimacy of that desire. 37 That he 
does indeed approve the legitimacy of an appropriately 
moderated desire to acquire is confirmed by his subsequent 
suggestion concerning the provision of playthings for 
children. Lest they be taught "Pride, Vanity, and Covet-
ousness" along with a perpetual, inherently immoderate 
dissatisfaction, children according to Locke should have 
few or no playthings bought for them, but should instead be 
required to make them for themselves. "This will accustom 
them to seek for what they want in th ems elves ... whereby 
they will be taught Moderation in their Desires, Applica-
37cf. Tarcov 1984, 141-145. 
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tion, Industry, Thought, Contrivance, and Good Husbandry" 
(STCE 130) . The acquisitive desire is not to be sup-
pressed, but instead to be subjected to the discipline of 
industry or laboring as the condition of its gratification. 
Locke's legitimation of acquisitiveness by associat-
ing it with liberality and self-reliant creativity in the 
Education is in perfect harmony with the teaching of chap-
ter 5 of the Second Treatise. Appropriation in unlimited 
amounts is a natural, unalienable right, according to the 
latter, so long as it is accomplished (directly or indi-
rectly) through productive laboring. Whoever "appropriates 
land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase 
the common stock of mankind" (TT II.37; also 40-44,48). 
The possibility of genuine liberality rests above all on 
the creation of wealth, and thus on the encouragement of 
productive industry. Indeed there is a sense in which 
productive appropriation represents for Locke an obligation 
as well as a right conferred by nature. "God and his 
Reason commanded [Man) to subdue the Earth, i.e. improve it 
for the benefit of Life, and therein lay out something upon 
it that was his own, his labour" (II.32; also 34,35). 
Natural necessity, or the natural condition of "penury" 
(32; cf. 35,37) obliges us to labor in order to eliminate 
or minimize the need for charity traditionally understood, 
and thereby to lay the foundation of civil concord. 
Locke's ambiguous argument in the First Treatise to the 
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effect that charity, if not justice, accords the needy a 
"Right" to another's surplus (42) implies that the desti-
tute have in the extremity of their condition a right to 
theft or even robbery; 38 if so, then the establishment of 
justice as the foundation of civil society, implying the 
protection of everyone's "Title to the product of his 
honest Industry, would require the creation or preservation 
of an abundance of material opportunity sufficient to 
enable all to subsist and even to profit by their own 
industry. Locke proposes the replacement of traditional 
charity with modern technology, with the development of 
"Invention and Arts" (II. 44) that will revolutionize the 
productivity of human labor, as the solution of this aspect 
of the problem of the state of nature.39 
The appeal of this solution, from the perspective of 
38Thus Strauss, commenting on the same paragraph: "in 
a state of extreme scarcity everyone may take away from 
others what he needs for mere self-preservation, regardless 
of whether or not the others starve" (1953, 239n.) Pangle 
adds that "what [Locke] means by 'charity' is just a sub-
division of justice: an expression, in desperate circum-
stances, of the inalienable right ... to self-preservation" 
(1988, 144). See also chapter II above, note 31. 
39As we have noted in another context, Locke's most 
explicit statement of this intention appears at ECHU 
4 .12 .12: "The study of Nature ... if rightly directed, may 
be of greater benefit to Mankind, than the Monuments of 
exemplary Charity, that have at so great Charge been 
raised, by the Founders of Hospitals and Alms-houses ... " 
This emphasis in the Essay and the Two Treatises on the 
technological overcoming of the need for charity represents 
Locke's resolution of the problem of scarcity that he had 
formulated in the early Questions Concerning the Law of 
Nature, 11.245-249. 
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Locke's promotion of the "endowment" of justice, lies in 
its psychological realism. While the acquisitive passion 
may become legitimate, in Locke's scheme, by virtue of its 
service to the cause of preservation, it is equally clear 
that it remains attractive to individuals, notwithstanding 
its subjection to the condition of laborious productivity, 
by virtue of its enduring potential for gratifying the 
desire for dominion or inequality. In the course of his 
defense of the right of appropriation, Locke places 
considerable emphasis on the proposition that "Men have 
agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possessions of the 
Earth" (II. 50); the invention of money in particular has 
"introduced (by Consent) larger Possessions, and g_ Right to 
them" (II.36; emphasis supplied). Recognizing not only the 
natural differences among individuals in "Parts and Merit" 
(II.54), but also the equally important human desire to be 
credited for such distinction, Locke insists that a well-
constituted political society guarantee the rewards of 
superior industry. "God gave the World to Men in Common," 
but gave it especially "to the use of the Industrious and 
Rational, " to those who enlarge the common stock by their 
rational, productive industry (II.34; also 37,48). The 
Lockean social contract requires then not the categorical 
repression of the desire for inequality or dominion, but 
rather its transformation. Its traditional manifestation 
in the "Quarrelsom and Contentious" idleness of unproduc-
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tive upper classes (of hereditary aristocracies, for 
instance) must give way to the more energetic, socially 
productive, genuinely self-validating expression of the 
modern commercial classes.40 Thus transformed or rechan-
nelled by the Lockean principles of education and constitu-
tionalism, the natural desire for self-aggrandizement is 
diverted from its preoccupation with dominating other human 
beings. Locke even expects that the pride that the indus-
trious experience in their own providence, in their partial 
mastery of nature, will provide the grounds for a certain 
generosity toward their social inferiors. Just as his 
suggestion in the Education for moderating the desire to 
possess serves also to legitimate that desire, so in this 
case he suggests that children should learn civility or 
respect for the principle of natural equality in part by 
learning that "No part of their Superiority will be hereby 
lost; but the Distinction increased ... The more they have, 
the better humour' d they should be taught to be ... " ( STCE 
117; also 109). The psychological subtlety of Locke's 
defense of the principle of natural jural equality is per-
haps best revealed in this educational stratagem, according 
40For Locke's critique of the traditional aristocracy, 
see STCE 207; Works (1823) 5.54,64,72,163; CJL #1693, 
1/19/94; King 1830, 97-98. Wood observes aptly that in 
"Locke's vocabulary, labor, industry, perseverance, sobri-
ety, and usefulness replaced aristocratic honor, pride, 
dignity, spirit, and the non-utilitarian" (1983, 148; also 
128)--though this does not imply that Locke disregarded the 
vices of the gentry (45-46). 
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to which respectful assent to the principle of common 
humanity appears less as a duty than as a mark of dignity, 
a privilege of a distinguished status.41 
41This apparent attempt at cultivating a somewhat 
attenuated sense of noblesse seems to apply not only to the 
propertied class in Locke's design, but also to the scien-
tifically or technologically skilled elite upon whose "gen-
erous pains" (ECHU 4. 3 .16) the wealth of the commercial 
classes ultimately depends. Whereas morality is the proper 
business of "Mankind in general," according to Locke, the 
"several Arts, conversant about parts of Nature, are the 
lot and private Talent of particular Men, for the common 
Use of humane Life ... " (4.12.11; emphasis supplied). Locke 
seems to intend his recognition of the particularity of 
such talents as a reward for their serving the common good. 
He in effect treats the generosity of society's powerful 
benefactors as in itself a privilege. 
THE LIMITS OF LOCKE'S UTILITARIANISM 
Let us reflect briefly upon the nature of Locke's 
solution, as thus far described, of the problem of moral 
dissensus. We have seen at length how, much of the 
rhetoric of the Second Treatise notwithstanding, Locke 
raises very serious questions concerning the status of the 
principle of human equality. In affirming specifically the 
naturalness to the human species both of significant 
inequalities in the possession of rationality and of class 
divisions based upon the relative powers of the passions 
for self-preservation and self-aggrandizement, Locke 
implicitly questions the propriety of conceiving of 
humankind as, in the morally decisive respects, a single, 
unitary species. He questions, in other words, whether 
there exist natural principles of justice, or whether the 
natural distributions of reason and passions among human 
beings provide adequate grounds for the development of a 
moral-political consensus naturally appropriate to human 
beings as such. His answer, again as described to this 
point, consists in a sophisticated form of utilitarian-
ism. 42 It consists in the proposition that under the 
influence of appropriate educational and constitutional 
42strauss 1953, 235 n. 107. 
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principles, self-interest and the common good can be 
harmonized; rational seekers of well-being who are unequal 
both in the power of their rationality and in their sub-
stantive conceptions of their own well-being can come 
freely to agree upon and to live harmoniously according to 
the principles of natural rights. In the Lockean stress on 
the preservation of property and on the right of appropria-
tion lies the basis of a sound mixed regime, the capacity 
to accommodate at once the lovers of equality and those of 
inequality. The rewarding of rational industry can appease 
the lovers of dominion or aggrandizement without fostering 
the resentment of the lovers of preservation, in that it 
bases social distinction upon a standard of achievement 
that is understandable, accessible, and beneficial to the 
common majority.43 
Yet the ultimate efficacy of this mixture or the 
compatibility of these two principles remains in question. 
In order to see this, it is necessary for us first to 
notice the role that a sense of justice plays in the 
maintenance of the Lockean regime. The foregoing account 
of Locke's psychological realism in addressing the problem 
43This explains more adequately why Locke includes 
little mention of violence and avoids altogether the 
concept of the state of nature in the Second Treatise' 
discussion of early property relations. While property 
surely provides often enough the occasion for conflict, 
Locke's aim is to show how the desire to appropriate, 
suitably directed, can operate as a pacifying principle. 
See chapter V above, p. 286, n. 81. 
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of natural class divisions does not imply that Locke indul-
ges, in anticipation of Mandeville, in a kind of uncritical 
moral alchemy, that he believes in the possibility of a 
perfect harmonization of communal well-being and private 
interest narrowly understood. He suggests at one point in 
the Second Treatise that to sacrifice in the performance of 
one's obligations ·is to act on the basis of what is "not 
only necessary, but just; since the other Members of the 
society do the like" (II.130). In Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education, he declares that the inculcation of "an ingen-
uous Detestation ... will be a better Guard against Dishon-
esty, than any Considerations drawn from Interest" ( 110). 
Also in the latter work, he explains that the psychological 
basis of this sense of justice lies not so much in 
abstraction from interest altogether as in its enlargement. 
"Reputation" in Locke's view is "not the true Principle and 
Measure of Vertue ... yet it is that, which comes nearest to 
it" (STCE 61). Thus he recommends that children learn 
courage or fortitude, "the Guard and Support of the other 
Virtues, " by learning to "pref err the Reputation of being 
Brave and stout, to the avoiding a little Pain," and with 
time to the avoiding of progressively greater pains (STCE 
115). 44 
44Thus Locke stresses that "the great Secret of 
Education" is the cultivation in children of "a Love of 
Credit, and an Apprehension of Shame and Disgrace" (STCE 
56; also 58,200). 
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It is possible to argue that in this enlarged concern 
for reputation or esteem lies the sentimental support for 
conformity with the demands of Lockean justice even at the 
extremities of political life, in those circumstances in 
which political obligation requires the greatest apparent 
personal sacrifices or acts of devotion. "Esteem and 
Disgrace are, of all others, the most powerful Incentives 
to the Mind, when once it is brought to relish them" (STCE 
56; also ECHU 2.28.12). In his diary entry of 12 December 
1678, Locke remarks on the power of this desire to make 
"the Hurons and other people of Canada with such constancy 
endure such unexpressible torments" (in Axtell 1968, 
153n.).45 There can be little doubt, therefore, that Locke 
believes the desire for esteem sufficiently powerful to 
support what must be at least for most the greatest per-
sonal sacrifice for their community. "Laurels and Hon-
ours," he takes care to affirm, "are always justly due to 
the Valour of those who venture their Lives for their 
Country" (STCE 115). 46 Moreover, the case seems similar 
45see also Horwitz 1979, 136-141. 
46Grant concludes that the performance of this ulti-
mate obligation "cannot be defended on the grounds of 
[Lockean] self-interest"; considerations of justice are 
entirely distinct from those of self-interest, and must 
supersede them (1987, 133). The argument presented here 
requires the following qualification of this conclusion: 
for an individual with the proper Lockean education or 
moral formation, self-interest would support justice inas-
much as the disgrace of failing to defend a free government 
or of subjection without resistance to an unfree one would 
be worse than the prospect of an honorable death. 
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with respect to an alternative form of personal sacrifice, 
involving a different sort of political extremity. To the 
lovers of extreme inequality, animated by the highest 
ambition and therefore incapable of appeasement in the 
ordinary acquisitive pursuits, Locke suggests that that 
"Prince" who secures "protection and encouragement to the 
honest industry of Mankind against the oppression of power 
and the narrownesse of Party," not only "will quickly be 
too hard for his neighbours," but in preserving a truly 
legitimate government--especially by prerogative power, at 
a moment when legitimacy is most vulnerable and arbitrary 
absolutism therefore most inviting--would become "wise and 
godlike," worthy of the highest distinction and esteem, the 
bearer of "true Power and Honour" (II.42,111,166).47 
According to this reading, therefore, Locke's appar-
ently stark indication of the ultimate ground of military 
obligation in the Second Treatise does not imply that in 
his view sheer terror or the fear of capital punishment by 
one's military superior is the only support of discipline 
47cf. in this regard Locke's reference to the unknown 
discoverer of iron, without which "we should in a few Ages 
be unavoidably reduced to the Wants and Ignorance of the 
ancient savage Americans," as the quasi-divine "Father of 
Arts, and Author of Plenty" (4.12.11). Once again, Locke 
holds before the "Master-Builders" of the new natural sci-
ence with its implicit technological providence the promise 
of a share of the "true honor and power" merited by the 
godlike princes. See note 41 above. 
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in combat.48 It may be significant that in the passage in 
question Locke holds that it would mean not simply death, 
but "justly death" to disobey one's superior (II.139). But 
in any event, in view of Locke's estimate of the power and 
usefulness in this respect of the desire for esteem, and 
more to the point, in view of the fact that the entire 
argument of the Second Treatise depends upon a spontaneous, 
defensive but foresighted popular willingness in extreme 
circumstances to risk death in resistance against tyranny, 
it seems safest to conclude that in this brief discussion 
of absolute military power, Locke intends primarily to make 
plain the extent of the government's authority, and perhaps 
also to lay bare the teeth of the law in such matters, but 
not to comment on the ultimate grounds or supports of 
members' obligations. 
Still, it may be possible to grant the seriousness of 
Locke's appeal to the concern for esteem or reputation and 
at the same time to persist in the argument that members' 
performance of their obligations to the Lockean common-
weal th could not be judged in the decisive respect free, 
nonalienating or nonrepressive, on Locke's own principles. 
Locke's apparent reliance on the concern for esteem 
involves the following two difficulties. First, the 
48contrast the view of Goldwin ( 1972, 483-484) . In 
differing from Goldwin on this point, however, I am not 
implying that he is wrong to call attention to Locke's 
evident abstraction from appeals to a sense of patriotism 
or civic duty in the Second Treatise. 
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concern for esteem can take the form of either a desire or 
an aversion; it can move us to action through the positive 
attraction of the pleasures attendant upon a good reputa-
tion, or through our repulsion by the prospect of incurring 
shame. Indeed it may be very difficult to separate the 
desire from the aversion in our concern for reputation. 
But to the extent that our performing our obligations 
proceeds from the latter motive, it proceeds from a kind of 
fear, and cannot be judged wholly free or voluntary. 49 
second, and more importantly, inherent in the concern for 
reputation, whether a desire or an aversion, is a psycho-
logical dependence upon the opinions of others.50 Although 
a "Mind free, and Master of it self and all its Actions ... 
is what every one is taken with" (STCE 66), yet "We are all 
a sort of Camelions, that still take a Tincture from Things 
near us" (67). The implication once again is that our 
consent at least in many cases cannot be wholly free, 
wholly self-affirming or in accordance with our nature. 
49see, for instance, STCE 110: The cultivation of "an 
ingenuous Detestation of this shameful Vice [i.e. of injus-
tice] ... is the true and genuine Method to obviate this 
Crime; and will be a better Guard ... than any Considerations 
drawn from Interest." 
50see especially STCE 57. The fact of dependence, as 
Tarcov observes, "lies at the bottom of the concern for 
esteem" (1984, 116-117). Thus Bloom epitomizes Rousseau's 
characterization of the bourgeois, including the Lockean 
individual: " ... to describe the inner workings of his 
soul, he is the man who, when dealing with others, thinks 
only of himself, and on the other hand, in his understand-
ing of himself, thinks only of others" (1979, 5). 
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In view of these characteristics of the concern for 
esteem or reputation, it is perhaps not surprising that in 
the second Treatise Locke de-emphasizes his appeal to this 
concern as the proper mode of governing the most ambitious 
individuals, those who desire sovereignty in its most 
profound, expansive forms. It is highly significant in its 
way that Locke refers to any prince or political ruler as 
"God-like"; yet it is also significant that he does so in 
the larger context of an argument to the effect that "the 
reigns of good Princes have been always most dangerous to 
the Liberties of their People," and therefore that princely 
prerogative is to be jealously monitored (II.166).51 
Apparently distrusting the power of esteem to govern the 
profoundly expansive desires, Locke maintains in the end 
that "the best fence against Rebellion" or against tyran-
nical designs on the part of rulers lies not in the desire 
of the latter to be or to appear godlike in their justice 
as well as their power, but rather in the "Doctrine of a 
Power in the People of providing for their safety a-new by 
a new Legislative" (II.226). A heal thy respect for the 
balance of powers within the commonwealth will provide the 
most reliable means for attaching the ambition of rulers to 
51Locke thus recognizes the force of the argument that 
the young Lincoln would make roughly 150 years later, to 
the effect that it is unsafe to assume the self-moderating 
character of that high ambition characteristic of "the fam-
ily of the lion, or the tribe of the eagle," which would 
sooner destroy than preserve ("Address Before the Young 
Men's Lyceum," in Current ed. 1967, 19). 
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the cause of legitimacy. The Lockean "appeal to heaven" 
reduces in the end to an appeal to popular vigilance 
(II.20,21,168,176,241-242). By raising a popular willing-
ness in extreme circumstances to take up arms against 
illegitimate rulers, Locke hopes to intimidate egoistic 
rulers and thus to diminish their appetites for the sorts 
of actions that would properly provoke popular resis-
tance. 52 
Locke's employment of this "best Fence" or balance-
of-powers argument points most clearly to the persistence 
of the fundamental question of the naturalness of the 
Lockean regime. The issue is not merely Locke's acknow-
ledgement that the reconciliation between private interest 
and the common good remains imperfect in the regime that he 
envisions, or that the laws made in accordance with the 
forms and goals of that regime require, like all laws, 
"teeth" for their enforcement. Locke maintains that the 
threat of popular resistance is the "best fence against 
Rebellion," the best defense against the greatest, most 
dangerous form of criminality (II.218,230). But can it 
indeed provide in the long run the best defense against 
tyranny, if it is not a theoretically satisfying, coherent 
defense? Given his own account of human psychology or 
motivation, on what basis is Locke entitled to conclude 
52rn this striking manner, as Pangle observes, Locke 
reaffirms the old identification of the vox populi with the 
vox dei (1988, 204). 
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that such rebellion or tyranny is naturally undesirable, 
and therefore that its suppression is not contrary to 
nature? It appears clearly undesirable, of course, for its 
subjects, for those who are incapable of becoming tyrants 
themselves; but what of the others, those among the classes 
of natural oligarchs or aristocrats whose ambitions cannot 
be satisfied by mere inequalities in material acquisitions? 
If power in the service of a relativistic pursuit of happi-
ness is the only aim of rational human action, then would 
it not be in the highest sense natural for human beings to 
seek radical freedom or sovereignty, to experience all 
limitations on personal freedom as alienating and to harbor 
a radically revolutionary animus against all conventional 
or political restraint?53 For the truly ambitious individ-
uals, would not Locke's acknowledgement of the primacy of 
the human pursuit of happiness serve only to expand still 
further the inegalitarian desires, not to diminish but to 
heighten a sense of the injustice of the demand for equal 
rights? If so, then Locke ultimately fails in his attempt 
at designing a mixed regime, or at discovering in the prin-
53such is the great fear of Burke, of course, who sees 
in the French revolutionaries an intoxicated lust for inno-
vation for its own sake, a radically negative, destructive 
willfulness that is the direct consequence of the theoret-
ical doctrine of natural freedom as pure negation or inde-
terminacy (Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 
Mahoney ed. 1955; see, e.g., 7-9,40-42,65-66, 86-89,97-101, 
107-111, 126-129, 181). Herein lies, once again, the full 
significance of the observation that labor, for Locke as 
well as for Hegel, expresses "a negative attitude toward 
nature" (Strauss 1953, 250). Cf. note 32 above. 
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ciple of equal natural rights the grounds of rational con-
sensus among all the partisans of democracy and oligar-
chy. 54 At best, according to this objection, the Lockean 
regime may secure the interests of the large majority, but 
it does not secure the interests of everyone.55 At worst, 
it may establish a laborious, emotionally and spiritually 
ascetic regime in which those who believe themselves happy 
are so by virtue of a sort of internalized timidity, or a 
forgetfulness of their own nature,56 and a relative few--
and these the most dangerous, the desirers of the grandest 
inequalities--are both miserable and restless. 
In thus noting the tenacity of the objection to the 
54rn sympathy with Locke, one might argue that Locke's 
achievement lies not so much in balancing the opposing 
principles of oligarchy and democracy as in showing how the 
principle of democracy properly understood comprehends a 
moderated form of the oligarchic principle. Still, if we 
continue to employ Aristotelian categories in analyzing the 
Lockean regime, it would seem according to this objection 
that implicit in Locke's best fence argument is an admis-
sion of the need for ostracism, or of the impossibility of 
doing justice to all relevant claimants to power. Would 
this not constitute an admission of the partiality, of the 
nonuniversality of Locke's principles of justice? Cf. 
Aristotle, Politics 3.13.13-25. 
55cf. Strauss 1959, 218. 
56Locke observes that "in this life there are not 
many, whose happiness reaches so far, as to afford them a 
constant train of moderate mean Pleasures, without any mix-
ture of uneasiness" (ECHU 2.21.44), and clearly suggests 
that his readers would do well to habituate themselves to 
find contentment in a moderated, mixed happiness (see e.g. 
2.21.43,46; STCE 130). The question is whether such moder-
ation can be truly choiceworthy, whether in practicing it 
we act in accordance with our nature, or merely under the 
constraint of a necessity that we desire most deeply to 
escape. 
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"peculiarity" of Locke's hedonism, even in the face of his 
manifest Machiavellian cleverness in designing a modern 
mixed regime, we come to the heart of Locke's textual 
ambiguity and therewith to the heart of his political 
philosophy. Having established the sophistication, but 
also the essential utilitarianism of Locke's nontheological 
moral-political reasoning, as presented thus far; conced-
ing, that is, that Locke does proclaim the moral primacy of 
the self and its happiness, and does present the rational 
pursuit of happiness in large part as a persistent struggle 
against various forms of natural necessity, we confront 
finally the decisive question. What has Locke to say, 
concerning the available sources of meaning or experiences 
of completion that might serve to redeem the ordinary and 
the extraordinary struggles that occupy so much of a 
rational and industrious individual's life, that might 
serve as the natural, rational limits on the negative, 
destructive projections of the human will? Beyond abstract 
pleasure and its instrumentalities of health, ease, and 
plenty, 57 what, finally, is to be affirmed according to 
Locke? 
57rn a 1677 fragment Locke observes that the happiness 
of this world "certainly is nothing else but plenty of all 
sorts of those things which can with most ease, pleasure, 
and variety, preserve [us] longest in it" (in King 1830, 
88; also 90). 
THE NATURE OF HUMAN HAPPINESS 
Of fundamental importance here is not whether the 
Lockean self is capable of any genuine self-transcendence, 
any devotion to a cause larger than itself, but instead 
whether the Lockean regime is capable of securing our 
natural happiness and therefore inspiring our positive 
devotion, or the devotion of a rational subject. 
Irrespective of how Locke chooses to denominate such 
experiences, it is clear that the Lockean self is capable 
of so extending the sphere of its vital concernment as to 
make it capable of actions practically indistinguishable 
from those motivated by a genuine self-forgetting or self-
transcendence.58 What is less immediately clear, and of 
58Notwithstanding his general avoidance of appeals to 
patriotism, it is clear, for instance, that Locke views 
patriotism, an expansion of one's sphere of concernment 
such that the well-being of the country or nation impli-
cates one's personal well-being, as at least a psychologic-
al possibility, if not indeed a commonplace. Albeit rather 
casually, he even appeals to the sentiment of patriotism in 
scattered passages in his published works, most prominently 
in the "Introduction" to the First Treatise, which begins 
with the declaration that "Slavery is ... so directly oppo-
site to the generous Temper and Courage of our Nation; that 
'tis hardly to be conceived, that an Englishman, much less 
a Gentleman, should plead for' t" (I. 1; also STCE "Epistle 
Dedicatory," 115). Leaving aside whether Locke thus indi-
cates a more powerfully self-expanding attachment to Eng-
land or to the gentry, we find the most extreme illustra-
tion of this capacity in the surprisingly common human 
readiness not only to risk death for the sake of one's 
country, but even "at any time to seal with their Blood" 
their most cherished principles, or to "contend ... fight, 
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decisive importance here, is whether it can do so rational-
1.Y' and in accordance with our natural happiness. In the 
final analysis, the fundamental question for Lockean polit-
ical philosophy concerns the possibility of genuine reason-
ing about human happiness, or to put it more simply, con-
cerns the status of human reason itself. 
On the basis of what has been said thus far, it may 
seem that the case against Locke is compelling. His urgent 
and colorful denials of the existence of any consensus 
gentium in matters of law and morality, and above all his 
assertion that "the Philosophers of old did in vain 
enquire" after the nature of the human "Summum bonum," 
because "those things, which produce the greatest 
Pleasure •.. to different Men, are very different things" 
(ECHU 2. 21. 55), appear to mark him clearly enough as a 
thoroughly modern moral and political utilitarian. Yet his 
apparently clear denials of the possibility of teleological 
moral reasoning must be considered in conjunction with the 
fact that Locke not only affirms the possibility throughout 
and die in defence of their Opinions" (ECHU 1. 3. 27, 26). 
Pangle suggests that such self-enlarging identifications 
are "ultimately dubious on strict Lockean grounds" ( 1988, 
212), but I fail to see the evidence for this. It seems to 
me perfectly defensible on Lockean grounds to argue that 
given the power of habituation, the self-concerned love of 
esteem becomes very difficult after a certain point to dis-
entangle from an extra-personal love of the source of that 
esteem, just as in a more general way after a certain point 
the love of any particular pleasure may become practically 
indistinguishable from a love of the source or object of 
that pleasure. 
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the Essay and exhorts his readers accordingly, but even 
affords occasional, partial glimpses of his own attempts at 
such reasoning. Once again, nothing is more dangerous in 
Locke's view than to allow one's moral principles to go 
unexamined. 59 More affirmatively, he insists that the 
nature of human beings as rational creatures concerned for 
happiness imposes on us a kind of obligation to reason as 
carefully as possible about the ultimate ends of human 
action. "[W)hen, upon due Examination, we have judg'd, we 
have done our duty ... in pursuit of our happiness ... " For 
just as "the highest perfection of intellectual nature, 
lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid 
happiness; so the care of our selves, that we mistake not 
imaginary for real happiness, is the necessary foundation 
of our liberty" (2.21.47,51). 
This suggestion of the possibility of genuinely 
reasoning about happiness, of rationally distinguishing 
"true and sol id" or "real" from "imaginary" happiness, 
requires further elaboration. At times Locke seems to 
indicate that this distinction rests upon no more than a 
prudent comparison of the immediate and the more distant 
consequences of particular courses of action60 ; the moral 
rightness or wrongness of a given action would then depend 
59see chapters II and v above, pp. 61-65, 239-240. 
60commenting directly on STCE 110, Tarcov suggests 
that "Locke ... equates reason with serious long-range 
considerations of interest" (1984, 149). 
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upon quantitative but not qualitative considerations, or 
upon the intensity and duration of the attendant pleasures 
and pains, not their content (2.21.58-65). As Rapaczynski 
notices, however, Locke's discussion of the possibility of 
teleological moral reasoning does imply a movement beyond 
such narrowly prudential calculations. Indeed Rapaczynski 
goes so far as to deny that Locke's moral theory is in the 
final analysis hedonistic or utilitarian, on the grounds 
that our particular ideas of happiness for Locke are prior 
to and cons ti tuti ve of our experiences of pleasure and 
pain. Locke is according to his reading a theorist of 
moral autonomy who closely prefigures the precritical Kant, 
in that his rejection of psychological hedonism allows him 
also to deny the necessity of abstracting moral principles 
altogether from natural motivations or principles of action 
(1987, 124,154-161). 
A significant strand of argument in Locke's Essay 
does at least to some extent support this reading. While 
the experience of present uneasiness is in his revised 
account the immediate determinant of volition (2.21.31ff.), 
Locke nonetheless makes plain his opinion that it lies 
within our power to determine which absent goods will 
produce uneasiness in us: "by a due consideration and 
examining any good proposed, it is in our power, to raise 
our desires, in a due proportion to the value of that good, 
whereby ... it may come to work upon the will ... " ( 2. 21. 4 6) . 
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What we find desirable, in other words, depends upon our 
previously constructed and internalized complex idea of 
happiness (2.21.41,43). Thus by means of consideration or 
habituation we are capable of correcting our "palates," of 
changing "the pleasantness, and unpleasantness, that 
accompanies any sort of action, " in accordance with the 
requirements of our conception of happiness (2.21.69). We 
are capable, in Locke's most far-reaching estimate of our 
powers of moral reasoning, of conforming "the relish of our 
Minds to the true intrinsick good or ill, that is in 
things" (2. 21. 53; emphasis supplied). 
This line of argument obviously raises a number of 
difficult questions. How, for instance, are naturally 
pleasure-seeking creatures capable of discovering "the true 
intrinsick good or ill" in things? Does our capacity for 
reflectively modifying the content of our pleasures and 
pains imply that the human self is infinitely malleable? 
If the content of our pleasures and pains is determined by 
our prior conceptions of happiness, on what nonhedonistic 
basis do we construct those conceptions of happiness? The 
answers to these questions remain unclear in Rapaczynski's 
reading, which focuses only on the achievement of moral 
agency, via the appropriative transformation or humaniza-
tion of nature, as the necessary means of the rational 
pursuit of happiness (1987, 171-176); as for the end, or 
the content of happiness itself, Rapaczynski offers no 
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satisfactory explanation of how according to Locke our 
choice of ideals of happiness could avoid an unreflective 
"heteronomy" and at the same time avoid collapsing into 
sheer arbitrariness or willfulness in the guise of 
"autonomy" (161-168).61 
It is unfortunate though (as we will argue) under-
standable that Locke devotes relatively little explicit 
reasoning toward addressing these questions. Nonetheless 
it is possible to construct out of the materials Locke 
provides at least a partial account of his conception of 
the ultimate grounds and ultimate ends of moral reasoning. 
In the midst of his more prominently displayed arguments, 
Locke more quietly provides the materials of an ultimately 
61Rapaczynski argues that Locke's emphasis of produc-
tive appropriation provides the means for avoiding the 
problem of heteronomy and establishing a genuine moral 
autonomy, insofar as the progressive recreation of nature 
in accordance with human ends guarantees that the experien-
tial materials out of which we construct our ideas of hap-
piness will be themselves products of human creation; 
therefore our construction of ideas of happiness, its 
dependence on the external environment notwithstanding, 
represents ultimately an act of self-legislation (172-176). 
Yet it is unclear how this suggestion resolves the problem 
of heteronomy in any but the most abstract, species-
oriented manner. It is unclear, that is, precisely how an 
individual's moral autonomy is enhanced by the inheritance 
of a cultural environment in the construction of which he 
or she played no part. Moreover, even if we accept this 
suggestion as a resolution of the problem of heteronomy, 
absent an explanation of how we reason about the ends that 
are to govern our transformation of nature, it would seem 
that the rationale for productive appropriation as Rapa-
czynski presents it reduces in the end to a celebration of 
creativity, of sheer arbitrariness or willfulness, for its 
own sake. Indeed the manner in which Rapaczynski frames 
the problem of heteronomy forecloses any possibility of its 
nonarbitrary solution. 
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nonutilitarian argument that is nonetheless independent of 
the more doubtful of his theological propositions. Occa-
sionally, at points scattered throughout his public and 
private work, Locke offers some apparently rather casual 
pronouncements concerning the content of human happiness, 
showing us in effect the results if not the process of his 
reasonings. In the Essay's chapter "Of Modes of Pleasure 
and Pain," he suggests but declines to elaborate what ap-
pears to be a crucial, fundamental distinction concerning 
objects of pleasure and the forms of pleasure that they 
produce in us. 
Were it my business here, to enquire any farther ... I 
should remark, that our Love and Hatred of inanimate 
insensible Beings, is commonly founded on that Pleasure 
and Pain which we receive from their use and applica-
tion any way to our Senses, though with their Destruc-
tion: But Hatred or Love, to Beings capable of Happi-
ness or Misery, is often the Uneasiness or Delight, 
which we find in our selves arising from a considera-
tion of their very Being, or Happiness. Thus the Being 
and Welfare of a Man's Children and Friends, producing 
constant Delight in him, he is said constantly to love 
them. (2.20.5) 
It is true that Locke immediately reverts to a more 
common line of argument, excusing himself from pursuing the 
implications of this observation by merely noting "that our 
Ideas of Love and Hatred, are but the Dispositions of the 
Mind, in respect of Pleasure and Pain in general, however 
caused in us" (2.20.5).62 But how does it come about, and 
62In an unpublished 1676 journal entry, Locke observes 
that love "is a sympathy of the soul and is nothing but the 
union of the mind with the idea of something that has a 
secret faculty to delight it ... " (in Von Leyden 1954, 267). 
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what is the significance of the fact, according to Locke, 
that we "often" experience an apparently nonutilitarian, 
selfless delight in the very existence or happiness of our 
children and friends, or in other words that we regard 
certain animate beings as possessing intrinsic worth, 
irrespective of the uses or applications to which we might 
put them? Is there some quality inherent in such beings 
that can produce such a response? Or if love and hatred 
are "but the Dispositions of the Mind, " is there some 
quality in us, in our natural mental constitution, that 
makes such experiences uniquely or especially gratifying 
for us? 
In the face of his prominently displayed evidence of 
the predations to which various peoples have subjected even 
their own children,63 it would be difficult to attribute to 
Locke the opinion that something inherent in children, let 
alone in anyone who is not our direct, blood relative, 
could in itself exercise such a power over us by nature. 
Locke therefore explains our devotion to our children, in 
the normal cases in which we are devoted to our children, 
by reference as much to something in our selves as to 
something in them. "God planted in Men a strong desire 
also of propagating their Kind, and continuing themselves 
in their Posterity ... " Parents are taught by "Natural Love 
and Tenderness to provide for [their children] as g part of 
63see chapter V above, pp. 264-266. 
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.tJlemselves" (I.88,97; emphasis supplied).64 Parental 
devotion or love is thus natural, according to Locke, at 
least in the most basic, minimal sense that it grows out of 
one's natural self-concernment. To be sure, its origin in 
self-concernment explains its uneven power over parents, 
and explains more particularly its occasional subjection to 
other, more fanciful visions of self-expansion. But the 
crucial question in this context concerns the character of 
the need that is expressed and fulfilled in the self-
extending activity of devotion to one's children. Does our 
ordinary if nonuniversal devotion to our children express, 
and fulfill more adequately than the relevant alternatives, 
a need on the part of the human self not merely to expand 
its sphere of concernment, but to do so specifically by 
identifying with another self? In his references to 
parenthood as self-extension, does Locke quietly suggest a 
greater natural sociality than he is willing consistently 
or unambiguously to attribute to the human self? 
A fuller consideration of Locke's treatment of the 
experience of friendship produces further support for this 
proposition. In conceiving of parental love as rooted in 
our more fundamental capacity and desire for self-extension 
64In the unpublished fragment "Ethica 92," Locke ex-
plains parental love as one of the pleasures of the mind, 
which "are the greatest as well as most lasting" pleasures. 
"Who ever was soe bruitish as would not quit the greatest 
sensual pleasure to save a childs life whom he loved. What 
is this but pleasure of thought remote from any sensual de-
1 ight" (in Sargentich 1974, 30). 
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or for identification with another self, Locke implicitly 
assimilates parental love to friendship. As we will see 
more fully below, 65 this assimilation appears in the Second 
Treatise mainly in the form of an admonition. But just as 
in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, in which education 
appears as an essentially private function, Locke seems to 
correct the one-sidedness of the Second Treatise in this 
respect by presenting a somewhat warmer conception of 
familial life,66 so also he reveals elsewhere in both 
private and public writings that he is by no means insensi-
ble of the power and sweetness of the sentiment of friend-
ship or interpersonal love. In the Essay, he provides only 
hints to the contrary, contenting himself to mention 
without comment the common acceptation of the word "Friend" 
as "a Man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another" 
(2.28.18), and to offer as an instance of "other Modes of 
Pleasure" undiscussed in the chapter devoted to that 
65see below, pp. 396-398. 
66Locke does warn in this work, as he does implicitly 
in the Second Treatise, that "Parents, being wisely or-
dain'd by Nature to love their Children, are very apt, if 
Reason watch not that natural Affection very warily ... to 
let it run into Fondness," and thus too often to "cherish 
their Faults" (STCE 34). This means, however, only that 
parental love should be informed by reason, or by an under-
standing of the long-term interests of the child; it does 
not mean that Locke conceives of a callous, calculating 
utilitarianism as the proper bond of the rational family. 
To the contrary, Locke argues that an essential means of 
rendering a child receptive to instruction in virtue is to 
make the child "sensible of your Care and Love of him," 
thereby planting in him "a peculiar Affection for you" 
(99). See also STCE 95-96. Contrast Pangle 1988, 230-243. 
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subject "the pleasure of rational conversation with a 
Fri end ... " ( 2 . 2 o • 18 ) . 
Striking a much more personal note, however, in the 
"Epistle Dedicatory" of Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 
addressed to his friend Edward Clarke, Locke confesses to 
"know no greater Pleasure in this Life, nor a better 
Remembrance to be left behind one, than a long, continued 
Friendship, with an honest, useful, and worthy Man, and 
lover of his Country" (in Axtell 1968, 113) . 67 The same 
sentiment finds still more powerful expression in his 
private correspondence. In one of his numerous letters to 
his dear friend William Molyneux, upon expressing his 
heartfelt disappointment at the postponement of a planned 
meeting, Locke confesses that "when the conveniences of 
life are moderately provided for," our earthly existence 
holds for him "nothing of value ... equal to the conversation 
of a knowing, ingenious, and large-minded friend ... " (CJL 
67rn an unpublished journal entry for 7/16/1676, Locke 
distinguishes between purer and more utilitarian forms of 
friendship. Although men, observes Locke, "often love 
their friends with whose good offices or conversation they 
are delighted, endeavoring and wishing their good, thereby 
to preserve to themselves those things they have pleasure 
in ... [s]ome wise minds are of a nobler constitution, having 
pleasure in the very being and happiness of their friends, 
and some yet of a more excellent make are delighted with 
existence and happiness of all good men, some with that of 
all mankind in general, and this last may be said properly 
to love" (in Von Leyden 1954, 266). 
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#2115, 8/4/1696). 68 The untimely death of Molyneux pro-
vided the occasion for a similar, still more heartfelt 
declaration by a genuinely grief-stricken Locke. Upon 
receiving the news, he wrote to Thomas Molyneux that 
Death has with a violent hand ... snatched from you a 
dear brother .•. I bear too great a share in the loss, 
and am too sensibly touched with it myself ... to do 
anything but mingle my tears with yours. I have lost 
in your brother ... an intimate and sincere friend whom I 
truly loved and by whom I was truly loved. And what a 
loss that is, those only can be sensible who know how 
valuable and how scarce a true friend is and how far to 
be preferred to all other sorts of treasure. 
( 10/27 /1698; ·quoted in Cranston 1957, 441) . 69 
68see also #3088A, 2/10/1702, to William Popple: 
"When necessarys are provided for, friendship is the best, 
most useful!, and most delightful! treasure that I know ... " 
69rt may be relevant in this context to note further 
that although the published works of the bachelor Locke are 
notably free of any discussion of romantic love, his pri-
vate correspondence indicates that in his younger years and 
even beyond, his life manifests no similar freedom. The 
young Locke writes, for instance, in a draft letter to an 
unnamed "Madam": "To catch the eyes of forward gazers, or 
by degrees to fire a heart that courts its flames is the 
effect of an ordinary face ... But M. to Captivate at a dis-
tance and takeing a heart (that supposed it self well for-
tified) without either surprise or seige is the priviledg 
only of your beauty which scorns to conquer ordinary 
ways ... thinke it not strange that you finde at your feet an 
unknowne captive, who may be permitted to submitt to a pas-
sion hee had noe means left him to resist and can noe more 
conceale then those flames that comeing from heaven are 
more violent then others and seldome burne slow or secreat-
ly" (CJL #45, date unknown [de Beer estimates 1658 or 
1659]). That his heart was not completely "fortified" even 
in his later years against such "non-Lockean" passions (see 
Tarcov 1983) is indicated by his lengthy and somewhat mys-
terious relationship with Damaris Cudworth, later the Lady 
Masham. See the discussions of this relationship in Crans-
ton 1957, especially 215-224,236,335-336; Yelton 1985, 8-
10. It is perhaps suggestive too that in his apparently 
casual enumeration of "other Modes of Pleasure" in the 
Essay Locke implies that the "Pleasure of Musick" lies at 
least in part in its power to soothe "the pain of tender 
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Is it plausible that this is not the expression of a 
genuinely grief-stricken man? Further, is it plausible 
that Locke, who relied so heavily on introspective evidence 
in the development of his empiricist epistemology, could 
have failed to reflect on the significance of his own 
sentiments for his account of human motivation? To the 
extent to which these propositions are indeed implausible, 
it is all the more necessary for us to consider a host of 
difficult questions. What reasoning according to Locke 
explains the 
claim of its 
experience of friendship, and supports the 
superiority to other pleasures? What more 
basic needs or desires in our selves are fulfilled by the 
experience of friendship or interpersonal love? What 
qualities in our friends or in those whom we love appeal to 
us, make them distinct from and preferable to others? 
Furthermore, insofar as friendship and love involve such a 
sense of distinction, to what extent could even a capacity 
on our part for genuine friendship or love provide support 
for the broader public principle of human equality? 
Once again, there is no question that Locke wishes to 
leave with at least some of the Essay's readers the 
impression that his remarks on the content of our pleasures 
and pains express merely subjective valuations, that the 
love of friendship represents a mere private "relish" or 
taste. It is therefore impossible to eliminate entirely 
Eyes" ( 2. 2 o. 18) . 
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the element of conjecture from our attempt at uncovering 
the reasoning that underlies those remarks. 7 0 It is safest 
70one might offer the following conjecture, for in-
stance, in defense of the proposition that even an origin-
ally radical egoism of the kind that Locke sometimes sug-
gests contains the materials for the development of at 
least a partial sociality or sense of sympathy. Locke ob-
serves the most extreme expression of our natural desire 
for well-being or pursuit of happiness in the desire to 
have more than one needs or to transcend necessity, to 
overcome all natural or conventional limits on one's own 
volition. But insofar as this desire for radical freedom 
and sovereignty represents a desire to transcend limits, it 
remains essentially relational in its object; one's sense 
of self, of the degree of one's self-magnification, depends 
on the degree of resistance, whether from the realm of 
nature in general or from other people, one encounters and 
overcomes. Locke seems to hold that the primary expression 
of the desire for dominion is a desire to be "submitted to 
J:2Y others" (STCE 104), to have one's greatness attested by 
others more-or-less like oneself. From this arises a ques-
tion. How is self-magnification to be gained through the 
experience of power over others or even over nature in gen-
eral, when it would seem that the very fact of their sub-
jection would render one's subjects contemptible, unworthy 
to attest to the scope of one's powers or greatness? (Cf. 
Aristotle's denial that there is dignity in the ruling of 
unequals; Politics 1.5.2-3, 1.7.4, 7.14.15-19). The desire 
for self-magnification would seem then to require for its 
fulfillment recognition by another whom one respects or 
even admires, by another equal to or even superior to one-
self. Perhaps from the perspective of the great, the Lock-
ean ethic consists less in a joyless quest for joy than a 
limitless quest for limits. The very logic of the desire 
for dominion or aggrandizement would then paradoxically 
culminate in a certain desire for equality, a desire for a 
certain kind of fellowship with another whose greatness 
confirms one's own, makes it recognizable. To be sure, 
such a desire for equality does not necessarily entail a 
desire for human equality; it could very well manifest 
itself in a fanciful desire for fellowship or identifica-
tion with a god. (See the discussion below, pp. 398-408.) 
For the desire for self-magnification to generate more than 
a partial sociality and in particular a desire for human 
equality, it must somehow discover grounds for identifica-
tion of oneself with other human beings as such. The 
completion of this conjectural argument turns in the end on 
whether Lockean reason forms a proper basis for community 
or for distinction among human beings. 
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here, however, to begin by considering Locke's own testi-
mony concerning the grounds of the respect or sympathy he 
feels for his own friends, the quality or qualities by 
virtue of which he could desire to identify himself with 
another. In the remarks we have cited, Locke makes clear 
that he values friendship in general, and that of Molyneux 
in particular, by virtue of the friend's knowledge, ingenu-
ity, and large-mindedness--in other words, by virtue of the 
perfection of the friend's rationality. A rational person 
finds the highest pleasure in a rational friendship; the 
pleasurableness or goodness of friendship is therefore 
ultimately inseparable from that of reason, or of the 
pursuit of truth. In fact, in his published work Locke is 
considerably less reluctant to proclaim his devotion to 
reason or to the truth for its own sake than he is to ex-
pound the joys of friendship, though in neither case does 
he appear completely forthcoming. The question then be-
comes: Why or in what respect does Locke find the exercise 
of reason a dignifying pursuit, a pursuit worthy of respect 
or admiration? 
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF REASON 
In the Essay's "Epistle to the Reader," Locke remarks 
that as the understanding is "the most elevated Faculty of 
the soul, so it is employed with a greater, and more con-
stant Delight than any of the other," and insists that 
"'tis Truth alone I seek" (Nidditch ed. 1975, 6,11).71 In 
virtually the same breath, however, he describes its exer-
cise as mere "Sport" or "Entertainment" or "Diversion," as 
though it held no more significance than the play of chil-
dren, or at best than the "recreation" by which adults 
restore the energy they must apply to their truly serious 
pursuits.72 It is surely implausible that Locke loved 
Molyneux and mourned his death for no more profound reason 
than that Molyneux was a clever or witty conversation 
partner; and it is perhaps still more implausible that he 
thought of the Essay, on which labored for over two decades 
and in the process placed at least his reputation at 
71tte reiterates directly or indirectly this devotion to 
the truth throughout the Essay and The Conduct of the 
Understanding in particular. See ECHU 1. 2. 28, 1. 4. 2 3, 25, 
2.21.72, 3.5.16, 3.9.21, 3.10.13, 4.19.1, 4.20.17; cu 3,6, 
11,14,33,34,42. 
72see Pangle 1988, 269-270. For Locke's thoughts on 
recreation, see STCE 108,206-209; also CJL #328, 3/12/1677, 
#426, 11/26/1678, both to Denis Grenville; #1655, 8/23/1693 
to Molyneux. Cf. the sophistic conception of philosophy as 
a child's pursuit, a nonserious form of play, in Plato, 
Gorgias 484c-486d, and Republic 328d. 
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considerable risk,73 as nothing more than the product of a 
pastime or hobby. One might then argue that he partially 
corrects this impression in ascribing to his intellectual 
labors a more serious purpose, in his famous self-descrip-
tion as an "Under-Labourer" to the true natural philoso-
phers or scientists; perhaps Locke locates the dignity or 
seriousness of his work in its contribution, however 
indirect, to the development of "Philosophy, which is 
nothing but the true Knowledge of Things" ("Epistle to the 
Reader," 10). 
But in stating this alternative we merely restate the 
question. The dignity of Locke's own work as a contribu-
tion to philosophy would depend ultimately upon the dignity 
of philosophy itself as a non- or trans-utilitarian pur-
suit. As we have seen, Locke indicates clearly enough his 
support for the modern project of placing scientific in-
quiry, that is, reason, in the service of the technolog-
ical enhancement of human power over material nature.74 In 
this respect it is true, as Pangle observes, that Locke 
73For a historical account of the controversies that 
the Essay aroused, see Yolton 1956, passim. On the Oxford 
attempt in 1703 at suppressing the teaching of the Essay, 
see Cranston 1957, 466-469. 
74In addition to the remarks we have discussed at ECHU 
4 .12 .10-12, see the unpublished fragments "Knowledge, Its 
Extent and Measure," and "Of Study," in King 1830, 87-91, 
106-107; also "De Arte Medica," in Fox Bourne 1876, I 222-
227. 
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does "'sell' philosophy" to the utilitarians (1988, 270).75 
sut the important questions concern to what extent and why 
he does so. If, as Pangle seems to charge,76 Locke pre-
sents utilitarian arguments for utilitarian reasons, if he 
endorses a wholly utilitarian, technological or instrumen-
tal conception of reason, he then commits himself to the 
nihilistic, Hobbesian or Nietzschean implications of the 
subordination or reduction of reason to will-to-power. 
There is, however, an alternative possibility. If the 
fundamental, unifying principle of Locke's thought is the 
rejection of arbitrariness in all its forms, or in other 
words is the rejection of the sovereignty of the human 
will, then his apparent endorsement of the technological 
75In the end Locke's suggestion of the technological 
applications of knowledge is only a particularly important 
implication of his more frequent assertion that the end of 
reason is action, not contemplation. "Our Business here is 
not to know all things, but those which concern our Con-
duct" (ECHU 1.1.6; also 2.7.3, 2.18.7, 2.22.10, 2.23.13, 
3.6.30ff., 3.11.5, 4.2.14, 4.11.8). 
76The nature of Pangle's objection to Locke is somewhat 
unclear, inasmuch as in the passage just cited, he seems to 
characterize Locke as a thoroughgoing utilitarian, whereas 
in the same context he describes Locke as a fundamentally 
Socratic philosopher whose failure to provide a complete 
account of the philosophic life reflects his failure or 
miscalculation in considering the "preconditions for the 
survival and fostering of that extraordinarily rare sort of 
young mind or self or personality that alone has the poten-
tial to become philosophic in the precise sense" ( 1988, 
272; in general, 262-275). We will argue below that what 
appears to Pangle as a failure or miscalculation may just 
as well proceed in Locke's mind from a different assessment 
of the nature and limits of the philosophic experience, and 
in particular of its capacity to serve as a model for human 
striving in general. 
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conception could not represent Locke's most serious think-
ing concerning the status of human reason; Locke's most 
serious thinking must somehow contain an affirmation of the 
ultimate sovereignty of human reason over human willful-
ness. 
The present reading stands or falls by a qualified 
rejection of the former alternative and affirmation of the 
latter. In this view, Locke does not unqualifiedly endorse 
an instrumental conception of reason and is not a Hobbesian 
or proto-Nietzschean nihilist, but instead presents such a 
conception in pursuance of a somewhat paradoxical rhetoric-
al strategy to promote a more moderate, rational form of 
politics. There can be no doubt that Locke's support for 
the modern technological project rests to some extent on 
the pragmatic or utilitarian justification that it serves 
the cause of social peace; it binds as tightly as possible 
the interests of the few and the many, in that it creates a 
material abundance that provides both comfort and security 
for the latter, and opportunities for power and pre-
eminence for the former. What requires particular emphasis 
at present, however, is the significance of the fact that 
Locke explains his support for the technological project by 
reference not only to such pragmatic considerations, but 
also to the proposition that that project properly con-
ceived serves also, and indeed cannot serve its pragmatic 
ends without serving also, the cause of truth, or more 
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precisely, of respect for truth. 
As zuckert perceptively observes (1974, 555~564), 
Locke's distinction in the Essay between civil and philo-
sophic forms of discourse ( 3 • 9. 3) carries the initially 
surprising implication that the former is all too often in 
the most important respect more genuinely philosophical 
than the latter: 
Vulgar Notions suit vulgar Discourses: and both, 
though confused enough, yet serve pretty well the Mar-
ket, and the Wake. Merchants and Lovers, Cooks and 
Taylors, have Words wherewithal to dispatch their ordi-
nary Affairs; and so, I think, might Philosophers and 
Disputants too, if they had a Mind to understand, and 
to be clearly understood. (ECHU 3.11.10) 
Paradoxically, according to Locke, its task of facilitating 
and regulating the affairs of ordinary practical life tends 
to impose a discipline upon civil discourse, guiding it to 
a degree of respect for reason and truth that is unfortu-
nately absent from much of what purports to be philosophic 
discourse. 77 People wholly ignorant of the concepts of 
real essences or substantial forms, who know things only by 
their sensible qualities, are often according to Locke 
"better acquainted with their Differences" and "can more 
nicely distinguish them from their uses ... than those learn-
ed quick-sighted Men" (3.6.24) in large part because they, 
unlike the pseudo-philosophers of the schools, have a 
77Recall Locke's repeated disparagements of the school 
philosophers' licentious management of their verbal curren-
cy, by contrast with the practical men of affairs' more 
sober and honest treatment of their own currency. See ECHU 
3.10 passim. 
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genuine, practical interest in making reliable identifica-
tions and distinctions (cf. 3.10.8-13). Locke's suggestion 
can be viewed as a corollary of his more general political 
project of endowing virtue or justice. In order effective-
ly to combat the theoretical obfuscation and political 
divisiveness that often proceed from an unregulated desire 
for power, Locke seems to reason, it is necessary not sim-
ply to suppress that desire, but instead to direct it 
toward material nature as its proper object. Thus direct-
ed, the desire for power can provide crucial support for 
the creation of material abundance and the cultivation of 
respect for reason and truth, both of which are indispensa-
ble elements of a free, stable, secure political society. 
In accordance with this reasoning, Locke expresses the hope 
that in bringing his readers to reflect on their use of 
language by first reflecting on what practical interests 
their use of language serves, he shall have served not only 
the cause of "Peace," but also that of "Truth ... and 
Learning" (3.5.16; also 3.9.21). 
Like Strauss before him and Pangle after him, Zuckert 
doubts Locke's sincerity in claiming service to the cause 
of truth as a standard that transcends ordinary considera-
tions of interest and that therefore enables him to judge 
civil discourse in the most important respect superior to 
philosophic discourse. Instead Zuckert infers from the 
reversal of the rank ordering of the two forms of discourse 
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that according to Locke "there is no realm of 'pure' philo-
sophic discourse ... for there is no class of philosophers 
aiming at 'true knowledge'; all men have a by-interest" and 
thus all thought reduces ultimately to ideology, to willful 
self-assertion (1974, 559). In response to this reading, 
it may be relevant for us to observe preliminarily that it 
would be by no means beyond the capacity of a writer such 
as Locke, ever-sensitive to the character of his audience, 
to present for rhetorical purposes a reductionist account 
of reason while maintaining a greater reserve in the 
presentation of what he considers a more serious account. 
Locke does after all describe the intended audience of the 
Essay, however learned or capable, as an essentially 
nonphilosophic audience;78 the fact that he chooses to 
appeal to nonphilosophic, often self-interested persons on 
the level of self-interest does not in itself imply that he 
categorically rejects the possibility that human thought or 
discourse can transcend mere self-interest. 
Nor does it in itself imply, of course, that he 
affirms this possibility. The more powerful evidence that 
Locke does quietly affirm the sovereign, transcendent 
78eis addressees, as he claims, are not primarily "men 
of large Thoughts and quick Apprehensions," but rather "Men 
of my own size" or scholars ("Epistle to the Reader," in 
Nidditch ed. 1975, 8). If we concede the ambiguity evident 
in the reference to "Men of my own size," it seems obvious 
nonetheless that Locke's intended audience consists primar-




or potential of 
from the spirit 
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human reason appears as an 
of modesty or humility that 
guides Locke's theoretical writing. It is understandable 
and to some extent justifiable that some might view as a 
kind of inverted Platonism Locke's suggestion that the most 
rationally adept turn their attentions away from useless 
disputations about the nature of "separate Spirits" and 
like issues, and toward the "useful Arts," whose improve-
ment promises to ameliorate the material condition of 
humankind (4.12.11,12; also 1.1.5-7). As Socrates in The 
Republic promotes a turning-away from the ephemeral 
practical world and toward a realm of eternity accessible 
(if at all) only through pure theory or contemplation 
(515c-521b), so Locke may seem to suggest a turning-away 
from whatever intimations of eternity our experience may 
contain, and toward an ever-more comprehensive accumulation 
of power in our practical, secular lives. Perhaps as 
prominently as one could expect in view of the prevailing 
circumstances, Locke does indeed make this suggestion. Yet 
when we consider well the context of his suggestion, we 
find that Locke's inversion of Plato is not necessarily 
complete. What is of decisive significance here is the 
evidence that Locke's promotion of the technological pro-
ject proceeds not from a dogmatic skepticism or an act of 
willful ideological closure, but instead from a more gen-
uinely moderate spirit of intellectual modesty and open-
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ness. 
As we have shown at length in chapters III and IV 
above, Locke's attempt at reforming the study of nature, 
and therefore at enhancing our technological power, rests 
upon both our recognition of our immense ignorance of the 
natural order and our acceptance of the possibility that 
through empirical and rational investigation, we can make 
genuine discoveries and lessen that ignorance. As a prac-
tical matter, the degree of care we take in our investiga-
tions of nature depends upon our ability to moderate 
between a dogmatic assurance of the adequacy of our present 
knowledge and a skepticism so thoroughgoing as to commit us 
to intellectual paralysis or arbitrariness. The point of 
those earlier chapters was to emphasize Locke's view that 
nature is not simply a human construction, that the world 
external to the mind is not simply a chaos into which we 
project our ordering, creative wills, and thus that reason 
in cooperation with empirical investigation can produce at 
least probabilistically reliable claims of knowledge. What 
is equally necessary in the present context, however, is to 
emphasize Locke's characteristic refusal to assent to any 
dogmatic claim of finality for our knowledge of the exter-
nal world. As we have seen, seldom in the Essay does Locke 
miss an opportunity to reiterate the point with which he 
introduces the work, that "the Comprehension of our Under-
standings, comes exceeding short of the vast Extent of 
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Things," though not so far short as to justify despair of 
the availability of the knowledge required for our genuine 
concernments (1.1.5) .79 
Now, one might argue that taken in itself, Locke's 
skepticism regarding the accessibility of a comprehensive, 
finally adequate science of nature represents only the 
provisional or tactical skepticism of the technological 
mind--that it proceeds ultimately from a conception of 
nature as a sort of void that we cannot comprehend, yet 
into which we can freely, experimentally project our will, 
so that our recognition of the limits of our potential 
knowledge prepares an effective denial of the limits of our 
potential power. It is for this reason that Locke's modest 
skepticism regarding our capacity for resolving the ul ti-
mate questions of theology is of decisive importance in 
elucidating the character of the Lockean inversion of 
Plato. However incomplete or inadequate in their more 
literal formulations and however exoterically intended, 
Locke's theologically oriented arguments can be taken to 
represent the surface or exterior of a more philosophically 
serious core. Looking beyond his perhaps deservedly ill-
received arguments purporting to demonstrate the existence 
of God or "a god" (especially ECHU 4.10) or to show us how 
to verify the authenticity of miracles (Works 1823, 
9.256ff.), in addition to his bare assertions of the 
79see especially chapter III above, pp. 127-147. 
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authenticity of the Biblical revelation, 80 we find intima-
tions of a more subtle, even more Socratic approach to 
these questions. For example, when we attempt seriously to 
give an account of it, what seems to be the outstanding 
characteristic of our idea of God, according to Locke, is 
its mysteriousness or incomprehensibility. Prior to any 
divine revelation, the "rational and thinking part of 
mankind" or the "heathen philosophers" could conceive of 
"the one, supreme, invisible God," though they were 
compelled for the most part to maintain this discovery in 
secrecy (RC, in Works 1823, 7.135,138). We (monotheists) 
commonly attribute to God infinity in the possession of 
such qualities as duration, power, wisdom, goodness, and so 
forth, but in so doing, we can only conceive of these 
infinities as negations of boundaries or limits, as the 
products of endless additions. The upshot for Locke is 
that "GOD ... is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow 
capacities" (2.17.1; also 2.16.8).81 More clearly stated, 
80see chapter II above, pp. 69-72. 
81cf. ECRU 3.6.11: " ... even the most advanced Notion 
we have of God, is but attributing the same simple Ideas 
which we have got from Reflection on what we find in our 
selves, and which we conceive to have more Perfection in 
them, than would be in their absence, attributing, I say, 
those simple Ideas to him in an unlimited degree. Thus ... 
we have the complex Idea of an eternal, omniscient, omnipo-
tent, infinitely wise, and happy Being." See also ECRU 
1.4.15, 2.23.35; journal entry of 8/17/1681, in King 1830, 
123. Cf. Jaffa, commenting on the meaning of the appeal to 
"Nature's God" in the Declaration of Independence: "Wheth-
er the God whom the Signers assume to exist can be proved 
to exist is not necessary . to the argument ... What can be 
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the upshot seems to be that the philosopher's god is in 
Locke's view virtually identical with the questioning 
experience of infinity, or with the transcendent mysteri-
ousness of the human condition within the order of being. 
Locke's view is similar with respect to the question of an 
afterlife. As reason compels us to maintain an openness to 
the possibility of the existence of a god, so we "cannot 
but be certain," as Locke cleverly puts it, "that a future 
Life is at least possible" (2.21.70; also 44) .82 
Some commentators cite such remarks as evidence of 
Locke's severe narrowing of the claims of religion or 
theology on reason.83 We do not deny either that this is 
proved is that a divine nature is of a certain sort. Such 
a nature would carry to absolute perfection those partially 
existing perfections perceivable in man ... Men form the idea 
of such a perfect being, as much to understand the limits 
of their own humanity, as to decide objectively of that 
superior being's existence" (1975, 153). 
82 11 This therefor is evident that there is pleasure and 
pain to be had in this life and all that it is possible 
there may be a state after this life wher in men may be 
capable of enjoyments or sufferings" ("Morality," in Sar-
gentich 1974, 27). See also "Knowledge, Its Extent and 
Measure," in King 1830, 89-90. 
83According to Strauss, even if we attribute to Locke 
no more radical thought than "some misgivings" concerning 
the power of his arguments in support of the authenticity 
of the Christian revelation to persuade all his readers, we 
must yet conclude that "he was forced to make his political 
teaching ... as independent of Scripture as it could possibly 
be" (1953, 209; see, more generally, 202-226, and Strauss 
1959, 197-220). Pangle "hasten[s] to stress" that "No one 
who possesses a sympathetic understanding of Locke's polit-
ical theology could ever pronounce against him the accusa-
tion of atheism" (1988, 149), although the general thrust 
of his assessment of Locke's political theology leads us to 
wonder whether a "sympathetic" understanding is in Pangle's 
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Locke's intention or that his remarks have this effect. 
For present purposes, however, that we cannot know whether 
there is a personal god or an afterlife is less important 
than the implication that according to Locke we cannot 
reasonably deny the existence of either; Locke's most 
radical, most implicitly skeptical statements concerning 
these questions do not surpass an insistence on an attitude 
of rational openness to the possibilities. For this 
reason, "everyone," every rational, mortal being, "has a 
concern in a future life which he is bound to look after," 
according to Locke, and indeed cannot avoid pondering the 
possibility, at least "sometimes" (CU 8; ECHU 4.20.6).84 
The implication of Locke's theoretical modesty is 
that no matter how much practically reliable knowledge, or 
more pertinently no matter how much power over nature we 
acquire, there is always a beyond, something that remains 
mysterious to us, something that eludes or resists our 
efforts at comprehension or control. Expressed somewhat 
more broadly, the posture of openness with respect to the 
questions of god and afterlife means an acknowledgement of 
a realm of authentic, permanent mysteries, and therewith an 
view equivalent to a fully adequate, reasonable, penetrat-
ing understanding. See idem 131-158, 204-211. See also 
Mansfield 1979, 28, and 1989, 209; Bluhm et al. 1980; 
Zuckert 1988, 112-117. 
84cf. Pascal on the rationality of "wagering" in favor 
of the existence of God and an afterlife (Pensees III, es-
pecially aphorism 233). 
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openness to the possibility that those permanent, ultimate 
mysteries provide intimations of the existence of a dispen-
sation that orders insofar as it transcends our practical 
and theoretical strivings. Therefore, in suggesting to at 
least some of his readers that they redirect their intel-
lectual energies away from fruitless efforts at resolving 
the deep questions of ontology and theology and toward the 
more practically useful, more genuinely charitable study of 
nature (ECHU 4.12.12), Locke does not necessarily suggest 
or reveal a posture of intellectual closure, a willful 
denial of the existence or legitimacy of such questions. 
He suggests not, for instance, that such questions proceed 
from a deformed or alienated consciousness whose overcoming 
is the historical task of humankind,85 but rather that we 
simply acknowledge their status as authentic mysteries, 
reconcile ourselves to a condition of "quiet Ignorance" 
with respect to them (1.1.4), and focus our attentions on 
85The classic expression of such a posture of closure 
appears in a manuscript of the young Marx, who acknowledges 
that "the idea of creation is thus one that it is very dif-
ficult to drive out of the minds of people," because to do 
so would contradict "all the evidences of practical life," 
and yet who proceeds to demand of an imagined interlocutor 
that the latter give up the "abstraction" from which such 
questions proceed. "Once the essential reality of man in 
nature, man as the existence of nature for man, and nature 
for man as the existence of man, has become evident in 
practical life and sense experience, then the question of 
an alien being, of a being above nature and man ... has be-
come impossible in practice" ("Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts," in McLellan ed. 1977, 94-95). See the com-
mentary on this passage by Voegelin 1968, especially 23-28, 
44-45. 
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those pursuits whereby we can more directly address our 
basic concernments. 
In the context of this argument, Locke's suggestion 
that we refocus our intellectual energies on technological 
pursuits represents not a negation, but to the contrary an 
affirmation of the limits of human knowledge and power; it 
implores us not to fancy ourselves the absolutely sovereign 
creators and masters of nature, but rather to create the 
conditions for securing that degree of freedom appropriate 
to our station in the order of being. Our possession of 
the faculty of reason could supply no firm grounds for the 
"Dignity and Excellency" of the human species (STCE 31) if 
it were no more than a technological faculty, an instrument 
for the achieving of practical aims. Such a faculty would 
be no more than a power, capable of distinguishing us from 
the other animals only by virtue of the superior cleverness 
or facility with which we pursue the objects of our happi-
ness; our claims of human or natural rights could be at 
bottom nothing more than assertions of power. According to 
this strain of Locke's argument, the technological mind is 
not simply identical or coextensive with the human mind, 
because the realm of human experience is broader than the 
realm of experience amenable to technological experimenta-
tion and control. The dignity of the faculty of reason, 
and therewith of the human beings who possess it, rests 
upon its capacity to transcend merely practical objects, to 
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rise to an awareness of the permanent mysteries that for-
ever stand before and challenge the human understanding as 
proper objects for its contemplation, that transcend the 
projects of our wills. Only as a contemplative faculty, 
exercised for its own sake, can human reason achieve a 
genuine independence of the will or the passions, and 
therewith a position of sovereignty within the human self 
or sou1.86 When Locke insists that we begin our inquiries 
in a spirit of modest recognition of our own ignorance, he 
does not refer merely to the sort of ignorance that assidu-
ous empirical or experimental exertions can dispel; he 
refers to the fact that there are some questions, ultimate 
questions, about which we are permanently ignorant. 
Herein consists the serious core of the principle of 
"workmanship" that Locke commonly presents as the founda-
tion of much of his moral and political argumentation. In 
briefly elaborating that principle in the Essay, Locke 
argues that whoever considers together the two ideas of God 
and man as God's workmanship must "certainly find that the 
Inferior, Finite, and Dependent, is under an Obligation to 
86Eisenach remarks that "Locke scholars always seek to 
resurrect elements of autonomous reason in Locke's poli-
tics, despite Locke's own denials in his epistemology" 
(1981, 239 n.28). I do not doubt that Eisenach would find 
herein a similarly futile effort. It seems to me, however, 
that, even leaving aside for the moment the fact that a 
consistent denial of reason's autonomy would make nonsense 
of the whole of Locke's thought, Locke's implicit denials 
of that autonomy are hardly unambiguous and must be under-
stood in the light of the spirit of intellectual modesty 
that inspires and pervades the Essay. 
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obey the Supreme and Infinite" (4.3.13; also 1.4.13). Al-
beit in a somewhat revised form, the proposition that the 
human condition is in the morally ultimate respect a condi-
tion of dependence remains tenable even in the absence of a 
demonstration of the existence of a creating god. If we 
understand this condition of dependence as signifying more 
precisely a condition of limited independence or limited 
sovereignty, we can then maintain the principle of human 
dependence as a corollary of Locke's theoretical openness, 
or as an implication of our negative knowledge, our Socrat-
ic knowledge of our own ignorance. If we know that there 
are permanent questions, that the human condition is in the 
ultimate respects permanently mysterious, that the ultimate 
origin and destiny of human beings transcend our under-
standing and our power, then we know that the human condi-
tion is in the decisive respect a condition of "mediocrity" 
or in-betweenness in the order of animate being. 87 We know 
87In a 1678 letter to Grenville, Locke remarks that "I 
have often thought that our state here in this world is a 
State of Mediocrity which is not capeable of extreams 
though on one side or other of this mediocrity there might 
lie great excellency and perfection. Thus we are not cape-
able of continual! rest nor continual! exercise, though the 
later has certainly much more of excellency in it. We are 
not able to labor always with the body nor always with the 
minde. And to come to our present purpose, we are not 
capeable of liveing altogeather exactly by a strict rule, 
nor altogeather without one. not always retired nor always 
in company. But this being but [an] odde notion of mine it 
may suffice only to have mentioned it ... " (CJL #374; see 
also "Of study," in Axtell 1968, 419-420). In addition to 
its expressions in the workmanship principle, this "odde 
notion" appears in the Essay in Locke's acknowledgment of 
"the weakness of our Faculties in this State of Mediocrity, 
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then that we are not gods, not the all-knowing sovereign 
creators and masters of nature, 88 and that it would involve 
a dishonesty, a willful obfuscation, a contraction dis-
which we are in this World, " in particular for acquiring 
final knowledge of nature ( 4 .12 .10; also 4 .14. 2) ; in his 
revised account of the inconstancy of the determination of 
our wills by the law of reason or toward our greatest hap-
piness (2.21.31-71) and in his related observations of the 
necessary imperfection of our mundane happiness (2.7.5, 
2.21.46); and somewhat more ambiguously, in his character-
ization of the great chain of animate being, from which, 
whatever his other motives, one could reasonably infer at 
minimum an agnostic openness to the possibility that human 
life or human intelligence is not the highest form in the 
order of animate being (3.6.12). Though his general empha-
sis on the significance for Lockean morality of the concept 
of mediocrity or in-betweenness is thus defensible, Colman 
attributes far too much credulity to Locke in asserting 
that Locke "accepts unquestioningly" the doctrine of the 
great chain of being (1983, 2; also 76-106). 
88According to this argument, Locke's premise that 
"Man made not himself nor any other man" and "made not the 
world which he found made at his birth" implies a funda-
mental qualification of his assertions of human sovereignty 
or self-ownership in the Second Treatise (27,44,123). In 
this view, Locke therein asserts not an absolute, but only 
a relative property of individuals in themselves, i.e rel-
ative to other human beings; he intends not necessarily to 
assert that the only genuine obligations are those self-
imposed, but only to deny that any person is the natural 
property of any other person. Similarly, the argument 
points to the limitations of Rapaczynski's observation that 
Locke attempts "to synthesize praxis and poesis in a uni-
fied theory of human activity" (1987, 117). A complete 
synthesis of these two categories would mean, as Rapaczyn-
ski argues, that human action according to Locke is self-
production, production of oneself, which would imply once 
again a justification of a thoroughgoing arbitrariness or 
willfulness. True, Locke synthesizes the categories of 
action and production, to the extent that he does, with a 
view to establishing the ownership of or responsibility for 
actions (see TT II.27; ECHU 2.27.9,17,18). But as we have 
seen, the principle of personal responsibility depends on 
the governing presence of rationality, which is ultimately 
incompatible with the principle of radical self-creation. 
Cf. Windstrup 1981. 
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guised as an expansion of our basic experience, for us to 
attempt to assume or usurp such a status. 
Locke's agnosticism can serve as the grounding for an 
affirmation not only of the dignity of human reason, but 
also of the moral principle of human equality, as follows. 
our rational capacity represents in its highest expression 
a capacity to transcend our particular historical condi-
tions and to confront the essential mysteriousness of our 
human condition. Somewhat paradoxically, we become free, 
self-knowing, self-possessing beings to the extent that we 
are able, by confronting our ignorance and our dependence 
with respect to the ultimate source of our being. Our 
capacity for law consists then in a capacity to regulate 
rationally our pursuit of happiness, in accordance with the 
fundamental, orienting insight into the middling, in-
between status of a rational, corporeal, mortal being. It 
is true that the natural law according to this argument 
could have no genuinely, categorically obligatory force, if 
we conceive of genuine obligation as Locke sometimes does, 
as depending upon a discoverable schedule of otherworldly 
sanctions to enforce our conformity with that law.89 The 
argument does, however, yield a conception of a natural law 
that obliges hypothetically or with directive force, re-
quiring us to respect the principle of equal natural rights 
89see ECHU 1. 3. 6, 12, 13; STCE 61; also Strauss 1953, 
226. 
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inasmuch as reason informs us that it is appropriate for 
beings of our station to do so. 90 More specifically, it 
would be appropriate for us to respect the principle of 
equal natural rights by virtue of the fact that whatever 
the differences in our particular powers of reasoning, in 
the morally fundamental respect we share a common condi-
tion, a common experience of dependence upon a transcendent 
dispensation. In this way reason can serve as a source of 
human community, justifying a sense of sympathy for our 
fellows and a commitment to their preservation and well-
being. Tyranny can be attractive to us only insofar as we 
misunderstand our own nature, insofar as we fail to 
confront rationally or to recognize the challenge of what 
transcends us, and therefore mistake human beings as the 
highest in the order of being, with no proper limits on the 
projection of our own wills or powers. By means of thus 
paring away, in the spirit of the modest, moderate skepti-
cism of the Essay, the more dogmatic and less sustainable 
assertions with which Locke tends to clothe his workman-
ship principle, Locke has, or would have, at his disposal 
90Jaffa observes, without specific reference to Locke, 
that the "imperatives of natural right have the character 
of the 'then' clause in an 'if ... then' proposition. 'If 
you would be happy, then you must be virtuous'" (1957, 64). 
With less sympathy for his subject matter, Von Leyden as-
similates Lockean natural law in this respect with that of 
Grotius and Suarez, according to whom natural law "only 
indicates whether or not an action is morally necessary," 
or has only "the nature of a directive rule rather than of 
a law in the strict sense" (1956, 32). 
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an essentially Socratic or Platonic conception of the dig-
nity and sovereignty of reason, capable of supporting both 
the distinction of human beings from lower orders of being 
and the rejection of any assertion of fundamental moral or 
jural divisions within the human species.91 
Now, in view of the apparently "non-Lockean" coloring 
of much of the foregoing, it is particularly necessary for 
us to be clear about what, precisely, we are and are not 
91Locke has available, in other words, an argument 
very similar in outline to the argument whereby Jaffa 
explicates the foundations of the natural rights principles 
in the Declaration of Independence. "We understand man, 
and his rights, as much by understanding what he is not, as 
by understanding what he is. In fact, we understand the 
latter only by understanding the former ... In short, as men 
are neither beasts nor gods, they ought not to play God to 
other men, nor ought they to treat other men as beasts" 
(1975, 153). Contrast Mansfield, who argues that Locke 
attempts in a more modern manner to conceive of a faculty 
of reason that distinguishes without dividing us. For 
Mansfield's Locke, the key to the moderation (or qualified 
democratization) of the power of reason lies in its mixture 
with the element of labor or industry (1979, 33-35). Con-
trast further Pangle, who argues that Locke's utilitarian 
argumentation proceeds from an "immoderate detestation of 
his necessarily embattled situation as a philosopher," or 
from a desire to free himself from "the troublesome need to 
respond to attack from the defenders of traditional or una-
dulterated piety and reverence" ( 1988, 27 4) . If the pre-
sent argument is correct, there is no need to ascribe to 
Locke such philosophic aloofness or even selfishness. If 
Locke maintains seriously his own principle of "medioc-
rity," then he has grounds for believing in the principle 
of moral and political equality. His utilitarianism would 
then proceed from the virtue of care or the sentiment of 
sympathy for the surrounding community. It seems to me 
that the relevant evidence that Pangle himself presents 
with great insight indicates a much greater concern on 
Locke's part for protecting the community against phil-
osophy, or against the corruptions incident to any serious 
public attempt at cultivating it, than the reverse. 
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arguing here. First, we do not suggest that Locke intends 
to present with any significant emphasis this implicitly 
Socratic dimension of his thinking as a publicly effica-
cious source of our moral-political orientation. Pangle, 
who concedes that the core of the originally Socratic, 
rationalist philosophic experience remains present and 
alive in Locke's thought, is perfectly correct in observing 
that Locke fails to make that experience an explicit theme 
of his reflections (1988, 265-275). Second, though Locke 
does seem to believe that such a presentation would be at 
best of very limited public utility,92 we are not suggest-
ing that his reluctance to elaborate this Socratic founda-
tion proceeds only or primarily from his estimate of its 
relative inaccessibility, or for that matter from a fear on 
his part of the consequences of its relative heterodoxy. 
We are suggesting more simply and cautiously, and for the 
moment without commenting on Locke's intentions at all, 
first that a Socratically inspired argument of the kind 
adumbrated above is available to Locke, is at his disposal 
within the boundaries of his epistemological and psycholog-
ical principles, and second that such an argument contains 
in the end the only possibility of making coherent sense 
out of his philosophical-political thought and the life 
92see Locke's account of the failure of the ancient 
philosophers in this respect, in The Reasonableness of 
Christianity (Works 7.135-151). 
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that he devoted to it.93 
From this perspective, the difficulty involved in any 
attempt at more confidently attributing such an argument to 
Locke's intention lies in ascertaining why he so steadfast-
ly refuses to give it his clear endorsement. More precise-
ly, the di ff icul ty lies not only in the fact that Locke 
characteristically presents the workmanship principle in a 
form that virtually guarantees its dismissal by any serious 
thinker, and refuses to elaborate the Socratic element of 
his thought along with its potential moral significance. 
After all, given his observation that the difference in 
individuals' understandings renders it impossible that "the 
same Truth shall be equally relished by every one in the 
same dress" (ECHU "Epistle to the Reader," 8), it is en-
tirely plausible that in setting forth a program of social 
as well as intellectual reform, Locke would act upon the 
principle that the deepest, most theoretically adequate 
93That Locke must recognize this appears evident in 
the following remark, from an unpublished fragment entitled 
"Ethica B": "The original and foundation of all Law is 
dependency. A dependent intelligent being is under the 
power and direction and dominion of him on whom he depends 
and must be for the ends appointed him by that superior 
being. If man were independent he could have no law but 
his own will no end but himself. He would be a god to him-
self and the satisfaction of his own will the sole measure 
and end of all his actions" (MS Locke c.28, p.141; quoted 
in Dunn 1969, 1; emphasis supplied). See also Colman 1983, 
46. 
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arguments may not be the most publically persuasive. 94 The 
difficulty lies in the fact that Locke evidently does not 
regard the argument in question as appropriate or persuas-
i ve for even the most rational, free-thinking portion of 
his readership; he flatly, publicly contradicts in the most 
implicitly radical terms his own suggestion that our open-
ness even to the possibility of an afterlife would, if well 
considered, provide for us sufficient moral orientation.95 
94In one of his replies to Stillingfleet, Locke admits 
to acting on the related principle that it may be unwise to 
discredit publically even relatively weak arguments that 
are intended to support true and salutary propositions, in 
view of the possibility that less discerning readers may 
find in such arguments "enough to preserve in them true 
sentiments of religion and morality" (Works 1823, 4.53-54). 
I am unable to follow Strauss on this point, however, who 
asserts that Locke hereby admits the weakness of the entire 
argument developed in ECHU 4.10 (1953, 207). It is clearly 
implausible that Locke would under any circumstances make 
such an admission to anyone, let alone Stillingfleet; and 
in any event Locke clearly refers to an argument specific-
ally mentioned and dropped at 4.10.7. 
95contrast ECHU 2.21.70 with 2.21.55. In the latter 
paragraph, which so far as I am aware constitutes the most 
extreme statement of moral relativism in the entire Lockean 
corpus, Locke concludes an ostensible explanation of the 
diversity of individuals' conceptions of happiness with the 
following observations: "For if there be no Prospect be-
yond the Grave, the inference is certainly right, Let us 
eat and drink, let us enjoy what we delight in, for to mor-
row we shall die ... Men may chuse different things, and yet 
all chuse right, supposing them only like a Company of poor 
Insects, whereof some are Bees, delighted with Flowers, and 
their sweetness; others, Beetles, delighted with other kind 
of Viands; which having enjoyed for a season, they should 
cease to be, and exist no more for ever." One might upon 
first reading believe that Locke intends here to reject the 
supposition that "there be no Prospect beyond the Grave." 
Yet he implies in context that he takes the proposition 
that we have no prospect to be identical in meaning with 
the proposition that "Men in this Life only have hope." We 
have seen that Locke denies in principle that we can have 
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The following questions arise. If Locke holds in the 
end an essentially Socratic conception of human reason, why 
does he not more openly and emphatically say so? Why would 
he sprinkle his works, however subtly, with such morally 
radical implications--why promote, even alongside his more 
theologically orthodox professions, a hedonistic, utilitar-
ian, ultimately nihilistic line of reasoning whose promo-
tion is sure to endanger his reputation and may well endan-
ger his career and even his life--if he did not mean them, 
or intend his most radical readers to believe them? Why, 
for that matter, if he holds it the most edifying, most 
dignifying of human activities, does he apparently encour-
age the most rational portion of his audience to forego a 
serious, sustained rational confrontation of the ultimate 
mysteries of the human condition, and to embrace instead a 
more pragmatically or technologically oriented study of 
nature? Yet why, on the other hand, if Locke does not 
seriously believe in the principle of common human dignity, 
knowledge of an afterlife; he affirms that we can know the 
afterlife only as a possibility, or in other words that we 
"have only hope." The inescapable implication is that in 
this passage Locke denies that the possibility of an after-
life can provide us any moral orientation; he suggests that 
we are "only like a Company of Poor Insects" who should 
spend our lives in pursuance of transient delights, "for to 
morrow we shall die." Cf. Burke's fear that under the in-
fluence of modern egoism, "Men would become little better 
than the flies of a summer" (Reflections, in Mahoney ed. 
1955, 108) . See also Locke's similar denials that our 
thoughts on the possibility of an afterlife can provide any 
moral orientation, in The Reasonableness of Christianity 
(Works 1823, 7 .149-150), and in the fragment "Morality" 
{Sargentich 1974). 
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if he really believes that we occupy no loftier moral 
status than that of "a Company of poor Insects" (ECHU 
2.21.55), does he devote his adult life to advancing the 
cause of natural human rights, a cause manifestly indefen-
sible in the absence of a grounding in such a principle of 
dignity? Who is the real Locke? 
THE CRITIQUE OF EROS 
In attempting to decide which of the available alter-
natives represents Locke's deepest reflections--the ration-
alized, quasi-Socratic version of the workmanship principle 
or the radically modern, ultimately nihilistic utilitarian-
ism--we are dealing with a matter of judgment, an estimate 
of relative plausibilities or probabilities. In order to 
support their case, those who endorse the latter reading 
have provided a plausible explanation of Locke's common 
public affirmations of more traditional, less radical 
foundations for his political principles. 96 In order to 
defend the more Socratic alternative as at least an equally 
plausible reading, it is therefore necessary for us to 
defend the perhaps initially surprising claim that Locke 
could intend his more radically modern, utilitarian sugges-
tions also to serve an essentially rhetorical, even to some 
extent exoteric purpose. 
The point of departure for this alternative reading 
consists in a reflection on the significance of Locke's 
emphasis on the great power of eros, or of the various 
objects of extra-personal devotion, to stimulate the human 
inclinations toward willfulness and partisanship. We have 




shown above how, notwithstanding occasional assertions to 
the contrary, Locke regards as inadequate a narrowly ego-
istic conception of the motivations and concernments of the 
human self. To repeat, the most telling indication of the 
self's capacity for self-transcendence lies in the rela-
tively common human willingness to die in the service of 
causes larger than self-defense or preservation. Yet in 
Locke's view that same willingness provides also a telling 
indication of the power and danger of the human propensity 
for partisanship, a recurrent, governing theme throughout 
Locke's work.97 To be a partisan in Locke's sense is to be 
resistant to rational appeal. 98 In the end, in Locke's 
estimation, a danger equal to or greater than that posed by 
egoism or narrow self-absorption lies in the fact that the 
desire for self-preservation is so frequently overpowered 
by other desires--that people too easily allow the expan-
sion of their spheres of vital concernment, or that we are 
so frequently all too willing to sacrifice ourselves in 
97on partisanship or sectarianism in general, see TT 
II.42; ECHU 1.3.14, 2.33.18, 3.10.2ff., 4.3.6,20, 4.20.18; 
CU 3,34,41; also Wood 1983, 101-109. 
98"(W]hat one of a hundred," he asks rhetorically, "of 
the zealous bigots in all parties ever examined the tenets 
he is so stiff in, or ever thought it his business or duty 
so to do?" (CU 34). The effect of this characteristic ob-
stinacy is to render real communication impossible, as "the 
contending learned Men of different Parties do, in their 
Arguings one with another ... speak different Languages" 
(ECHU 3.10.22). 
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acts of uncritical devotion to larger causes.99 
Locke's concern over the human propensity for parti-
sanship, or over the fragility of human reason that it 
reflects, is abundantly evident in his treatments of the 
more common or prominent modes of our expansive affections. 
Although, as we have seen, Locke occasionally appeals to 
such affections as supports of our duties or sources of our 
happiness, the more immediately noticeable characteristics 
of those appeals are their infrequency and their considera-
ble ambiguity. Such is the case, for instance, with 
respect to his treatment of the sentiment of patriotism, 
which, notwithstanding his references to his readers' duty 
to country and to the "generous Temper and Courage" of the 
English nation, is marked in general by neglect and at 
least implicit hostility. The relevant textual discussions 
certainly contain no suggestion that Locke conceives of any 
romantic absorption into a supposed national will as an 
appropriate sentimental support for the performance of 
individual obligations. If anything, Locke's argument in 
the Second Treatise serves to undercut the sentiment of 
99nr easily grant, that there are great numbers of 
Opinions, which, by Men of different Countries, Educations, 
and Tempers, are received and embraced as first and unques-
tionable Principles; many whereof, both for their Absurd-
ity, as well as oppositions one to another, it is impossi-
ble should be true. But yet all these Propositions, how 
remote soever from Reason, are so sacred somewhere or 
other, that Men even of good Understanding in other mat-
ters, will sooner part with their Lives, and whatever is 
dearest to them, than suffer themselves to doubt, or others 
to question, the truth of them" (ECHU 1.3.21). 
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patriotism. Not only does he maintain therein the ultimate 
arbitrariness of political boundaries, devoting little 
attention to the argument that such boundaries should cor-
respond to national divisions,100 but he also explains the 
enduring fact of political divisions among humankind only 
by reference to "the corruption, and vitiousness of degen-
erate Men, " with out which there would be no need for any 
society other than the community of "Mankind ... one Society 
distinct from all other Creatures" (II .128; cf. II .14) . 
Apparently in keeping with the same intention, Locke leaves 
little ground for confusing his doctrine of political lib-
erty with a doctrine of republican liberty in the classical 
sense. By carefully avoiding any reference to "citizens" 
lOOI take this to be the implication of Locke's loose 
stipulation, issued without further qualification, that 
"Wherever ... any number of Men are so united into one Socie-
ty" as to surrender their natural executive powers, "there 
and there only is a Political, or Civil Society" (II.89), 
also of his apparently approving observation of the histor-
ical frequency of "Men withdrawing themselves ... from the 
Jurisdiction they were born under ..• and setting Y2 new 
Governments in other places" (II .115) , and finally of his 
observation that it "seldom happens, that ... Conquerors and 
Conquered never incorporate into one People, under the same 
Laws and Freedom," again with the implication that the free 
consent of a conquered people to a benign conqueror suff i-
ces to establish the legitimacy of the government of the 
latter, irrespective of considerations of nationality 
(II.178). I cannot agree with Seliger, therefore, in the 
assertion that "Locke's political society presupposes the 
coexistence of contractual with such natural ties as the 
modern conception of a nation associates with it" (1969, 
22). Seliger seems thus to underappreciate the indissolu-
ble link between liberty and preservation in Locke's 
thought, such that the imperative of preservation for Locke 
renders rational one's consent even to a government that 
does not represent one's nationality. 
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or any insistence on participatory freedom, he attempts to 
maintain the assertiveness of free "subjects" or "members" 
in an essentially defensive posture, intent on the protec-
tion of the self's sphere of privacy but resisting the 
absorption of that sphere into a larger, collective, public 
sphere.101 Locke's treatments of the issue of patriotism 
and of the closely related issue of civic virtue in the 
second Treatise appear thus to be governed by the opinion 
that national and political identities both reflect and 
exacerbate the human propensity for divisiveness or parti-
sanship, and are therefore to be diluted or subordinated as 
a precondition of the achievement of a truly liberal, sta-
ble, moderate, consensual politics.102 
lOlTo his friend Edward Clarke, Locke expresses the 
hope that "the zeale and forwardness of you your selves 
[i.e. the House of Commons] makes it needlesse for us with-
out dores soe much as to thinke of the publique which is 
the happyest state a country can be in, when those whose 
businesse it is, take such care of affairs that all others 
quietly and with resignation acquiesce and thinke it super-
fluous and impertinent to medle or beat their heads about 
them" (CJL #1326, 10/17/1690). Cf. Jefferson's reflection 
on the ultimate guarantor of happiness and prosperity in 
his first inaugural address: "a wise and frugal govern-
ment, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, 
which shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own 
pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take 
from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is 
the sum of good government, and this is necessary to close 
the circle of our felicities" (in Koch and Peden eds. 1944, 
323; also Jefferson to Madison, 6/9/1793, idem 523-524). 
102rn an entry in his "Common-Place Book" entitled 
"Amor Patriae," Locke appears to conceive of patriotism or 
love of country as an instance of the association of ideas, 
in particular as an association or outgrowth of private 
affections. "The remembrance of pleasures and conveniences 
we have had there; the love of our friends, whose conversa-
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The same rhetorical design appears still more clearly 
in Locke's analogous reflections, once again scattered 
throughout his work, on the sentiments of friendship and 
familial love. Again notwithstanding his published intima-
tions and his more expansive private testimony concerning 
the power and sweetness of such sentiments, it is undenia-
ble that the attitude toward them that predominates in his 
published works, and especially in those more immediately 
concerned with politics, is much more narrowly utilitarian 
and emotionally austere. The Second Treatise contains but 
three direct references to friendship, none of which 
emphasizes the power of friendship to bring meaning and 
completion to individuals' lives. In a discussion of 
parental rights and obligations, Locke mentions as an aside 
that a person may owe "defence to his Child or Friend" 
(II. 70); in his discussion of the beginning of political 
tion and assistance may be pleasant and useful to us; and 
the thoughts of recommending ourselves to our old acquain-
tance, by the improvements we shall bring home, either of 
our fortunes or abilities, or the increase of esteem we 
expect for having travelled and seen more than others of 
this world ... all these preserve in us, in long absence, a 
constant affection to our country." Cf. Tarcov 1983, 136. 
Yet "the chief cause, that keeps us a longing after our 
country," Locke suggests pregnantly, is the fact that 
"Whilst we are abroad we look upon ourselves as strangers 
there ... and the mind is not easily satisfied with anything 
it can reach to the end of. But when we are returned to 
our country, where we think of a lasting abode, wherein to 
set up our rest, an everlasting abode ... we do not propose 
to ourselves another country whither we think to remove ... " 
(in King 1830, 291-292). On the implications of the mind's 
dissatisfaction with transience, see note 114 below. 
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societies, he supposes (questionably, as it turns out103) 
that the members of political societies in the beginning 
must have "some Acquaintance and Friendship together," only 
to draw the inference that "they could not but have greater 
Apprehensions of others, than of one another ... " (II.107). 
He makes clear his view of the possible consequences for 
domestic politics, in raising the obvious difficulty with 
the individual exercise of executive power: "it is unrea-
sonable for Men to be Judges in their own Cases," precisely 
because "Self-love will make Men partial to themselves and 
their Friends" (II.13). Friendship appears in the Second 
Treatise as a power that divides just as it unites, that 
moves us to feel the alienness of non-friends in proportion 
as we experience friends as extensions of ourselves. It 
appears, in other words, as little more than an occasion of 
partiality or partisanship. The same can be said of famil-
ial love: Locke's widely remarked utilitarian conception 
of marital and familial relations in the Second Treatise 
can be understood as an attempt not only at correcting the 
tendency for excessive parental tenderness to cultivate 
habits of slavishness and dependence in their children,104 
103cf. the passage under examination here with II.112, 
115,175; see the discussion in chapter V, pp. 263-272. 
104cf. Seliger 1968, 238-241; Pangle 1988, 230-243. 
The cultivation of such slavishness can be seen as a conse-
quence of an excessive sense of self-extension on the part 
of parents; to identify oneself with one's child may facil-
itate a salutary sense of devotion, but it may also in more 
extreme cases move parents to appropriate their childrens' 
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but also at tempering the love of one's own, which when 
taken to an extreme can produce a spirit of clannishness 
that corrupts and fractures the public sphere.105 
Among all self-transcending or self-expanding human 
devotions, however, unquestionably the deepest and most 
dangerous, the most productive of partisanship, according 
to Locke, are those associated with religion or theology--
or more fundamentally still, are those associated with 
attempts, whether ostensibly by reason or revelation, at 
gaining knowledge of divinity or eternity. "The three 
great things that govern mankind," he observes in a 1681 
journal entry, "are Reason, Passion, and Superstition; the 
first governs a few, the two last share the bulk of man-
kind ... but superstition is most powerful, and produces the 
greatest mischiefs" (in King 1830, 120) . It is, broadly 
understood, the theological dimension of partisanship, its 
faith in the divine authorization of its mission, that most 
concerns Locke. The theological partisanship that he judg-
sense of agency or responsibility, thus impairing their 
development into free, self-disposing beings. 
105Locke indicates his disagreement with Hooker on 
this point, in diverging from Hooker's explanation of the 
basis of equality. In the latter's view, it is men's 
"Duty, to Love others than themselves, for seeing those 
things which are equal, must needs all have one measure." 
It seems to be the weakness less of our capacity to love 
others, according to Locke, than of our ordinary capacity 
to love others equally that leads Locke to explain the 
basis of equality in the "independent" status of individu-
als rather than in an obligation to mutual love (II.5,6). 
See Zuckert 1978, 60. 
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es dangerous is a form of "enthusiasm," of purely willful, 
nonrational or irrational assent. The paradigmatic example 
of such assent is the pretension among such partisans that 
they are the recipients of a divine revelation, "that they 
are under the peculiar guidance of Heaven in their Actions 
and Opinions ..• " (4.19.5). 
Notwithstanding, therefore, his often-repeated dec-
laration that the true ground of morality can only be "the 
Will and Law of a God, who sees Men in the dark, has in his 
Hand Rewards and Punishments, and Power enough to call to 
account the Proudest Offender" (ECHU 1. 3. 6), and notwith-
standing further his claim that any serious reflection on 
the phenomena of causation confirms the proposition of the 
existence of a supreme being (ECHU 1.4.9-10; 4.10 passim), 
Locke expresses throughout his career a deep concern over 
the power of religious or quasi-religious sentiment to 
stimulate partisanship or sectarianism. In his early Two 
Tracts on Government, he testifies in the preface that "I 
no sooner perceived myself in the world but I found myself 
in a storm, which hath lasted almost hitherto," and pro-
ceeds to argue that a denial of the civil sovereign's 
authority to "determine the use of indifferent things 
relating to religion" would provide "only a liberty for 
contention, censure, and persecution and turn us loose to 
the tyranny of a religious rage" (ETG 119,125,120; also LTG 
210-211). Much later, commenting on "those Absurdities, 
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that fill almost all the Religions which possess and divide 
Mankind," Locke observes plaintively that "Religion which 
should most distinguish us from Beasts, and ought most 
peculiarly to elevate us, as rational Creatures, above 
Brutes, is that wherein Men often appear most irrational, 
and more senseless than Beasts themselves" (ECHU 
4.18.11) .106 
Theological sectarianism or fanaticism as Locke diag-
noses it proceeds from two general causes. Its permissive 
cause lies in the willingness and even eagerness of flocks 
of people to embrace unreflectively the dogmatic teachings 
of one theological authority or another. The "greatest 
part of the Partisans of most of the Sects in the World" 
hold in the strict sense, according to Locke, no genuine 
opinions of their own, and often become militant defenders 
of their received dogmas not in spite of, but rather 
because of that fact. "They are resolved to stick to a 
Party, that Education or Interest has engaged them in; and 
there, like the common Soldiers of an Army, shew their 
Courage and Warmth, as their Leaders direct, without ever 
examining, or so much as knowing the Cause they contend 
106see also Locke's more private remark to a French 
acquaintance: " ... les bestes sont plus sages que nous 
autres parceque comme di t une de nos poets burlesques ... 
'But noe beast ever was so slight/For man, as for his god 
to fight/They have more wit alas! and know/Themselves and 
us better than soe'" (Correspondence #623, 2/9/1681 to 
Toinard; the verse is from Butler, Hudibras I.i.775-778). 
Cf. TT I.58. 
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for" (ECHU 4.20.18). In many cases, partisan assent 
simply attests to the great power of custom in forming 
human minds and characters. The power of custom in shaping 
our opinions results in part from the laborious character 
of serious inquiry. As is the case with material property, 
it is far easier to acquire one's opinions by inheritance 
than by industry; and unlike that of inheriting property, 
the opportunity of inheriting opinions extends to virtually 
all members of society. Moreover, the powerful desire for 
esteem may discourage even the relatively industrious from 
inquisitiveness, insofar as the challenging of orthodox or 
fashionable opinions may invite the opprobrium of one's 
fellows (CU 34; ECHU 1.3.25, 2.28.12, 3.10.4) .107 
Given thus both the lack of opportunity or inclina-
tion for most people to reflect seriously on their princi-
pl es, and the fact that "most Men cannot ... be at quiet in 
their Minds, without some Foundation or Principles to rest 
their Thoughts on" ( 1. 3. 24), the commonness of the human 
propensity to render nonrational assent should come as lit-
tle surprise. But it does call attention to the extreme 
importance of the formation of opinions among the "Leaders" 
of parties, who do so much to form others' opinions, and 
107or it may, as in Locke's own experience, invite 
worse than opprobrium; surely not the least cause of non-
rational assent is the fact that many people are "cooped in 
close, by the Laws of their Countries, and the strict guard 
of those, whose Interest it is to keep them ignorant" (ECHU 
4.20.4), or if not wholly ignorant, orthodox. 
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with such potentially grave consequences. In reflecting 
upon the character of the latter, Locke suggests with some 
understatement that "If we could but see the secret 
Motives, that influenced the Men of Name and Learning in 
the World, and the Leaders of Parties, we should not always 
find, that it was the embracing of Truth for its own sake, 
that made them espouse the Doctrines, they owned and 
maintained" ( 4. 2 O. 17) . To the contrary, Locke observes 
throughout his career that the passion of ambition, the 
desire for dominion or self-aggrandizement, constitutes the 
more active or efficient cause of theological partisanship. 
In the English Tract he argues that a proper religious 
liberty does not include "a liberty for some men at pleas-
ure to adopt themselves children of God, and from thence ... 
proclaim themselves heirs of the world; not a liberty for 
ambition to pull down well-framed constitutions ... not a 
liberty to be Christians so as not to be subjects" (121). 
Supporting the opposite constitutional principle in his 
1667 "Essay Concerning Toleration," he similarly decries 
the propensity of "depraved ambitious human nature" to 
assume "something of a godlike power" in the attempt at 
enforcing uniformity in religious worship (in Fox Bourne 
1876, 1.178). It is in the Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing, however, that Locke presents his most elaborate 
and penetrating analysis of the enthusiastic propensity to 
interpret one's strongest inclinations, however bizarre, as 
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directives from heaven: 
the love of something extraordinary, the Ease and Glory 
it is to be inspired and be above the common and natur-
al ways of Knowledge so flatters many Men's Laziness, 
Ignorance, and Vanity, that when once they are got into 
this way of immediate Revelation ... 'tis a hard matter 
to get them out of it. (4.19.8) 
In attempting to appreciate the extent of Locke's 
respect for the depth and profundity of the human desire 
for dominion at its extremes, it is important for us first 
to notice that the doctrinal expressions of that desire are 
not in Locke's view confined to the realm of theology nar-
rowly conceived. Throughout the Essay, Locke characteris-
tically uses the terms "party" and "sect11108 in reference 
not only to theological, but also to certain philosophical 
schools; whereas the "Romanist[s]" provide a theological 
example, the "Peripatetick[s]," Platonists, and Epicureans 
are examples of "Sect[s] in Philosophy" (3.10.14). More-
over, the philosophical or quasi-philosophical sects in the 
schools that Locke observes firsthand tend paradoxically to 
provide theoretical support for the irrationalism or enthu-
siasm that he finds so prevalent among the theological 
sects. This points to the deeper significance of his sus-
tained and vigorous attack on the scholastic philosophers 
whose dominance over the English universities lingers even 
to his own day. 
108He tends to use these terms interchangeably, as at 
ECHU 4.20.18, where he refers to "the Partisans of most of 
the Sects in the World ... " 
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As we have seen, the "Schoolman and Metaphysicians" 
as Locke presents them are abusers of speech, wholly ab-
sorbed in abstract, purely formal, aridly logical disputa-
tions, arrogantly eschewing any real empirical inquiry. In 
effect, according to Locke, the scholastics are in the 
realm of theory what the "Quarrelsom and Contentious" (TT 
II. 34) are in the realm of practice; their fondness for 
displaying rhetorical virtuosity serves ultimately to 
precipitate an intellectual state of war, wherein words and 
arguments serve as weapons and the purpose for their 
exchange is not to enlighten, but only to prevail (3.10.7; 
also 3.5.16; CU 42). The scholastic conception of argumen-
tation, as Locke presents it, constitutes the theoretical 
or ideological form of willful self-assertion. The crucial 
point here, however, is that the theoretical expressions of 
willfulness do not merely parallel, but also support and 
strengthen the more directly practical forms. The scholas-
tic abusers of words have not confined their attentions to 
mere "logical Niceties, or curious empty Speculations. " 
They have "invaded the great Concernments of Humane Life 
and Society"; they have "obscured and perplexed the materi-
al Truths of Law and Divinity ... and if not destroyed, yet 
in great measure rendered useless, those two great Rules, 
Religion and Justice" (3.10.12,8; also 13). 
Locke repeatedly and emphatically contends that these 
destructive effects proceed from no mere inadvertency, but 
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rather from "wilful Faults and Neglects" (3.10.1). The 
scholastics act as purveyors of "affected Obscurity, "fill-
ing their discourse "with abundance of empty unintelli-
gible noise and jargon" (3.10.6,4), often in a spirit of 
sheer dishonesty, in order "to cover some Weakness of their 
Hypothesis" or to "hinder their weak parts from being dis-
covered" ( 3 . 1 o . 2 , 6) . By marshalling "Legions of obscure, 
doubtful, and undefined Words" to guard their "strange and 
absurd Doctrines" against rational scrutiny, making their 
"Retreats, more like the Dens of Robbers, or Holes of 
Foxes, than the Fortresses of fair Warriours," they have 
sought and in large measure acquired "Glory and Esteem" 
along with "Authority and Dominion" (3.10.8,9; also 12,28). 
In their motives and aspirations as Locke presents them, 
the schoolmen are akin to liars, robbers, and conquerors; 
they are intellectual criminals or even tyrants whose 
subtly, insidiously intellectualized form of criminality 
makes them no less and perhaps at bottom more practically 
dangerous than those less artful in concealing their 
designs.109 Reflecting on the resistance to reason charac-
109zuckert comments that though this is not Locke's 
last word on the subject, "Locke's suggestion as to the 
character of the by-interests is certainly ungracious and 
reflects perhaps worse on him than on those of whom he 
speaks" (1974, 558 n.32). Locke's incivility toward the 
scholastics is obviously incongruous with the spirit of 
modesty and toleration that generally animates the Essay, 
as well as the emphasis on civility in his educational 
writing (STCE 67,93,141-145). The incongruity here seems 
to proceed from Locke's more general attempt at attaching 
our pride to our rationality. The peculiar odiousness and 
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teristic of the partisan enthusiast, Locke wonders "how 
almost can it be otherwise, but that he should be ready to 
impose on others Belief, who has already imposed on his 
own? " ( 4 . 19 . 2 ) . Further, from this implicit warning one 
might draw the corollary that whoever tyrannizes over 
others' faculties can only be expected to tyrannize over 
their bodies, their entire persons, as well. It is after 
all no "small power it gives one Man over another," Locke 
warns, "to have the Authority to be the- Dictator of Princi-
ples, and Teacher of unquestionable Truths" (1.4.24). 
In objecting to scholastic philosophy and theology in 
particular, Locke objects to a mode of thinking that lends 
itself far too easily to the service of the human passion 
for glory or dominion, if indeed it is not at bottom a mere 
projection of that desire. When we reflect on this partic-
ular critique, however, we come to question whether or to 
what extent it applies in Locke's view not merely to late-
medieval scholasticism, but in principle to the rest of the 
dangerousness of Locke's scholastics lie in their implicit 
treatment of arguments as weapons, and interlocutors and 
audiences as potential subjects to be vanquished thereby, 
or as irrational creatures incapable of judging and pursu-
ing their own goods. Scholastic ism then represents an 
affront to our rationality, to our capacity for self-
government, to our very dignity as human beings. Thus 
according to this reading, in the Essay as well as in the 
Two Treatises Locke seeks to fortify human rationality, 
appealing to his readers' natural love of independence as 
the psychological support of a proper respect for reason. 
In seeking to arouse anger at the schoolmen, he seeks to 
arouse anger at irrationality as such. 
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"pre-modern consciousness,"110 the Biblical-Classical moral 
and intellectual tradition. For what seems, according to 
Locke, particularly to suit scholasticism for the service 
of the passions of self-aggrandizement is not only its 
disputatious, polemical mode of reasoning, but also, and 
perhaps more fundamentally, the characteristic objects of 
its reasonings. At one point Locke assimilates to the 
schoolmen "the Philosophers of old," who like the former 
would gain glory "for their great and universal Knowledge" 
(3.10.8). Inasmuch as he immediately qualifies this remark 
by explaining that it is "the disputing and wrangling Phil-
osophers I mean, such as Lucian wittily, and with reason 
taxes, " it is doubtful that Locke intends thus to charac-
terize the great classical Greek philosophers as mere lov-
ers of glory.111 But it is far less doubtful that accor-
llOzuckert 1973, 69. 
lllLocke appends to his remark a footnote directing his 
readers to three of Lucian's comedies in particular: Bis 
Accusatus, Vitarum Auctio, and Convivium. In Bis Accusat-
us, the voice of Justice distinguishes Socrates, whose sin-
cere defense of the worthiness of justice proved ineff ica-
cious, from the contemporary schools of philosophers who 
"quarrel so among themselves," and who "make so free with 
my name" yet "show no inclination at all to put my princi-
ples into practice" (Works 1905, III .14 7-148) . In the 
Essay Locke is notably more generous to Aristotle himself 
than to Aristotle's professed followers among Locke's 
contemporaries, taking pains in the midst of his critique 
of the syllogistic form of reasoning to insist that he 
intends thereby "not ... to lessen Aristotle, whom I look 
upon as one of the greatest Men among the Antients; whose 
large Views, acuteness and penetration of Thought, and 
strength of Judgment, few have equalled" (4.17.4). on the 
other hand, this is by no means to deny the significance of 
Locke's general failure, in his educational writings, to 
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ding to Locke in the nature of the "old," premodern philo-
sophers' publicly professed aspiration to "great and uni-
versal Knowledge" is the power to stimulate the vanity of 
those perhaps least in need of such stimulation. 
Just as Locke holds that the prevalence of scholastic 
disputation bears most heavily on the great human concern-
ments of religion and justice, so he seems more generally 
to view the most important focus of the premodern phi lo-
sophic aspiration as the search for the human "Summum 
bonum" (2. 21. 55). If the love of glory tends to corrupt 
the love of truth or wisdom, then it would seem to follow 
that the pursuit of the highest truths, corresponding to 
the deepest human concernments and thus promising the 
greatest glory to their discoverers,112 is most susceptible 
to this form of corruption.113 In the Second Treatise and 
still more clearly in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 
include the works of Aristotle (to say nothing of his com-
plete neglect of Plato) among the front rank of works he 
recommends for special study. See STCE 185-186. In a 
draft letter to the Countess of Peterborough, Locke allows 
that in the study of "True politics" as "a part of moral 
philosophy ... Aristotle may be best to begin with," supple-
mented later by "more modern writers of government" (in 
Axtell 1968, 395-396). See also "Some Thoughts Concerning 
Reading and Study for a Gentleman," in Axtell 1968, 400, 
403. 
112on the glory of religious founders, cf. Machiavelli, 
The Prince 6; Discourses 1.10. 
113cf. Pangle: "Among civilized and educated men 
influenced by priests, theologians, and philosophers," 
according to Locke, "the most insidiously powerful desire 
is the one for the Summum Bonum" (1988, 184). 
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Locke identifies the most dangerous human desire or the 
"Root of all Evil" as the desire of "having in our Posses-
sion, and under our Dominion, more than we have need of" 
(STCE 110; TT II.37). The human desire of having more than 
we need represents in its extremity a desire to transcend 
once and for all our necessitous, incomplete natural condi-
tion, to achieve a final state of fullness or completion, 
to be perfectly free and absolutely sovereign--to imitate 
and even to identify ourselves with God, or with the high-
est, freest, most powerful being we can conceive of. In 
the Essay's discussion of the power of volition, Locke 
remarks on our good fortune to be determined in willing not 
by the greater prospective good, but rather by the greatest 
uneasiness present to our senses. His immediate intention 
is to explain how many people can maintain a sense of con-
tentment with a "moderate portion of good" or a succession 
of ordinary Enjoyments"; if it were otherwise, "we should 
be constantly and infinitely miserable; there being infi-
nite degrees of happiness, which are not in our possession" 
(2.21.44). But the implication relevant for the present 
argument is that for a person ruled by the expansive de-
sires, a serious contemplation of the infinite, and there-
fore of the infinite degrees of happiness beyond what is 
present to us and especially of "the infinite and eternal 
Joys of Heaven" (2. 21. 38), may very well make life a 
constant and infinite misery. For such people, it would 
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seem, mortal life could be made bearable only by embracing 
the thought that it is within one's power--perhaps by with-
drawing from the world, perhaps by attempting actively to 
recreate it--to achieve the infinite, to obtain for oneself 
the heavenly joy of final completeness or self-sufficiency, 
of the infinite freedom and power whose absence brings such 
misery. 114 
114Locke's view of the moral significance of the fact 
of mortality is complex and difficult. As we have seen, 
according to Locke the human condition of "mediocrity," in-
volving especially the unavailability of any pure, unmixed 
pleasure or happiness, makes some awareness of and reflec-
tion on the possibility of an afterlife unavoidable for 
even a minimally rational person (ECHU 2.7.5, 2.21.46, 
4.20.3,6; see pp. 376-383 above). The moral or legislative 
implications of this fact, however, are problematic. 
First, the natural or unreflective human propensity for 
absorption in the present appears in many people to mini-
mize the effect of this thought on their behavior (2.21.44, 
60; 2.28.9, 12). The suspicion of the greater likelihood 
that death is a mere void or nothingness may do the same 
(2.21.55; Works 1823, 7.6-7). Second, among those over 
whom the thought of an afterlife exercises some significant 
power, it is by no means clear that that power will serve 
the endowment of virtue (7.149-151), or that it will take 
the form of an "expectation" that "carries a constant 
pleasure with it" ("Thus I Think," in King 1830, 307). It 
may produce in the manner presently described an overpower-
ing, expansive desire for the fullness of heaven, or it may 
produce an immoderate, incapacitating fear (STCE 115,191). 
As Strauss observes, Locke goes so far in his unpublished 
work on the law of nature as to hint that "the creation of 
man as a mortal being which knows of its own mortality 
cannot be due to a being which loves man" (1959, 213-214; 
see LN 5.161-163). On the human uneasiness or revulsion at 
the experience of transience, see "Amor Patriae," in King 
1830, 291-292. Cf. the expansive uneasiness Locke fears 
with that of Nietzsche's Zarathustra: "if there were gods, 
how could I endure not to be a god! Hence there are no 
gods" (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 2. 2 [Kaufmann ed. 1954, 
198]). Locke's attempt is to teach us to endure our con-
dition of in-betweenness, to bear not to be God without 
thereby inviting others to act as gods over us. 
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In thus reflecting on the deeper significance of the 
scholastics' intellectual tyranny and of the partisan 
enthusiasts' tendency to proclaim their own opinions as the 
directly revealed word of God, in effect to usurp God's 
dominion, we return ultimately to the fundamental issue, 
namely Locke's respect for the enormous and enormously 
destructive power inherent in "the busy and boundless Fancy 
of Man" (ECHU 2.1.2; also 4.19.3,6,11). "[Tis] Phansye," 
the young Locke writes privately, that "is the great com-
mander of the world" and that "rules us all under the title 
of reason," acting as "the great guide both of the wise and 
the fooleish" (to [Thomas Westrowe], CJL #81, 10/20/1659). 
Locke's emphasis on the moral primacy of the ego or self, 
his insistent explanation of what may appear to be experi-
ences of genuine sociality or self-transcendence as instead 
experiences of mere self-extension or self-expansion, 
reflects his urgently felt need to call attention to the 
sobering ease and frequency with which the human fancy 
seduces its proper governor, or eclipses its "only Star and 
compass," the guiding, directive power of reason (TT I.58). 
The human experiences of love or devotion--for country, for 
family and friends, but especially for God and for reason 
itself--serve in Locke's view as powerful stimuli for our 
fanciful, willful inclination to endow our particular af-
fections with transcendent significance and thereupon to 
demand that others embrace or bow to them. It is only too 
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human, according to Locke, for us to create gods or visions 
of human completion and then to attempt to stride the earth 
as their prophetic messengers, in effect to create or re-
create the world so that we may rule it ourselves. 
Herein lies, then, a plausible rationale for Locke's 
firm refusal to appeal to any vision of human completion as 
a source of moral and political orientation. It is clear 
that the primary business of political philosophy in 
Locke's view is not to raise the aspirations of political 
societies toward ennobling but potentially intoxicating 
visions of the best, but rather to educate them to recog-
nize the constraints imposed by natural necessity and thus 
to prepare them to defend themselves against the worst, to 
assist them in constructing the "best fence against Rebel-
lion" (TT II.226).115 Locke's great respect for the human 
propensity for partisanship, for the corrupting, disorder-
ing power of the human fancy, implies that he may well 
115Grant observes aptly that according to Locke the 
"most important task" of political theory "is to let men 
know what political evil is" (1987, 203). Cf. Mansfield: 
"To cool the ambition of religious fervor and replace it 
with decent calculation of self-interest, Locke sketches 
out a demonstrative morality according to which we are 
wholly absorbed in meeting our necessities. By this view 
we shall find it in our interest always to consult necessi-
ty and live as we must without taking on the risks of en-
terprise" (1989, 208). See also Cox (1960, 165-195) on the 
primacy of foreign policy in Locke's political thought. 
More fundamental in this respect is Locke's emphasis on the 
primacy of pain in human experience. See especially ECHU 
2.1.21, 2.20.6; STCE 126; Locke's journal entry of 7/16/76, 
in Von Leyden 1954, 265-268; and the discussion in Strauss 
1953, 249-251. 
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maintain, in his most serious thinking, the propositions of 
the sovereignty of reason and of the possibility of teleo-
logical moral reasoning, and yet feel rhetorically com-
pelled to de-emphasize .or to render problematic his support 
for such propositions in public, at least to certain por-
tions of his public audience. That the implications of the 
utilitarian strain of Locke's presentation are incontesta-
bly radical and even dangerous does not in itself prove 
that this strain represents Locke's most serious think-
ing; 116 he may well find the implications of the contrary 
alternative more dangerous still. 
We have argued at some length in this chapter and 
those preceding it that Locke's highly self-conscious mod-
esty and openness to empirical evidence, his insistence on 
116contrast Seliger, who asserts that "according to 
[Strauss') "esoteric method the inoffensive views must be 
cancelled; they are intended to mislead the censor and 
protect the writer" (1968, 34). Though he clearly errs in 
conceiving of this manner of interpretation as a precon-
ceived method to be inflexibly applied to the reading of 
any text, Seliger is not wrong in observing a tendency, 
quite commonly justified, among Straussian readers to con-
clude that the most radical statements or implications of 
an esoteric writer must reflect that writer's most serious 
intention. Such conclusions normally rest upon the absence 
of any plausible alternative for explaining the presence of 
textually anomalous statements that it is clearly contrary 
to an author's narrow interest to make. As zuckert points 
out in response to Seliger and others, however, the impera-
tive of self-preservation, and by implication of avoiding 
or concealing "offensive" views, is by no means the only or 
the highest reason for esoteric writing (1978, 63). I am 
suggesting that even Locke's utilitarian or Hobbesian 
strain may not represent his deepest understanding of the 
human condition, but instead may be intended to serve for a 
certain portion of his audience a pedagogical purpose. 
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the possibility of a rational pursuit of happiness over 
against the countervailing forces of passion, custom, 
enthusiasm, and the irrational association of ideas, even 
his acknowledgement of the occasional legitimacy of prerog-
ative power, with its implicit allowance of the limitation 
of the claim of consent by the claim of wisdom, 117 all 
require the sovereignty of reason within the human mind or 
self. When we consider the defensiveness of Locke's 
thought in conjunction with these facts, it seems most 
plausible to infer that Locke maintains in his deeper 
reflections an awareness of the limits of the utilitarian 
principle. On the basis of the available evidence, it 
117wallin maintains that for Locke "Government becomes 
based on consent in a more explicit manner than ever before 
for the very reason that consent or agreement is thought to 
be so arbitrary" (1984, 157). But with respect to the pre-
rogative power of the "wisest and best Princes," Locke com-
ments that "such God-like Princes indeed had some Title to 
Arbitrary Power, by that Argument, that would prove Abso-
lute Monarchy the best Government, as that by which God 
himself governs the Universe by: because such Kings par-
take of his Wisdom and Goodness" (II.165,166). It is true, 
of course, that Locke decisively rejects "that Argument" to 
which he refers; but the fact that he admits the legitimacy 
of prerogative power at all, of executive action "without 
the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even against it" 
(160) in furtherance of the public good, implies an acknow-
ledgement on his part of the claim of genuine wisdom to 
supersede consent, or of the partial force of the classical 
argument in support of a natural right of the wise to rule. 
This means that for Locke wisdom must be distinct from or 
nonreducible to consent, as reason must be distinct from 
and nonreducible to will. Locke's emphasis on consent im-
plies that the sovereignty of reason is politically prob-
lematic; it does not imply the sovereignty of will over 
reason. His difficult discussion of tacit consent seems to 
carry a similar· implication (II.119-122), as does his 
support for the principle of representation (especially 
II.154-158; contrast Rousseau, Social Contract 2.1, 3.15). 
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seems most plausible to infer that Locke's abstraction from 
~' his appeal to a principle of egoistic utilitarianism 
or of the moral primacy of the self and its pursuit of 
happiness as the basis of natural human rights, and further 
his reluctance to present detailed treatments of founda-
tional questions,118 proceed in Locke's own mind less from 
a theoretical than from a merely practical or rhetorical 
necessity. It appears, in other words, that his relative 
narrowing of the political horizon proceeds from a judgment 
less of the ultimate theoretical groundlessness of various 
conceptions of human completion or fulfillment than of 
118Locke begins the concluding chapter of the First 
Treatise by declaring, "The great Question which in all 
Ages has disturbed Mankind, and brought on them the great-
est part of those Mischiefs which have ruin'd cities, de-
populated Countries, and disordered the Peace of the World, 
has been, Not whether there be Power in the World, nor 
whence it came, but who should have it" (I.106). This dec-
laration seems somewhat disingenuous in implying that the 
clarity with which it establishes the title to authority is 
the primary criterion whereby a political theory should be 
judged. To say nothing of other difficulties, Locke's 
awareness of the frequent dependence of disputes over title 
on the question of the foundation of political authority is 
beyond question. As Grant observes, the "first task of 
theory" for Locke "is a normative one ... to identify a stan-
dard of legitimate authority that does not dissolve into 
'might makes right,'" while its second task is to meet the 
criterion of clarity, to "teach us how to recognize who has 
[authority]" (1987, 52-53). In contenting himself expli-
citly to argue against Filmer that the principle of divine 
right cannot meet the criterion of clarity, Locke implies 
that the divine right principle (and by implication, that 
of the natural right of the wise) resolves into an asser-
tion of faith or will. A complete defense of the principle 
of consent then requires a defense of reason against faith 
or will as the proper foundation of politics, a defense 
that Locke is characteristically reluctant to elaborate 
clearly and completely. 
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their public dangerousness. If so, then Locke's break with 
the premodern tradition of political philosophy would be 
much less radical, and the foundations of his liberalism 
more secure, than his most powerful critics allow. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL RIGHTS 
Commenting on the problem of preserving the world's 
most Lockean regime, the young Lincoln insists that "All 
the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined ... could not 
by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on 
the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years." Whatever 
danger may arise "must spring up amongst us. It cannot 
come from abroad'' ("The Perpetuation of Our Political 
Institutions, 11 in Current ed. 1967, 12). Blessed on the 
whole with the most favorable historical conditions, the 
United States in Lincoln's view can best secure itself as a 
free society by securing itself against the dangers gener-
ally incident to free societies, against the dangers to 
which such societies tend naturally to be susceptible. He 
suggests implicitly that the theoretical problem of preser-
ving a free society, of preserving a societal attachment to 
the idea of freedom under law, reduces to the problem of 
forming domestic public opinion. 
Guided by the principle that at least in a free or 
open society, the soundness of the formation of public 
opinion depends in large part upon the soundness of its 
theoretical foundations, we have attempted in the present 
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work to uncover and elucidate the foundations of Lockean 
natural right. In the course of that attempt, we have 
struggled, as virtually all of Locke's commentators have 
struggled, to understand the significance of the extraor-
dinary complexity and difficulty of Locke's political phil-
osophy in general and of his account of natural rights in 
particular, its peculiar apparent resistance to unitary, 
coherent interpretation. We have suggested that that ap-
parent resistance need not reflect a state of theoretical 
confusion on Locke's part, but instead may itself function 
as an integral component of his highly self-conscious 
response to the complexity and difficulty of the problem as 
he understands it. Having completed our investigation, we 
are now in a position to state briefly our understanding 
both of the manner in which Locke holds certain rights to 
be natural and unalienable and of his insight into what is 
essentially problematic about political justice, or into 
the nature of the problem that requires for its solution 
his peculiarly elusive treatment of the doctrine of natural 
rights. Finally, we will attempt to elaborate in somewhat 
broader and more conjectural terms the intention behind and 
the significance of his treatment of that problem. 
Natural rights are natural to human beings, are nat-
urally appropriate to human beings, according to Locke, in 
three main respects. First, it is natural for human beings 
as individuals to assert, or at least to desire the secur-
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ity of, their own rights of life, liberty, and property. 
second, notwithstanding the fact of diversity among_ indi-
viduals, the constitution of our natural desires is such 
that we are naturally capable of, though not instinctively 
driven toward, achieving a general consensus on the right-
fulness of respecting the claims of other persons to rights 
equal to our own. Third, natural rights are appropriate to 
us in the most profound, comprehensive respect, by virtue 
of the unity, dignity, and middling or in-between status of 
humankind in the order of animate being. 
This account of Locke's conception of the naturalness 
of rights carries implications for two broad and related 
scholarly controversies. As we have seen, particularly 
though not exclusively in the past few decades, scholars 
have disagreed radically in their assessments of the funda-
mental coherence or incoherence as well as of the fundamen-
tal traditional ism or modernity of Locke's thought. Our 
own findings support the following general conclusions with 
respect to these issues. However numerous his apparent 
confusions or self-contradictions, Locke can be most plaus-
ibly understood as a fundamentally coherent political 
thinker. The basis of his coherence consists, however, not 
in the essential subordination or reduction of the tradi-
tional or premodern to the modern element of his thought, 
nor even in the subordination of the latter to the former 
as it is commonly conceived, but rather in a peculiar 
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attempt at combining or synthesizing modern and premodern 
elements. "There is no occasion," Locke maintains, "to 
oppose the ancients and the moderns to one another or to be 
squeamish on either side. He that wisely conducts his mind 
in the pursuit of knowledge will gather what lights and get 
what helps he can from either of them, from whom they are 
best to be had" (CU 24). 
Perhaps the most uncommon aspect of this suggestion 
concerns the character of the traditional or premodern, or 
to borrow Tarcov's usage (1983), the "non-Lockean" Locke. 
According to the present reading, the premodern Locke is 
not a faithful expositor of any authoritative revelation, 
nor even fundamentally a theologian, but rather in his most 
serious intention a quasi-Socratic rationalist. As a 
modern, Locke rejects both in its corrupted and original 
forms the classical teleological understanding of nature, 
and proposes its replacement with a conception of nature as 
an aggregation of diverse powers, explainable most precise-
ly in terms of hypothetically formulated laws of material 
and efficient causation. The completeness of his assent to 
modern principles is questionable, however, at least inso-
far as Locke does not draw from the ultimately hypothetical 
character of any scientific or causal account of nature the 
more radically modern inference that we are incapable of 
any reliable knowledge of nature, or that what we please 
ourselves to call "knowledge" is at bottom a pure mental 
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construction. 
Locke insists that the inaccessibility of a genuine, 
comprehensive science of nature need not and should not 
dissuade us from the serious study of nature. It need not, 
because we can gain reliable probabilistic knowledge 
through careful empirical study, through the gathering of 
"natural history," in many cases under the guidance of 
hypotheses involving causality. It should not, because the 
advancement of the empirical study of nature lies very much 
in our practical concernment. Thus the validity of Locke's 
defense of the study of nature rests in part upon conclu-
sions drawn from his study of human nature. But this means 
in turn that in order to perform a natural-historical 
investigation of the human condition and the concernments 
proper to human beings as such, the human understanding 
must maintain an openness to the relevant evidence, must 
operate in the decisive respect in independence of the 
conditions of its own efficient causation. Locke cannot 
then maintain dogmatically, but must instead maintain only 
provisionally, the modern conception of nature. He acknow-
ledges not only that we are inherently incapable of cer-
tainty with respect to propositions involving efficient 
causation, but more importantly that there are natural phe-
nomena--mental operations in particular--whose explanation 
we cannot even conceive in such terms. In this consists 
the basis of the Socratic element of Locke's thinking. 
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Cognizant of its limitations, Locke adopts only partially 
and provisionally the modern conception of nature as a 
realm ruled by the forces of material and efficient causa-
tion; at least his natural-historical account of the human 
condition must rest on a somewhat more "naive," more gen-
uinely empirical investigation. 
For the same reason, Locke's rejection of the specif-
ically classical teleology and its more dogmatic medieval 
variants need not proceed from or entail a categorical 
rejection of the notion of teleology. In conceiving of the 
human nature that is relevant to the foundation of the 
principles of natural human rights, Locke conceives of the 
faculty of reason as engaged in a two-sided relationship 
with the most powerful passions. In its more common, prag-
matic or instrumental manifestations, reason cooperates 
with and even serves the passions; while in its manifesta-
tion as consciousness of our common ignorance or of the 
mysteriousness of the human condition, reason struggles to 
gain independence of the passions. In this way, Locke 
adopts a kind of modernized, attenuated teleology, which 
takes its bearings not from instances of exceptional human 
perfection, but rather from natural, empirical regularities 
or from the "ordinary course of nature." 
The suggestion that Locke's political philosophy pro-
ceeds from a fundamentally Socratic inspiration carries a 
surprising and at least initially problematic implication. 
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It implies the existence of not one, but two exoteric 
Lockes: not only the more prominent Locke who claims an 
intellectual genealogy tracing through Hooker to the roots 
of the Christian natural law tradition, therewith invoking 
religious authority in support of his conception of human 
dependence; but also, with a somewhat more specialized 
intention, the more radically modern Locke who seeks to 
adapt to liberal ends the hedonist subjectivism of Hobbes 
in particular. We might say then that Locke diverges from 
the premodern tradition, ultimately from the Socratic tra-
dition, not radically, not theoretically, but only pruden-
tially or instrumentally. Yet we cannot simply leave the 
matter as it stands; for the question arises whether this 
apparently instrumental divergence in itself entails a deep 
radicalism. Stated in other words, the peculiar implica-
tion of our suggestion is that the appropriate mode of 
preserving or advancing in practice the Socratic principle 
is not, according to Locke, the classical regime or polit-
ical science designed by Socrates and his philosophic 
descendants, but rather the modern regime and political 
science, at the core of which is the modern principle of 
natural rights. What the Socratic premoderns affirm on 
Socratic grounds as a guide to rational action, Locke 
rejects, also, according to our argument, on Socratic 
grounds. The following is an attempt at elaborating some-
what more conjecturally the grounds of Locke's surprising 
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choice to advance his own foundational Socratism at least 
to a significant extent by modern means. 
The point of departure for Locke's deviation from 
premodern natural right teachings appears especially in the 
problematic relation between the second and third proposi-
tions stated above, describing the manner in which Locke 
holds certain rights to be natural. It appears, in other 
words, in the fact that the "ordinary course of nature," as 
manifested throughout human history, hardly provides unam-
biguous support for the principles of natural rights. Nat-
ural rights are most powerfully and persistently, in this 
sense most naturally endangered, in Locke's view, not by 
the material unprovidedness of nature in general, but 
rather by the natural expansiveness of the specifically 
human, mental desires. The implication seems to be that 
the rhetorical advancement of the cause of natural rights 
requires not only the affirmation of the fact of human dig-
nity, but also and perhaps more urgently the de-emphasis of 
and even abstraction from the grounds of human dignity. 
Insofar as arguments elaborating those grounds may tend to 
excite in some readers fanciful dreams of dominion, in par-
ticular in the most clever, most ambitious, most rationally 
adept readers, their unambiguous public presentation may 
serve in the end to harm the cause they are intended to 
advance. 
For this reason, the suspicion arises that the spirit 
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of defensiveness that animates Locke's political thought 
also governs Locke's presentation of his political thought. 
According to this reading, the peculiar problem of natural 
rights in Locke's view would then consist in the tendency 
in practice of even or especially the deepest, most pro-
found and complete accounts of human nature and of the 
naturalness of rights to invite the greatest abuses, to 
reinforce or exacerbate the greatest dangers to the secur-
ing of those rights. Herein lies the broader significance 
of Locke's emphasis in the Second Treatise and elsewhere on 
the centrality of the property right and the justice and 
social beneficence of the productive pursuit of material 
abundance. This emphasis can be misleading in the respect 
that it tends to mask the essentially austere, necessitous 
character of the Lockean political ethic. Somewhat para-
doxically, the Lockean liberation of acquisitiveness repre-
sents in fact an attitude of deference to the powerfully 
necessitous character of the human condition. Locke not 
only acknowledges as legitimate, but in fact urges as a 
natural political imperative the creation of a condition of 
material abundance; the right to acquire is to be protected 
because nature compels us to labor productively, not only 
to relieve or moderate our natural penury, but also to 
stimulate a more active desire for independence among the 
sluggish and to provide benign gratification for the 
expansive desires of many of the more energetic members of 
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the species. In its defensive respect for the power of 
necessity, Locke's political thought can be viewed as 
centering on an act of resistance to the transition that 
Glaucon insists upon in Book 2 of The Republic, the transi-
tion from the necessitous to the luxurious or feverish city 
(369b-373e). The Second Treatise in this way presents a 
liberalized, technologically fortified version of the Pla-
tonic "city of sows," and thus denies, despite its emphasis 
on the creation of abundance, any public significance to 
the liberal arts, the leisured pursuits that might fulfill 
the lives and redeem the labors of its inhabitants. 
In short, Locke seems more deeply impressed than 
Plato himself by the Platonic insight of the kinship be-
tween eros and tyranny (Republic 571a-580a; cf. Strauss 
1964, 110-111, 133), to the point that he seeks to defend 
the commonwealth against tyranny by banishing at least the 
most prominent forms of eros from public life. The enor-
mous disordering power of the human fancy, which Locke 
seems implicitly to accuse the premoderns of underapprec-
iating, greatly magnifies the enduring political problem of 
authenticating the claims of wisdom to the unwise and 
therewith intensifies the need to separate philosophy from 
political life, to deny for practical purposes that wisdom 
or philosophy as such has any superior legislative claim. 
The dangers to public well-being posed by private fancies 
are so persistent and so severe, in Locke's estimation, 
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that any vision of human happiness or completion that tends 
to enflame such fancies, including the life of reason as 
the classics presented it, must be at least to a consider-
able extent relegated to private life along with the activ-
ities of the fancy proper. 
As a rationale for his deviation from premodern nat-
ural right, however, Locke's appeal to the fundamentally 
necessitous character of the natural human condition as 
thus described remains partial or one-dimensional. It is 
useful in this connection first to observe that the tradi-
tion of premodern natural right hardly manifests an obliv-
iousness to the disorderly potential of the human mind. 
The Socrates of Plato's Republic, to cite perhaps the 
clearest example to the contrary, remarks not only upon 
the presence in virtually all human souls of "beastly and 
wild, " tyrannical desires that emerge commonly in dreams, 
unrestrained by "shame and prudence," but also upon the 
power of a partial education in philosophy to liberate or 
inflame those desires, producing the most degenerate forms 
of human being (571c-d, 491a-492c, 495a-b; cf. Aristotle, 
Politics 2. 7.11-13,19). It clearly strains credulity to 
charge the major figures of the premodern natural right 
tradition, originally inspired by a reflection on the 
meaning of the life and death of Socrates, with insensitiv-
ity to the dangerousness of philosophy or of any truly 
ennobling vision of virtue or completion to the political 
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community (cf. Republic 539c). The disagreement between 
Lockean and premodern natural right would appear then to 
consist less in their divergent estimates of the power of 
the fancy or of the human propensity for madness than in 
their conceptions of the most appropriate or efficacious 
remedy for the mind's peculiar diseases. At issue, in 
other words, would be the most appropriate or efficacious 
manner of communicating and therewith cultivating and 
preserving respect for the human condition of "mediocrity" 
or in-betweenness. 
In Plato's Republic's implicit teaching of the endur-
ing tension between love of one's own and love of the good 
(419a-421c, 472a-473b, 499b-c, 501a, 519d-52lb, 541a), for 
instance, as well as in Aristotle's more straightforward 
observation in the Politics of the naturalness of the 
desire for private property and therefore of the need for 
balancing the competing claims of virtue and consent in 
constituting a legitimate regime (2.5.8, 3.10.4, 3.11.7; 
cf. 7. 14. 12) , appears a recognition on the part of the 
founders of classical natural right of the enduring power 
of necessity over political life and human life. The char-
acteristic classical emphasis on the priority of virtue or 
wisdom to consent, of the liberal to the necessitarian pur-
suits, most generally of the sphere of peace to that of 
war, in no way reflects an opinion that the sway of neces-
sity can be simply overcome at the political level, but to 
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the contrary proceeds at least in part from a conviction 
that a genuine respect for the limits of political life or 
political strivings requires in the end an affirmative 
conception, a publically superintending and in some manner 
authoritative conception of the good or the admirable for 
the sake of which one willingly restrains the fanciful, 
antisocial desires. 
Thus a certain confidence in the proposition that a 
teleological conception of human virtue and the human good 
can serve to limit as well as to elevate human strivings in 
and out of the political arena underlies the general pre-
modern insistence on viewing the question of political 
legitimacy in the light of the question of the best regime, 
just as it underlies the general premodern rejection of 
"egalitarian natural right" in favor of a more meritocratic 
or aristocratic conception of the proper ordering of a 
political community (Strauss 1953, 131-143). The serious 
cultivation of virtue, in this view, requires directly or 
indirectly the political rule of virtue. It requires that 
the healthy community feature an ordering of rank among the 
various classes that compose it, that it distribute of-
fices, honors, and influence among those classes not simply 
equally, but in accordance with the nature and extent of 
their respective contributions to the maintenance and 
especially the perfection of the regime (Aristotle, Poli-
tics 3. 7-3 .13) . In its highest or purest instantiation, 
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this ordering of rank according to virtue would entail the 
absolute rule of the wise, while in its less pure, more 
practically accommodating forms, it would entail a mixed 
regime, combining the more partial interests and principles 
with whatever approximation of the aristocratic principle 
prevailing circumstances might permit (Plato, Republic 
473d-e; Aristotle, Politics 3.13.24-25, 4.1.3-7, 4.7, 
4.8.3-10; Cicero, Republic 1.26,29-30,35-41, 2.1-2,11,23). 
The need to mix or dilute the aristocratic principle 
with lower interests or principles, or in other words to 
qualify pure merit or virtue as the requisite of rulership 
by the lower requisite of the consent of the governed, 
derives from the practical impossibility or extreme unlike-
lihood of the direct rule of reason in political life. 
Even in the most favorable circumstances, the unphilosophic 
character of the governed requires that their consent be 
secured by means of an unphilosophic appeal or "noble lie" 
(Plato, Republic 377a-383c, 389b-c, 414c-415d, 459d). In 
more ordinary circumstances, such an appeal seems in some 
form to influence governors as well as governed, inasmuch 
as, however refined their practical wisdom, the aristocrat-
ic gentlemen who occupy the highest or the most important 
offices in the classical mixed regime belong ultimately 
among the unphilosophic, among the bearers of faith or 
moral commitment (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1094b29-
1095a14, 1095b4-5; Politics 7.8.7, 7.9.4,5,9). The classi-
431 
cal mixed regime can therefore remain informed by a high 
rational principle to the extent that its ruling aristoc-
racy cultivates a respect if not an affinity for theoret-
ical as well as moral virtue and possesses the leisure 
required for the most gifted and independent of its members 
or of their offspring to pursue the life of reason in the 
fullest sense. Under such conditions, the indirect legis-
lative influence of philosophy injects an element of open-
ness into the general atmosphere of closure that pervades 
the regime as a moral community, thus preventing the moral 
bond of the community from degenerating into a species of 
tribalism (Strauss 1964, 28). At the same time, philosophy 
itself in this view seems best to renew a sense of its own 
limits, and thus to preserve the purity of its own rational 
striving, through a serious and continuing confrontation 
with the realm of moral commitment or of faithful devotion 
to the sacred (Strauss 1979; Strauss 1983, 147-173; Pangle 
1983, 18-26). 
From the perspective of classic or premodern natural 
right, the Lockean political science, elaborating a funda-
mentally egalitarian regime or according the principle of 
consent a status of primacy relative to that of wisdom or 
virtue, runs the risk of neglecting and thus undermining 
the communal or political supports required for the culti-
vation of reason as a truly independent, regulatory power. 
Notwithstanding his suggestion that "if those of [the gen-
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tleman's] rank are by their Education once set right, they 
will quickly bring all the rest into order" (STCE "Epistle 
Dedicatory"; cf. Horwitz 1979, 142), Locke recommends 
measures with respect to the formation of a gentlemanly 
class, as well as of a more distinctly intellectual class, 
that may tend to diminish significantly the capacity of 
such classes to function as genuine elites. Apparently 
moved by an acute sensitivity to the fragility of political 
consensus, and thus by a heightened concern to formulate an 
effective principle of political mixture, Locke elevates 
the principles of Cartesian subjectivity and of the vir-
tually all-encompassing sway of natural necessity to a 
status of prominence or even primacy in his political 
ethic, with the result, according to this view, that he 
renders somewhat obscure the grounds for the principle of 
the sovereignty of reason within the human self or soul, 
upon which his doctrine of justice ultimately depends. 
In speaking to what would appear to be his most 
intellectually refined audience, Locke certainly allows 
greater visibility to his levelling conception of the pur-
suit of happiness than to his Socratic inspiration. He 
refuses to present in the more classically Socratic manner 
a comparative analysis of or dialectical confrontation 
between the various regimes or ways of living, and tends to 
state the principles of natural right in a relatively 
dogmatic or doctrinaire manner, apparently in order to 
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minimize the constitutional or legislative importance of 
the distinctive virtue of prudence (cf. Mansfield 1989, 
209-210). Above all, he refuses to provide an explicit 
account of the specifically philosophical way of living, 
instead placing his main emphasis on an account of science 
as proceeding from an essentially technological inspira-
tion. In providing for the formation of a more practically 
oriented, more directly influential class, Locke relies for 
a primary principle of political mixture on an ethic of 
rational, industrious, productive acquisitiveness, under-
lining his emphasis on the power and scope of natural 
necessity by his doctrine of the rationality of endless 
striving for endless increase and its corollary in his 
replacement of the classical concept of leisure with the 
more modern or utilitarian concept of "recreation" (STCE 
108, 206) . Perhaps most tellingly, the Lockean education 
relies heavily on the cultivation in its pupils of a 
heightened desire for esteem or sensitivity to the opinions 
of others, with the consequence that the Lockean gentry may 
tend to value civility over independence of spirit, and 
therefore may prove an insufficient check against the con-
formist tendencies of modern egalitarian societies (Strauss 
1959, 38; Pangle 1988, 227-229,264-266,272). 
The upshot seems to be that if Socrates is willing to 
risk the emergence of an Alcibiades in order to preserve 
the possibility of cultivating a Plato, Locke seems intent 
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on suppressing the likes of Alcibiades, even at the cost of 
malnourishing those natures out of which, properly tended, 
the likes of Plato may develop. The general failure of the 
older political science to promote or to generate moderate 
forms of political practice may indeed lend considerable 
force to Locke's critique. Yet, to repeat, the danger is 
that in his sensitivity to the susceptibility of the doc-
trines of classical natural right to capture and misuse by 
the willful, Locke proposes a remedy that involves an 
oscillation to the opposite extreme, thus overlooking the 
potential in the principle of subjectivity or in the denial 
of a proper human orientation by the transcendent to sup-
port even more extreme and self-consciously arbitrary forms 
of willfulness, to effect a fuller eclipse of reason than 
had ever been accomplished in the corrupted practical forms 
of classical or premodern natural right. 
The core dilemma of Lockean liberalism, as perhaps 
for modern liberalism in general, lies in the fact that 
while, cognizant of the danger and practical likelihood of 
enthroning malevolent impostors, it declines to honor the 
claim of superior reason to public sovereignty, it all the 
more firmly requires the sovereignty of reason in private, 
requiring of individuals that they rationally consent to 
government and rationally pursue private happiness. An 
overemphasis of the sovereignty of reason carries the dan-
ger of emboldening the ambitions of those unreasonably 
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proud of their own rationality. Yet an underemphasis of 
the same carries the danger of teaching the complete pri-
vacy of reason and of therewith facilitating the overwhel-
ming of the public by the private realm, led by those who 
make no pretense of rationality, but who proclaim merely 
the most powerful faith or the strongest will. In the lat-
ter dimension of the dilemma, then, if Locke abstracts too 
completely from the ultimate aims of rational action, if he 
too thoroughly ostracizes philosophy from public life, he 
may leave reason powerless beyond the dictates of mere 
instrumental calculation to regulate the forces of irra-
tionalism or willfulness, and thus leave the political 
sphere to be ruled by pure ideology. If he attempts too 
one-sidedly to erect a defense against tyranny, he may 
unwittingly unsettle the theoretical grounds for objecting 
to tyranny. It would seem then that Locke's diagnosis 
leads him to confront the possibility that the major theo-
retical alternatives, the classical or premodern teleology 
as well as the radically modern antiteleological view, 
carry unacceptable dangers as public teachings, insofar as 
each tends in its way to excite or flatter the human fancy. 
Absent a viable alternative or middle ground, it would seem 
that Locke's estimate of the power of the fancy must yield 
a Hobbesian or even Nietzschean conception of the human 
condition, according to which a willful politics of one 
form or another is all but unavoidable, a truly liberal, 
436 
moderate, reasonable politics all but unattainable. 
Given that he provides ample indication of an aware-
ness of the dangers presented by both extremes, it seems 
reasonable for us to view Locke's foundational ambiguities, 
his peculiar apparent oscillation between premodern and 
modern, teleological and nonteleological arguments, as 
necessitated by the delicacy of his task in addressing this 
dilemma. The middling solution that Locke seeks seems to 
require the partial, practical or political, not total, 
radical or theoretical, privatization of the quest for the 
human good or human completion. It requires the deflation 
of the legislative aspirations of visionaries of human 
salvation or perfection, while requiring also the preserva-
tion of a notion of human dignity that seems to depend 
ultimately on a conception of the human good. 
In accordance with these requirements, Locke seems to 
intend the ostracism from public life of philosophy in its 
classic form, with its implicit or explicit persuasion of 
its own sovereign dignity, while yet intending the preser-
vation or even enhancement of the public stature of reason. 
Thus if it is unsafe for philosophy to appear fully exposed 
in public, according to Locke (see e.g. ECRU 2.21.20), it 
may be safer and even salutary for it to appear in public 
as it were partially exposed, as the new "natural philoso-
phy" or at least as "Under-Labourer" to the same. By hon-
oring the new natural philosophy and its eminent "Master-
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Builders" as an exemplary employment of human reason, Locke 
advances his public purposes in the following ways. He 
establishes by this means a prominent public model of devo-
tion to reason and truth, of openness to the persuasive 
power of evidence and rational argumentation, and at the 
same time honors a form of reasoning or of the pursuit of 
truth that promises to generate very substantial utilitar-
ian benefits while carrying in itself no significant legis-
lative aspirations. He seems to calculate that the pur-
suance of this strategy will serve not only to facilitate 
the production of at least that level of material abundance 
required for the establishment of a general, societal con-
sensus on the protection of property rights as a core prin-
ciple of justice, but also to lay the public foundation for 
the promotion of a societal respect for reason in the most 
generally accessible manner. It will tighten as it lends 
greater visibility to the bond between truth and utility, 
encouraging a conception of truth, if as a means, then as 
an indispensable means to public and private utility or 
happiness. Moreover, to honor scientific explorations of 
the infinite mysteries of material nature may provide some 
publically salutary direction for the indulgence of the 
more expansive yearnings of the intellectually refined or 
sophisticated class; in minimizing his ostracism of the 
latter, Locke may well minimize the potential for cultivat-
ing enemies of the regime, and further reinforce his claim 
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to have identified the grounds of rational consensus on a 
principle of justice that, of the available alternatives, 
would be both least dangerous and fairest to all concerned. 
The question persists, however, concerning the extent 
to which this casting of philosophy in the role of under-
laborer or handmaiden of an essentially mechanistic or 
nonteleological natural science can promote among the most 
intellectually adept members of society the requisite devo-
tion either to the principle of reason or to the Lockean 
regime. Granted, there can be little doubt that in obser-
ving that "most Men cannot ... be at quiet in their Minds, 
without some Foundation of Principles to rest their 
Thoughts on," Locke refers to the educated as well as to 
the uneducated classes (ECHU 1. 3. 24) . Insofar as the 
desire for foundations frequently overpowers the desire for 
rational foundations, Locke would have reason to believe 
that many members even of his society's intellectual elite 
will espouse some version of his rationalized Christianity 
or of his workmanship argument, and therewith the equali-
tarian moral implications he adumbrates, and that others 
more secularly inclined but perhaps chastened by his insis-
tent illustrations of the fragility of reason and the 
grotesque extremes to which fanciful visions of dominion or 
completion can carry us, will see in the utilitarian prin-
ciple an adequate foundation for the same equalitarian 
morality. Yet, just as it strains credulity to suggest 
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that Locke himself is unaware of the intrinsic weaknesses 
of such arguments, so it is equally implausible to attrib-
ute to Locke, who after all is repeatedly compelled by 
contemporary critics to respond to charges of Hobbesian 
skepticism and nihilism, the opinion that none of his 
readers would be cognizant of those weaknesses. It seems 
further implausible, in view of Locke's great sensitivity 
to the human mind's susceptibility to disorder, to suggest 
that he could simply fail to consider the possibility that 
a few of the most ambitious and intellectually radical of 
his readers would find in his utilitarian relativism in 
particular an implicit invitation to reduce morality and 
justice to sheer willfulness and thus to formulate new, 
modern sectarianisms, secular fancies of human completion. 
It may well be a part of Locke's calculation that the 
human desire for foundational principles is ordinarily of 
such power as to engender a certain popular resistance to 
the principle of subjectivity, thus enabling him to employ 
the latter as a monitory corrective of the excesses to 
which an embrace of the contrary principle of natural pro-
videdness may lead, confident that the principle of subjec-
tivity will not take root so deeply as to supplant or 
undermine all other, more genuinely moral, foundational 
principles. His critique of the implications of moral 
innatism (ECHU 1. 3) clearly indicates his opinion of the 
enervating and corrupting effect of the presumption of a 
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morally provided world, while his suggestion of the super-
iority of civil to philosophic discourse seems to indicate 
a calculation of the potentially salutary effect of a 
teaching of pragmatism and provisional subjectivism in 
cultivating a genuine respect for reason and for the 
rational conception and pursuit of happiness (cf. ECHU 
3.11.10 with 3.5.16, 3.6.24, 3.9.21, 3.10.8-13). Carrying 
this calculation further, Locke may reason that if by prop-
agating the principle of subjectivity he weakens or removes 
the moral constraints on willful thought and action on the 
part of those relative few capable of appreciating the 
radical implications of that principle, then by the same 
means he also prepares the majority of the Lockean regime's 
subjects to recognize assertions of willfulness as such, 
and consequently to resist them. 
Yet it is not quite sufficient to conclude simply 
that if Locke finds it in the end impossible to formulate a 
political theory that eliminates the potential for abuse, 
he elects in accordance with this somewhat Machiavellian 
calculation to risk the sorts of abuse attendant upon the 
principle of subjectivity rather than those associated with 
the premodern orientation toward a state of completion or 
perfection. Taking advantage of the hindsight afforded by 
the experience of the past two centuries in particular, we 
can hardly avoid questioning the soundness of any judgment 
to the effect that the desire for moral foundations engen-
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ders an ordinary human resistance to demoralization, and 
therefore that the propagation of the principle of moral 
subjectivism can serve reliably to immunize at least the 
majority of human beings against assenting to the fanciful, 
fanatical dreams of a few. That Locke himself already 
questions the soundness of such a judgment or that he takes 
seriously the possibility of popular demoralization is 
evident in the attention that he devotes to constructing 
the "best Fence against Rebellion" by cultivating in his 
respectably acquisitive gentry and laboring class alike a 
spirited, defensive, jealous love of privacy or indepen-
dence. Implicit in this attempt appears to be a conception 
of the proper or salutary role of the philosopher as that 
of an underlaborer not only in the realm of scientific 
inquiry, but also in that of political morality. Imitating 
nature as he presents it or proceeding in the manner of a 
judicious parent or educator, Locke insists upon the spe-
cific "Dignity and Excellency" of rational creatures and on 
the estimable, dignifying character of the rational pursuit 
of happiness, while permitting himself to provide only the 
scattered materials or seeds of arguments pointing toward 
the nature of human happiness or of the various goods prop-
er to rational beings. The political task of the philoso-
pher according to Locke appears to involve the cultivation 
of reason in nonphilosophers, not by directly instructing 
them in the content of their proper happiness, but by pro-
442 
rooting, and supplying the rationale for the political pro-
tection of, their own active, industrious reflection on the 
nature of a life well-lived. 
Thus in his exhortations to his readership and by 
extension to all .members of society insofar as it lies in 
their capacity to take care in reasoning about their own 
proper happiness, we might find Locke's implicit response 
to the charge that in promoting civility and a sensitivity 
to esteem he prepares the undermining of the moral indepen-
dence and courage from which one draws the strength to 
resist the recurring tides of irrationalism. While the 
Lockean education clearly does involve an attempt at form-
ing the class of gentry in particular as creatures of es-
teem, it appears nonetheless Locke's intention that they be 
bred to consider themselves estimable insofar as they are 
rational, self-disposing, self-providing, independent pro-
prietors. It may then represent a dictate of pedagogical 
prudence for Locke to leave his political philosophy in a 
condition of incompleteness, such that it points beyond it-
self to its completion in the private thoughts of the sub-
jects of the Lockean regime. By thus limiting or obscuring 
the legislative authority of philosophy, Locke facilitates 
the cul ti vat ion of a nonphilosophic or aphilosophic yet 
firmly rationalistic people, of the sort that Tocqueville 
finds exemplified in the Americans of the early nineteenth 
century (Democracy in America 2.1.1,2). 
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In this appears to consist the theoretical core of 
Locke's middling or moderating approach to the liberal 
dilemma. Philosophy is to serve in public as underlaborer 
not only to the new science or sciences of nature, but also 
to moral and political reasoning; and in the latter capac-
ity, it is to serve not only a negative, critical function, 
but also a pedagogical, even exhortative function in seek-
ing to raise in nonphilosophers an energizing sense of 
their own rational dignity. But this means that even the 
Lockean regime seems to require the indirect rule of phil-
osophy, if in a much more indirect way than the best regime 
according to premodern or classical political philosophy 
would require. For to the extent to which we recognize the 
nonphilosophic character of the various appeals whereby 
Locke seeks to establish in the public mind the legitimacy 
of the Lockean regime--in particular, of his appeals to the 
workmanship principle or to a more secularized, more util-
itarian doctrine of rights, along with his assertive insis-
tence on the principle of common human dignity--it becomes 
all the more necessary for the propagators of such appeals 
to recognize their deeper, more defensibly philosophical 
justification. In order for such appeals to serve effec-
tively as noble lies, lest they be contemptuously debunked 
and replaced by more radical, allegedly more coherent ideo-
logical constructions, the merit or nobility of the prin-
ciple they serve must be evident to those cognizant of 
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their intrinsic weaknesses. The implication, to repeat, is 
that notwithstanding his visible ostracism of philosophy or 
of any claim to wisdom concerning the comprehensive human 
good, Locke is compelled by the logic of his own argument 
to care about and if possible to take measures to provide 
for the cultivation, if not of philosophy itself, at least 
of a rational elite sufficiently philosophic in character 
to reflect upon and thus preserve the ordering experience 
of openness or in-betweenness that alone can serve as the 
foundation for his teaching of rights. 
Herein then lies the ultimate question for Lockean 
politics. If we are correct in viewing Locke as a Socratic 
revisionist, attempting to promote essentially Socratic 
ends by decidedly non-Socratic means, then the wisdom or 
reasonableness of Locke's revision seems to depend most 
fundamentally upon the capacity of the most apparently non-
Socratic means to promote the highest Socratic ends. In 
contrast to Socrates or to Plato, Locke does not present 
philosophy as emerging from and struggling to achieve clar-
ity in an endless dialogue with various representatives of 
the realm of faith; he seems to intend, if not simply to 
bring that dialogue to a final resolution, at least to 
obscure the centrality of its role in sustaining the life 
of reason (cf. Pangle 1988, 273-274). Viewed in the light 
of his apparent preference of the modern natural scientists 
to the def enders of the faith as conversation partners, 
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Locke's repeated emphasis of the inherent limitations of 
the formers' enterprise carries potentially great signif-
icance. From this insistence on the theoretical limita-
tions of the modern scientific perspective, one might draw 
either or both of two implications. On the one hand, 
accepting without necessarily attempting to ascend from the 
partiality of the truths produced within the scientific 
perspective, one might infer that the aim of scientific 
endeavor is not truth or knowledge as such, but instead 
power. On the other hand, one might find implicit in its 
limitations the need to transcend the scientific perspec-
tive, to ascend from its partial truths to a fuller, more 
specifically philosophic reflection on the openness of the 
human understanding to the ultimate mysteriousness of the 
order of nature. 
In insisting both on the theoretical limitations of 
the perspective of modern natural science and on his own 
nonutilitarian devotion to the truth, Locke clearly lays 
the foundation for a more genuinely philosophic ascent from 
that perspective. Insofar as a clear recognition of the 
limits of the scientific perspective represents for Locke a 
prerequisite of sound moral reasoning, we may take these 
insistences as Locke's implicit suggestion that his or the 
Lockean philosopher's function as moral underlaborer in the 
end supersedes or comprehends his function as scientific 
underlaborer. Yet, to state it once more, it is clear also 
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that, apparently with a view toward promoting the creation 
of the material abundance required both to broaden the 
civility of the gentry and to facilitate the elevation of 
the class of common laborers, Locke much more emphatically 
directs the readers of the Essay toward technological or 
power-oriented than toward contemplative pursuits. As 
moral underlaborer, the Lockean philosopher serves primar-
ily, most visibly or vocally, the advancement of pragmatic 
concerns, not the advancement of the cause of philosophy 
itself. Insofar as we are justified in viewing it as the 
product of rational deliberation or choice, Locke's polit-
ically narrowed or partialized presentation of philosophy 
appears to proceed from his calculation that the pursuit of 
power and the pursuit of truth can be linked with suffic-
ient firmness that a recognition of the limits of our com-
prehension of the latter can serve to bring into view also 
the proper limits of our desire or demand for the former. 
His de-emphasis of philosophy as such appears to rest, in 
other words, on a calculated, qualified confidence that 
philosophy could emerge more safely in the course of a 
dialogue with modern natural science than in a dialogue 
with revealed religion in one form or another, or that it 
would confront less inherent resistance and thus require 
less explicit cultivation in a society formed by the influ-
ence of modern science than in a society formed predom-
inantly by the influence of religion. If so, then for that 
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very reason the characteristic danger for the Lockean or 
modern liberal regime becomes the danger of succumbing to 
"the charm of competence" (Strauss 1959, 40) or of lapsing 
into a state of intoxication by its own unprecedented tech-
nological prowess. The essential challenge for that regime 
must then be to preserve or to reinvigorate a societal con-
sciousness of the limits of human power, rooted in turn in 
a consciousness among the regime's rational elite of the 
grounds of the principles of human freedom and dignity that 
such power is to serve. Locke seems to calculate that he 
does as much as is necessary or prudentially advisable to 
nurture such a consciousness, in preparing but only prepar-
ing the way for a continuing reflection on the limits of 
human science and power, thus leaving it for others to 
reproduce in private the reflections that he himself seems 
to engage in for the most part in private as well. 
Let us return, in closing, to the question with which 
we began. In arguing for the likelihood that Locke's util-
itarianism in particular does not represent his deepest 
reflection concerning the foundation of the natural rights 
principle, but proceeds instead from an essentially 
instrumental calculation concerning the most effective 
rhetorical and constitutional strategy for advancing that 
principle, we have been attempting to rethink the distinc-
tion between what is essential and what accidental, what is 
the core and what the exterior in Locke's political 
thought. 
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If we are correct in suggesting that the core of 
Lockean natural rights is not utilitarianism, not simply an 
arbitrarily equalitarian expression of will-to-power, but 
rather a partially classical, moderately teleological, gen-
uinely empirical conception of human nature, then the roots 
of the contemporary opinion of the infirmity of the founda-
tions of classical liberalism would require some similar 
rethinking. On the part of those sympathetic to attempts 
at constructing more radically modern foundations for lib-
eral theory, 
element of 
this might involve a reconsideration of the 
common sense that endures in the midst of 
Locke's critical epistemology, and in particular of his 
defense of probabilistic judgments about nature and his 
demonstration of the arbitrariness that follows from their 
rejection. Conversely, for those inclined to reject Locke 
al together and attempt the recovery of purely classical 
foundations for modern liberalism, it may be worthwhile to 
reconsider not only the element of classical thinking that 
endures in Locke, but also the reasoning behind Locke's 
reluctance both to preserve more than this element of pre-
modernism and to present unambiguously the element that he 
does preserve. 
In arguing in this manner for a reconsideration of 
what is the core or the spirit of Locke's political phil-
osophy, we are suggesting primarily that the relative 
resilience of the Lockean regime in practice may be less 
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accidentally, more essentially related to Locke's theoret-
ical provision than his most severe and powerful critics 
maintain. In making this suggestion, we grant that the 
long-term resilience of that regime remains at this point 
an open question, and therefore by no means deny the rea-
sonableness of wondering whether over the long term Locke 
miscalculates or calculates one-sidedly the dangers of 
serious public theological or teleological reasoning, or 
whether Locke's partial or political modernism may be less 
efficacious in defending the health of the Lockean regime 
against the challenge posed by theoretical modernism than 
against that posed by corrupted premodern principles. The 
effect of the present argument is to deny not the legit-
imacy of such doubts, but only their radical character and 
implications. Our reconsideration of the core of Locke's 
intention suggests a flexibility in Locke's political 
thought, such that should the need arise, it could accom-
modate as a matter more of rhetorical adjustment rather of 
radical alteration the formulation of a more forceful and 
straightforward defense of the sovereignty of reason and 
the grounds of human dignity. If we judge it necessary at 
some point to ascend from the principles of utilitarianism 
or relativism upon which Locke seems content at times to 
rest his political thought, we may do so, according to this 
argument, in the understanding that Locke's assent to such 
principles is at best partial and serves a moderate inten-
tion. 
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In appealing to such principles in a manner that 
invites at least some of his readers to seek to ascend from 
them, Locke enables those readers to conceive of the req-
uisite ascent as an ascent within, not beyond the bounda-
ries of his political thought. Thus understood, the per-
plexities of Locke reflect not confusion or thoughtlessness 
on Locke's part, but are made necessary by the difficulty 
and delicacy of his task of at once explaining and advan-
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